COVID-19 and Political Trust in local governments: evidence from Nepal

[EN] The COVID-19 pandemic has reinvigorated debates about the drivers of political trust. Research so far has mainly focused on national-level institutions, during the early stages of the pandemic and using data from established democracies. However, how does this relationship look like if we pay attention to subnational institutions in non-consolidated democracies, and further away from the initial COVID-19 outbreak? To contribute to this line of research, this article focuses on the local level and explores the association between individuals’ satisfaction with COVID-19 performance and political trust in Nepal. For that, it uses novel data collected via telephone interviews (N = 1400) conducted between 25 April and 24 May 2021, during the second wave of COVID-19. Our main results reveal that satisfaction with local institutions’ COVID-related performance is significantly and robustly associated with levels of political trust at the local level. The association holds even when geographical and time specifications are added, trust towards national institutions or expectations about local governments are included in the analysis and the dependent variable is disaggregated to discard measurement biases. The study thereby provides important insights into the role performance plays for institutional trust beyond the national level and in an unconsolidated democracy

Fostering democracy and stability in Timor-Leste after the 2006 crisis: on the benefits of coordinated and cooperative forms of support

Aiming to gain deeper knowledge of the impact that external engagement can have in fragile contexts, this paper analyses international support given to foster stability and democracy in Timor-Leste. Two main questions guided the research. First, have international actors contributed to the consolidation of peace and democracy in Timor-Leste? Second, which factors explain successful support, and which ones explain failure? After having achieved independence, the young nation faced a new task: establishing a stable state and a functioning democratic system. Four years after formal independence had been established, a major violent crisis forced the government to invite an international stabilisation force. The crisis revealed not only that stability was still fragile, it also disclosed the many persistent challenges. Since then, considerable achievements have been made: solving the crisis of massive internal displacement caused by the 2006 events, and conducting two elections without major incidents, in 2007 and in 2012. However, problems in the security sector, which were closely linked to the outbreak of the 2006 crisis, still have not been comprehensively addressed. The international community provided substantial support to all of these processes, helping to facilitate important accomplishments, yet failing to prevent – or even reinforcing – some weaknesses as well. The research uses selected “critical junctures” in the peace and democratisation process to assess the impact of donor engagement. The analysis focuses on these critical junctures in order to establish what impact they had and to infer the causality of donors’ support. International engagement claiming to have made a crucial contribution to the overall process should be visible in these critical junctures, while significant contributions to such critical junctures will, by definition, also have had an impact on the larger peace and democratisation processes. The critical junctures analysed are: 1) the 2007 electoral process, 2) the crisis of internal displacement (2006-2010) and 3) Security Sector Reform (2006-2014). In order to analyse which factors influenced the effectiveness of external support, the research was guided by academic literature, which suggests that both choosing cooperative over coercive forms of cooperation as well as high levels of coordination increase the effectiveness of international support given to advance peace and democracy. Both of these expectations were generally confirmed by this research: high levels of coordination indeed helped to render external support effective, whereas low levels significantly hampered its success, as diverging approaches in the security sector show, in particular. Cooperative forms of support have been more successful, as illustrated by the very successful international facilitation of the government-led resolution of the internal displacement crisis. More coercive measures in the Security Sector Reform process provoked resistance and reduced the effectiveness of international support. Yet, the analysis also shows the limits of cooperative forms of support when framework conditions are unfavourable

