Affordance Ontology: Towards a Unified Description of Affordances as Events

An argument is developed that suggests the concept of affordances can best facilitate the pursuit of new knowledge if it’s defined as an event. The first description initially generated by James J. Gibson was deceptively vague. This has led to several attempts by additional researchers to re-describe it. These efforts fall short of describing a concept that is consistent with both the historical context of Gibson’s work and his motivations for introducing the term. Additionally, no definition has been introduced that aims to limit the scope of information researchers must consider when using the term. I put forth a description of affordances that is consistent with Gibson’s motivations and is pragmatically motivated to restrain the scope of inquiry. The application of this new description may lead to more fruitful experimentation and less problematic discourse throughout the disciplines that use the term

Process and Mind: Exploring the Relationship Between Process Philosophy and the Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Science of Cognition

This work examines the relationship between Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and the nonlinear dynamical systems framework for studying cognition. I argue that the nonlinear dynamical systems approach to cognitive science presupposes many key elements of his process philosophy. The process philosophical interpretation of nature posits events and the dynamic relations between events as the fundamental substrate of reality, as opposed to static physical substances. I present a brief history of the development of substance thought before describing Whitehead’s characterization of nature as a process. In following, I will examine the both the computational and nonlinear dynamical systems frameworks for investigating cognition. I will show that the computational paradigm is subject to many of the same criticisms as substance. Conversely, I will show that nonlinear dynamical cognitive science avoids these criticisms and is congenial to Whitehead’s philosophy insofar as it is suitable for describing emergent processes. To conclude, I suggest that the nonlinear dynamical cognitive science confirms and validates Whitehead’s philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that process philosophy is an appropriate characterization of nature for guiding inquiry in cognitive science

Thermodynamics and Cognition: Towards a Lawful Explanation of the Mind

An argument is developed to show that explanations ofbiological and physical systems can be unified via the secondlaw of thermodynamics (SLT). The SLT’s influence on theevolutionary history of life at the scale of the global Earthsystem justifies reunifying phenomena—i.e., mind andmatter—whose separation dates back to Modern Westernphilosophy and still influences contemporary scientificinvestigations. From this perspective it appears that thenecessity of ever-increasing entropy in nature may constrainthe organization and behavior of living organisms andcognitive processes. Via an example of explaining memory atthe scale of the brain-body-environment system, werecommend understanding cognition with respect to its role inincreasing entropy in nature. This framework may lead to afruitful understanding of cognition by appealing to thenecessity of physical laws