On the Strategic Use of Debt and Capacity in Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets

In capital intensive industries, firms face complicated multi-stage financing, investment, and production decisions under the watchful eye of existing and potential industry rivals. We consider a two-stage simplification of this environment. In the first stage, an incumbent firm benefits from two first-mover advantages by precommiting to a debt financing policy and a capacity investment policy. In the second stage, the incumbent and a single-stage rival simultaneously choose production levels and realize stochastic profits. We characterize the incumbent's first-stage debt and capacity choices as factors in the production of an intermediate good we call "output deterrence." In our two-factor deterrence model, we show that the incumbent chooses a unique capacity policy and a threshold debt policy to achieve the optimal level of deterrence coinciding with full Stackelberg leadership. When we remove the incumbent's first-mover advantage in capacity, the full Stackelberg level of deterrence is still achievable, albeit with a higher level of debt than the threshold. In contrast, when we remove the incumbent's first-mover advantage in debt, the Stackelberg level of deterrence may no longer be achievable and the incumbent may suffer a dead-weight loss. Evidence on the telecommunications industry shows that firms have increased their leverage in a manner consistent with deterring potential rivals following the 1996 deregulation.Industrial organization; Deregulation; Deterrence; Capital structure; Capacity; Telecommunications

Financing investment with external funds

This thesis presents various dynamic models of corporate decisions to address two main issues: investment distortions caused by debt financing and cash flow sensitivities. In the first chapter, four measures of investment distortion are computed. First, the effect of financing frictions is examined. The tax benefit of debt induces firms to increase their debt capacity and to invest beyond the first-best level on average. The cost of this investment distortion outweighs the tax benefit of debt. Second, Myers's (1977) debt overhang problem is examined in a dynamic framework. Debt overhang obtains on average, but not in low technology states. Third, there is no debt overhang problem in all technology states when debt is optimally put in place prior to the investment decision. Finally, the cost of choosing investment after the debt policy is examined. Equity claimants lose value by choosing to invest after their debt is optimally put in place because they do not consider the interaction between their investment choice and the debt financing conditions. The second chapter explores the impact of financial constraints on firms' cash flow sensitivities. In contrast to Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), cash flow sensitivities are found to be larger, rather than smaller, for unconstrained firms than for constrained firms. Then, why is investment sensitive to cash flow? In the two models examined in the second chapter, the underlying source of investment opportunities is highly correlated with cash flows. Investment may be sensitive to cash flow fluctuations simply because cash flows proxy for investment opportunities. This leaves two important questions. Can this chapter suggest a better measure of investment opportunities than Tobin's Q? Not a single measure for both the unconstrained and constrained firm models. Can this chapter suggest an easily observable measure of financial constraint? Yes: large and volatile dividend-to-income ratios.Business, Sauder School ofGraduat