Democracy support and peaceful democratisation after civil war

Evidence exists that democracies are particularly stable, yet also that processes of democratisation are highly susceptible to conflict, especially if democratisation occurs in the aftermath of violent conflict. New research from the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) indicates that external democracy support can help mitigate the destabilising effects of post-conflict democratisation. Since the 1990s, democracy support has been integral to most peacebuilding efforts. Supporting free and fair elections or a vibrant media seems well-suited for fostering peace: Democratic institutions can actively deal with societal conflicts, in sharp contrast to authoritarian regimes, which often rely on repression. However, altering power relations through more political competition can also trigger power struggles, which newly emerging democratic institutions may have difficulty containing. Therefore, questions arise regarding countries that have embarked on a process of democratisation after civil war: Can democracy support help to mitigate destabilising effects, or does it reinforce them? If it can foster peace, how should it be designed in order to avoid renewed violence? The wisdom or folly of supporting democracy to build peace after civil war has caused controversy, yet has rarely been tested empirically. This briefing paper summarises findings from DIE research that addresses this gap. The results demonstrate that: * External democracy support that accompanies postconflict democratisation can help to foster peace after civil war. Importantly, it does not trigger renewed violence. * Analysing the effects of two donor strategies to deal with trade-offs between stability (preventing renewed violence) and democracy shows that prioritising stability over democracy does not contain fewer risks than gradualist support, in contrast to widespread assumptions. In fact, the prioritising strategy can also fail, and even be counterproductive. * The competitive elements of a democratic system explain both why it can help to avoid, or provoke, renewed violence. Democracy support facilitating "controlled competition" can mitigate the destabilizing effects: Support for political competition strengthens the peaceenhancing effects by promoting meaningful choice and enabling the peaceful allocation and withdrawal of political power. Fostering institutional constraints limits the discretionary power of the executive and enforces a commitment to democratic rules. These results can provide guidance to policy-makers when engaging in post-conflict situations: 1. Donors should actively accompany post-conflict democratisation processes with substantial democracy support. They should not refrain from offering such support until stability has already proven to be sustainable, since it can make an important contribution towards strengthening peace and help in avoiding destabilising effects. 2. When facing trade-offs between stability and democracy in post-conflict situations, donors should bear in mind that prioritising stability is not less risk-prone than a gradualist approach, which promotes both stability and democracy in an iterative way. Thus, prioritising stability should not be the obvious choice in post-conflict situations. Instead, donors should carefully scrutinise the political dynamics before applying either strategy and recall that a gradualist approach offers considerable potential for strengthening peace sustainably. 3. Engaging in a context of post-conflict democratisation, donors should provide substantial support both for political competition and for institutional constraints.2nd revised editio

What do we know about post-conflict transitional justice from academic research: key insights for practitioners

Societies that have experienced violent conflict face considerable challenges in building sustainable peace. One crucial question they need to address is how to deal with their violent past and atrocities that were committed – for example, whether perpetrators should be held accountable by judicial means, or whether the focus should be laid on truth telling and the compensation of victims. Transitional justice (TJ) offers a range of instruments that aim to help societies come to terms with their history of violent conflict. Systematic, empirical analyses of TJ instruments have been emerging over the last years. This Briefing Paper summarises the policy-relevant insights they provide regarding the main TJ instruments: trials; truth commissions; reparations for victims; and amnesties. Reviewing academic literature on the effects of transitional justice in post-conflict contexts, three main messages emerge: Initial evidence suggests that transitional justice can help to foster peace. Contrary to concerns that actively dealing with the past may deepen societal divisions and cause renewed conflict, most statistical studies find either positive effects or no effects of the various instruments on peace. Research indicates that amnesties can help to build peace, though not as a response to severe war crimes. Contrary to strong reservations against amnesties at the international level (especially on normative grounds), several academic studies find that amnesties can statistically significantly reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. However, the most extensive and recent study also shows that this effect varies depending on the context: amnesties can contribute to peace when they are included in peace agreements, but have no effect after episodes of very severe violence. To effectively foster peace, trials should target all perpetrators involved in the conflict, not only the defeated party. A likely explanation for this finding from a recent study is that otherwise domestic trials can be used by the victorious party to punish and repress the defeated side. More generally, donors should be aware that if a political regime is able to instrumentalise a transitional justice process, for instance after a one-sided victory or in an undemocratic environment, the process is often not conducive to peace. Reviewing the literature also makes clear that important, open questions remain: Can transitional justice contribute to a deeper quality of peace that goes beyond the absence of violence? TJ should be able to foster reconciliation and mend broken societal relationships. However, if and how TJ can affect social cohesion after conflict needs to be better understood. How do various transitional justice instruments need to be combined? Both the academic literature and policy documents suggest that it is important to find the right mix of instruments, but more systematic analyses of successful combinations of TJ instruments are necessary. What role does donor support play in processes of transitional justice? Although transitional justice can be strongly domestically driven, such as in Colombia, donor funding often facilitates these processes. However, we still know too little about the effectiveness of such support

Was wir aus der Forschung zu Transitional Justice in Postkonfliktgesellschaften wissen: wesentliche Erkenntnisse für die Praxis

