1,109 research outputs found
Ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive
Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive â in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable â is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti 2005 have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive â that is, of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti 2005 and define two evidence gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science
Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism
Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesnât elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wrightâs contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements donât remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they donât actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wrightâs responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzziâs argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright cannot answer Moruzziâs challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification
Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness
Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PCâs advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)âs theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToISâs advocates
The many ways of the basing relation
A subject S's belief that Q is well-grounded if and only if it is based on a reason of S that gives S propositional justification for Q. Depending on the nature of S's reason, the process whereby S bases her belief that Q on it can vary. If S's reason is non-doxasticââlike an experience that Q or a testimony that QââS will need to form the belief that Q as a spontaneous and immediate response to that reason. If S's reason is doxasticââlike a belief that PââS will need to infer her belief that Q from it. The distinction between these two ways in which S's beliefs can be based on S's reasons is widely presupposed in current epistemology butââwe argue in this paperââis not exhaustive. We give examples of quite ordinary situations in which a well-grounded belief of S appears to be based on S's reasons in neither of the ways described above. To accommodate these recalcitrant cases, we introduce the notion of enthymematic inference and defend the thesis that S can base a belief that Q on doxastic reasons P1, P2, âŠ, Pn via inferring enthymematically Q from P1, P2, âŠ, Pn
Assessing concept possession as an explicit and social practice
We focus on issues of learning assessment from the point of view of an investigation of philosophical elements in teaching. We contend that assessment of concept possession at school based on ordinary multiple-choice tests might be ineffective because it overlooks aspects of human rationality illuminated by Robert Brandomâs inferentialismââthe view that conceptual content largely coincides with the inferential role of linguistic expressions used in public discourse. More particularly, we argue that multiple-choice tests at schools might fail to accurately assess the possession of a concept or the lack of it, for they only check the written outputs of the pupils who take them, without detecting the inferences actually endorsed or used by them. We suggest that school tests would acquire reliability if they enabled pupils to make the reasons of their answers or the inferences they use explicit, so as to contribute to what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. We explore the possibility to put this suggestion into practice by deploying two-tier multiple-choice tests
Boghossian's template and transmission failure
Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This article aims to defend the template from this objection. We provide an accurate description of the type of non-transmissivity that Ebert attributes to the template and clarify why this is a novel type of non-transmissivity. Then, we argue that Jenkins (2008)âs response to Ebert fails because it focuses on doxastic rather than propositional warrant. Finally, we rebut Ebertâs objection on Boghossianâs behalf by showing that it rests on an unwarranted assumption and is internally incoherent
Goldman and Siegel on the epistemic aims of education
Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegelâs position intuitively more plausible than Goldmanâs, we also find Siegelâs defence of it wanting. We suggest novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegelâs own arguments but look to us more promising
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