Network centrality and mergers

We hypothesize that the more central a firm in the customer-supplier network the lower is its returns from an acquisition. We find that the acquirers’ announcement day abnormal returns decline if the acquirer is more central in the network. Additionally, the target’s premiums decline if the target is more central in the network. Lastly, we also find that conditioned on the acquirer’s centrality, the acquirer’s announcement day abnormal returns increase if more information is available about the target. The centrality of the firm represents information availability of the firm. Thus, information availability may lead to a decline in acquisition returns

Pandemics and Cash

We investigate the relationship between firms’ cash holdings and pandemics. Our results show that as compared to tele-workable firms, whose employees can work remotely, non-tele-workable firms with more on-site employees increase cash during pandemics. This increase in cash comes from short-debt, preferred stocks, reduction in capital expenditures and discontinuation of some operations. Firms hold more cash as a reaction to higher default risk. For non-tele-workable firms, there is a positive relationship between abnormal stock returns and cash, suggesting that this increase in cash during pandemics is not driven by behavioral reasons, but by increases in uncertainty in labor productivity

CEOs religious affiliation and managerial conservatism

We investigate whether manager’s religious affiliations affect corporate decisions. We hand collect data on the religious affiliations of CEOs and find that firms with Catholic CEOs have less leverage, issue debt less often, increase business and geographic diversification, and invest less than firms with Protestant CEOs. We also find that the decisions of Catholic CEOs are associated with lower firm value. These corporate actions are also reflected in the CEOs’ personal decisions, such as owning fewer company stocks and playing less risky sports

The decline in stock exchange listed firms

The number of exchange-listed firms has declined dramatically in the U.S. We argue that increases in payroll cost decrease the firm’s output and consequently, the need for capital. Thus, fewer new firms list on exchanges. Similarly, more firms delist as payroll costs reduce profits. We find empirical results that support our hypotheses. The results are stronger when firms are located in areas with greater regulatory restrictions on residential use of land - suggesting that increases in payroll costs is one of the factors driving this phenomenon

It pays to partner with a firm that writes annual reports well

We use strategic alliances as a setting to examine whether the readability of a firm’s partner’s 10-K matters. We find that the increase in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the announcement of an alliance is relatively lower when the firm’s partner in a strategic alliance has a less readable 10-K report. Additional tests show that the impact of the readability of a partner’s 10-K is much stronger when investors suspect insufficient due diligence before the alliance’s formation, when the partner is from a different industry, and when the alliance occurs before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Overall, our results show that the readability of a partner’s annual report matters—it pays to partner with a firm that writes these reports well

Industry Networks and IPO Waves

We offer a new perspective on why initial public offerings (IPO) occur in waves and propose that the customer-supplier relationships among industries help propagate IPO waves. Our empirical tests provide evidence that demand shocks increase the number of IPOs in an industry. The shocks then spread upstream through customer relationships leading to an increase in the number of IPOs in more central and connected industries. These findings contribute to the IPO literature by demonstrating the channel through which IPO waves propagate

Information Asymmetry About Investment Risk and Financing Choice

Though it is generally accepted that information asymmetry has an impact on capital structure policy, the nature of the information asymmetry is not well understood. Recent theoretical work and empirical evidence suggests that financing choice depends upon the information asymmetry associated with the investment risk of the particular use of proceeds. Consistent with this view, using the sources and uses of funds framework, we find that equity is used to fund projects with greater information asymmetry about their risk such as research and development expenditure, while debt is used to fund investments with lower information asymmetry about their risk such as liquidity enhancement

Does policy uncertainty increase relational risks? Evidence from strategic alliances

Prior studies on capital investments, including mergers and acquisitions, point to investment irreversibility as the primary factor behind diminished investments during periods of increased policy uncertainty. We show that increased relational risk, due to the potential for counterparty misbehavior or shirking and higher contracting costs, appears to be the primary driver behind the diminished propensity to undertake strategic alliances during enhanced policy uncertainty regimes. Alliances are even less likely during such times when they (a) involve more than two firms, (b) are in industries with greater counterparty risk, and (c) involve partners that require intense contracts

The relationship between underinvestment, overinvestment and CEO\u27s compensation

This research separates out the incentive and entrenchment effects of executive pay and uses it to test if the agency cost is that of underinvestment or overinvestment. I find that investments increase with dollar value of stock and options owned by the CEO but decrease with percentage of shares owned by the CEO. These results are robust to alternate measures of investments such as R&D, acquisitions, and change in assets. It appears that the positive relationship between investment and percentage of stocks owned by the CEO, as observed in the literature, is because of the omitted variable of dollar value of stock and options. I also find that the increases in dollar value of stock and options owned by the CEO reduces agency costs; while increases in percentage of stocks owned by the CEO increases entrenchment. These results are robust to endogeniety and a battery of relevant tests. This research concludes that, for the average firm, the agency cost is that of underinvestment, while the concerns about overinvestment are overstated