Gesellschaften, die Gewaltkonflikte erfahren haben, stehen vor der großen Herausforderung nachhaltigen Frieden aufzubauen. Dabei ist eine entscheidende Frage, wie mit der gewaltsamen Vergangenheit umgegangen wird – sollen die Täter vor Gericht zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, oder der Schwerpunkt auf Wahrheitsfindung und Entschädigungen für Opfer liegen? Die verschiedenen Instrumente der Vergangenheitsarbeit und Versöhnung (Transitional Justice, TJ) wurden in den letzten Jahren von systematischen empirischen Analysen untersucht. Dieses Papier fasst die ersten, politikrelevanten Erkenntnisse zusammen, die sich daraus für die wichtigsten TJ-Instrumente ergeben: Gerichtsprozesse, Wahrheitskommissionen, Entschädigungen und Amnestien. Aus der akademischen Literatur zur Wirkung von Transitional Justice in Postkonfliktkontexten ergeben sich drei Kernbotschaften: Transitional Justice kann einen wichtigen Beitrag zu Frieden leisten. Entgegen Bedenken, dass eine aktive Auseinandersetzung mit der Vergangenheit Gesellschaften noch stärker spalten und Konflikte erneut aufflammen lassen könnte, ergeben statistische Untersuchungen überwiegend, dass TJ sich entweder positiv oder gar nicht auf Frieden auswirkt. Amnestien können helfen Frieden zu sichern. Entgegen Vorbehalten gegenüber Amnestien auf der internatio¬nalen Ebene (besonders aus normativen Gründen), kommen mehrere Studien zu dem Schluss, dass Amnestien das Risiko eines Wiederausbruchs statistisch signifikant verringern können. Jedoch zeigt die aktuellste Studie auch, dass die Wirkung kontext¬abhängig ist: Amnestien können einen Beitrag zum Frieden leisten, wenn sie Teil von Friedensabkommen sind, aber sie sind wirkungslos nach Episoden sehr schwerer Gewalt. Um Frieden wirksam zu fördern, sollten Gerichtsprozesse Täter aller Konfliktparteien einbeziehen. Dieses Ergebnis einer aktuellen Studie lässt sich damit erklären, dass andernfalls Gerichtsprozesse von der siegreichen Partei genutzt werden können, um die unterlegene Seite zu bestrafen. Allgemein sollten Geber sich darüber im Klaren sein, dass ein TJ-Prozess durch ein politisches Regime instrumentalisiert werden kann und der Prozess dann selten friedensfördernd ist. Aus der Literatur wird auch deutlich, dass wichtige Fragen nach wie vor offenbleiben: Kann Transitional Justice zu einer tiefergehenden Qualität von Frieden beitragen, die über die reine Abwesenheit von Gewalt hinausgeht? Da TJ darauf abzielt Aussöhnung zu fördern, sollte es gesellschaftliche Beziehungen stärken. Es muss jedoch besser verstanden werden, ob und wie TJ auf soziale Kohäsion in Postkonfliktgesellschaften wirken kann. Auf welche Weise müssen die verschiedenen Instrumente kombiniert werden? Sowohl die Literatur als auch politische Grundsatzdokumente weisen darauf hin, dass es wichtig ist, die richtige Mischung von Instrumenten zu finden; es fehlt jedoch noch an systematischen Analysen zu Kombinationen von TJ-Instrumenten. Welche Rolle spielt Geberunterstützung für Transitional-Justice-Prozesse? Geber begleiten TJ Prozesse häufig finanziell, aber auch inhaltlich. Über die Effektivität dieser Unterstützung ist jedoch noch zu wenig bekannt

What the EU should do for democracy support in Africa: Ten proposals for a new strategic initiative in times of polarisation

The EU has made democracy support a stronger aspect in its relations with African countries since 2002. However, a broad range of political and economic dynamics within as well as outside of Europe challenge democracy and its supporters: the rise of non-democratic countries such as China, challenges to democracy within the EU, and global autocratization trends, which include African countries. While posing new challenges the EU needs to react to, these trends also reinforce the importance of continued support and protection of democracy abroad. In light of this changed context, the EU will need to fundamentally adjust its strategic approach and instruments towards democracy support in Africa. Against this background, this paper discusses reasons for the EU to continue and even strengthen its democracy support in Africa: societal demands in Africa and regional democracy norms; the relationship between democracy and sustainable development as well as the new geostrategic competition. The paper analyses how the EU's support for democracy and human rights in sub-Saharan Africa has developed over the last decades in terms of its understanding of democracy support as well as its substance. The paper concludes by making ten proposals for reforming the EU's democracy support in Africa. The reform proposals relate to a new narrative and more strategic approach to democracy support in light of the changed geopolitical setting, to addressing megatrends more explicitly through democracy support or to reforming the EU's institutional prerequisites

Supporting peace after civil war: what kind of international engagement can make a difference?

How can international actors effectively support peace after civil war? So far, empirical research has established that peacekeeping can be an effective instrument in maintaining peace, but little systematic knowledge exists on the roles that other types of peace support can play. International peacebuilding encompasses a broad range of activities beyond peacekeeping. It includes non-military support to increase security through disarmament, demobilisation, the reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, as well as security sector reform (SSR) and demining; support for governance to strengthen political institutions and state capacity; support for socioeconomic development to create a peace dividend through reconstruction, basic services, jobs and macroeconomic stability; and support for societal conflict transformation, including reconciliation, dialogue and transitional justice programmes. This briefing paper presents the results of a comprehensive analysis of disaggregated external support in post-conflict situations, undertaken recently within the DIE research project “Supporting Sustainable Peace”. Analysing combinations of peace support provided during the first five years of 36 post-civil war episodes since 1990, we find that international peacebuilding can clearly make a difference. More specifically, our findings show that international peacekeeping is one, but not the only, means of support associated with sustained peace; contrary to concerns regarding the destabilising effects of democratisation, the majority of successful cases are in fact characterised by substantial international support in the field of politics and governance in democratising contexts; only combined international efforts across all types of support can help prevent renewed conflict in contexts of a high risk of recurrence; and countries that did not receive any substantial peace support experienced conflict recurrence within five years. In light of these findings, we recommend the following to the international community when faced with post-civil war situations: Engage substantially in post-conflict countries. Our results show that international peacebuilding can be effective, even where there is a high structural risk of conflict recurrence. While success will never be guaranteed, countries that receive substantial international support often remain peaceful, whereas all countries that were neglected by the international community experienced conflict recurrence. Pay particular attention, and provide substantial support, to the field of politics and governance in post-conflict countries that begin to democratise. While it is well known that democratisation processes are conflict prone, our analyses demonstrate that donor engagement geared towards supporting such processes can help mitigate conflict and contribute to peace. When a post-conflict country has decided to embark on political reforms donors should offer governance support to help overcome potential destabilising effects of democratisation processes. Invest in an international approach that encompasses all areas of peacebuilding early on after the end of a civil war. Especially in contexts with a high structural risk of renewed violent conflict, the chances of sustained peace are increased by simultaneous support for security, institutions, livelihoods and societal conflict transformation

Friedensförderung nach Bürgerkriegen: welche Arten internationaler Unterstützung sind erfolgreich?

Wie können internationale Akteure Friedensprozesse nach Bürgerkriegen erfolgreich unterstützen? Bisherige Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Friedenstruppen ein effektives Instrument zur Vermeidung eines Wiederausbruchs sind. Kaum erforscht ist, welche Rolle andere Formen der Friedensförderung spielen können. Zu diesen zählen nichtmilitärische Unterstützung für mehr Sicherheit, etwa durch Entwaffnungs-, Demobilisierungs- und Reintegrationsprogramme (DDR) für ehemalige Kombattanten, Sicherheitssektorreformen (SSR) oder Minenräumung; Unterstützung im Bereich Governance für die Stärkung politischer Institutionen und staatlicher Handlungsfähigkeit; die Förderung sozioökonomischer Entwicklung, um durch Wiederaufbau, Basisdienstleistungen, Jobs und makroökonomische Stabilität eine „Friedensdividende“ für die Menschen zu generieren; sowie Unterstützung für gesellschaftliche Konflikttransformation, etwa in den Bereichen Versöhnung, Dialog und Transitional Justice. Dieses Papier fasst Ergebnisse einer Analyse externer Unterstützung in Post-Konflikt-Ländern zusammen, die im Rahmen des DIE-Forschungsprojekts „Frieden nachhaltig fördern“ durchgeführt wurde. Darin wurden, nach Förderbereichen gruppiert, systematisch verschiedene Kombinationen friedensfördernder Maßnahmen in den ersten fünf Nachkriegsjahren in 36 Ländern untersucht, in denen nach 1990 ein Bürgerkrieg endete. Die Analyse belegt deutlich, dass internationale Friedensförderung etwas bewirken kann. Insbesondere zeigt sich, dass internationale Friedenstruppen eine, aber nicht die einzige Form effektiver Friedensförderung sind; dass substantielle Unterstützung im Bereich Politik und Governance in sich demokratisierenden Ländern vielfach erfolgreich war – entgegen Bedenken, dies könne zur Destabilisierung beitragen –; dass nur das Kombinieren aller Arten von Friedensförderung das Wiederaufflammen von Konflikten auch in Situationen verhindern kann, in denen ein hohes Wiederausbruchsrisiko besteht; und dass in Ländern, die keine signifikante Friedensförderung erhalten haben, innerhalb von fünf Jahren wieder Gewaltkonflikte ausgebrochen sind. Für die internationale Gemeinschaft ergeben sich daraus folgende Empfehlungen: Vertieftes Engagement in ehemaligen Konfliktländern lohnt sich. Internationale Friedensförderung kann wirken – selbst dort, wo ein hohes strukturelles Risiko für einen erneuten Konflikt besteht. Zwar ist Erfolg nie garantiert, doch blieb in Ländern, die signifikante Unterstützung erhielten, der Frieden oft gewahrt, während in allen, die von der internationalen Gemeinschaft vernachlässigt wurden, erneut Konflikte ausbrachen. In Post-Konflikt-Ländern, die sich demokratisieren, sollte ein Fokus auf substantielle Unterstützung im Bereich Politik und Governance gelegt werden. Zwar sind Demokratisierungsprozesse konfliktanfällig, doch gezielte externe Unterstützung kann Konflikte abmildern helfen und damit zu Frieden beitragen. Wenn ein ehemaliges Konfliktland einen demokratischen Wandel selbst eingeleitet hat, sollten Geber diesen daher unterstützen und so mögliche destabilisierende Effekte der Demokratisierung verhindern helfen. Ein umfassender Ansatz, der unmittelbar nach Kriegsende alle friedensfördernden Bereiche abdeckt, ist besonders effektiv. Vor allem wenn ein hohes strukturelles Wiederausbruchsrisiko vorliegt, erhöhen sich die Chancen für nachhaltigen Frieden durch die gleichzeitige Unterstützung in den Bereichen Sicherheit, Politik, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und gesellschaftliche Konflikttransformation

Implications of COVID-19 for conflict in Africa

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts. In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures. Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, democratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance. Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to: 1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict. 2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully. 3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high

Strengthening social cohesion in conflict-affected societies: Potential, patterns and pitfalls

Bilateral and multilateral donors are increasingly focusing on strengthening social cohesion in efforts to build and sustain peace in conflict-affected societies. What does promoting social cohesion mean with respect to international engagement? This policy brief provides an overview of the 'social cohesion' approach, explains how it applies to conflict-affected and fragile contexts, and introduces a typology of common interventions. It discusses the added value of taking a social cohesion approach to development and peacebuilding practice, as well as challenges policymakers and practitioners may encounter when using it. Social cohesion can be understood as positive relations among individuals and groups (the horizontal dimension) and between society and the state (the vertical dimension). While fostering, rebuilding or sustaining cohesion are challenges for any society, they are particularly difficult in conflict settings where divisions fuel violence and violence reinforces divisions. We argue that taking a social cohesion approach in divided, conflict-affected societies offers several advantages. First, it has the potential to focus intervention on less tangible aspects of conflict - drawing attention to overlooked grievances and bringing tensions between groups and the state into focus. Second, it helps integrate a peacebuilding lens in a broad variety of policy spaces. Third, it helps policymakers to integrate citizen perspectives into development strategies and to focus on the provision of quality peace for all citizens. Taking a social cohesion approach, however, also brings challenges. It may be sensitive for external actors to address social grievances, identity-based divisions and power relations. Dominant groups may feel threatened in their position of power and push back against these attempts, or tensions among historically marginalised groups may cause friction. Donors may experience backlash against programmes that directly address sensitive topics. At the same time, if the intent is to take a transformative approach to building social cohesion, it may be difficult for donors to maintain a neutral stance. Social cohesion programmes may risk increasing tension in the short term, but to restore inter-group trust and state legitimacy over the long term, it might be necessary to confront and accept tension. Reflecting on the potentials and pitfalls of strengthening social cohesion in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, we suggest that policymakers and practitioners should: Think politically. Fostering social cohesion may initially appear less political or less contentious than peacebuilding, but it inevitably involves engaging politics, as well as identity and power dynamics. Securing donor support for 'apolitical' social cohesion programming may at first appear to be advantageous, but this perception risks overlooking power relationships, politicised grievances, hierarchies and other salient dimensions of social structure (e.g., class dynamics). Expect pushback. The social cohesion approach has the potential to interrupt powerful political and economic structures that link social and political identities (e.g., ethnicity, class and gender) to power, status and public goods. Donors should expect overt and covert pushback and contention and be prepared to encounter the stickiness of informal institutions. Work across multiple dividing lines. Strengthening in-group trust and cooperation may negatively affect out-group relationships and overall social cohesion. Fostering social cohesion in the wake of violent conflict requires networks to address multiple social divisions. Large coalitions that cut across race, ethnicity, gender, class and generation are notoriously difficult to form and sustain, yet essential for building sustainable peace