65 research outputs found
Operating Model of Knowledge Quantum Engineering for Decision-Making in Conditions of Indeterminacy
The operating model of knowledge quantum engineering for identification and prognostic decision-
making in conditions of Ξ±-indeterminacy is suggested in the article. The synthesized operating model solves three
basic tasks: Πt-task to formalize tk-knowledge; Πt-task to recognize (identify) objects according to observed
results; Π‘t-task to extrapolate (prognosticate) the observed results. Operating derivation of identification and
prognostic decisions using authentic different-level algorithmic knowledge quantum (using tRAKZ-method)
assumes synthesis of authentic knowledge quantum database (BtkZ) using induction operator as a system of
implicative laws, and then using deduction operator according to the observed tk-knowledge and BtkZ a
derivation of identification or prognostic decisions in a form of new tk-knowledge
E-Support for English Language Course to Enhance University Studentsβ Learning.
The peculiarities of English language teaching for students at higher educational establishment using
some elements of distance learning, developed by the author, are described in this article. The results of
studentsβ questioning, received at the end of the experimental teaching, are suggested and analyzed. The
conclusions are formulated and the further ways of teaching English with e-support are outlined
Remote Development of Distance Course Using Virtual Learning Space βWeb-Class Khpiβ
An approach to a specialized website creation β club of distance courses authors β on the basis of
Virtual Learning Space βWeb-Class KhPIβ is implemented and suggested in the article
Spatial distribution of temperature during geomagnetic disturbances
We propose an index of efficiency of the solar activity effect on the tropospheric temperature, which takes into account the spatial irregularity of the response to this effect. As a proxy of solar activity we take the PC index of geomagnetic activity, designed to monitor the geomagnetic field at high latitudes. Using NCEP/NCAR reanalysis data, we carry out a comparative analysis of variations in the proposed index and lower-troposphere temperature variations during geomagnetic disturbances. We identify the presence of a high degree of correlation between the temperature in the 925β700 hPa layer and the proposed index of solar activity effect. The spatio-temporal analysis of the index and temperature variations shows that the index of effi-ciency of the solar activity effect describes well both the value and the sign of the observed variations in the spa-tial distribution of the lower-troposphere temperature as compared to the frequently used index of geomagnetic activity
Impact of Short-Term Exogenous Shocks on Taxpayer Behavior and Tax Evasion
The evolution of views on tax evasion following the introduction of limited rationality and social and psychological factors into the models of taxpayer behavior has increased the plausibility of the initial assumptions of the models, but it has made it difficult to use classical approaches based on the search for equilibrium states. The variety of behavioral responses of taxpayers due to the many factors that influence their choice has led to the fact that tax evasion has come to be considered as the result of nonlinear and dynamic interactions between the state and taxpayers. In such models, small short-term external influences can act as shocks, which leads to the emergence of a wide range of different long-term trends, the analysis of which within the framework of traditional approaches is difficult. In this regard, the purpose of this review study is to study the evolution of views on the behavior of taxpayers that has led to the emergence of new approaches to modeling tax evasion where the key role is assigned to the analysis of the impact of external shocks of various scales and nature. The research hypothesis is that modern approaches to the study of tax evasion problems make it necessary to consider the interaction of the state and taxpayers within the framework of the theory of non-equilibrium and nonlinear systems in which minor external influences can play the role of shocks, and the most promising direction of their study is the use of agent-based modeling tools. The results of the study confirm that the use of agent-based models is a promising approach for integrating existing approaches in the study of tax evasion processes. The proposed concept of building an agent-based model for analyzing the processes of tax evasion allows us to answer the question of how short-term exogenous shocks will affect the preferences of taxpayers, taking into account their individual characteristics and accepted behavioral patterns in society.ΠΠ²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΡ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ², ΡΠ²ΡΠ·Π°Π½Π½Π°Ρ Ρ Π²Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ Π² ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ², ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠΈΠ»Π° ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠΊ, Π½ΠΎ Π·Π°ΡΡΡΠ΄Π½ΠΈΠ»Π° ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ², ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ ΡΠ°Π²Π½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΉ. Π Π°Π·Π½ΠΎΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΅Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π²ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ², Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΡ
Π½Π° ΠΈΡ
Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ, ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π»ΠΎ ΠΊ ΡΠΎΠΌΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°Ρ Π½Π΅Π»ΠΈΠ½Π΅ΠΉΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²ΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ. Π ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΡ
Π½Π΅Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠΊΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ ΠΈΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ², ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡ ΠΊ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΡΠ° ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π΄ΠΎΠ»Π³ΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π΄ΠΎΠ², Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π·Π°ΡΡΡΠ΄Π½Π΅Π½. Π ΡΡΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·ΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π»Ρ ΠΎΠ±Π·ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ², ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΊ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΊ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ², Π³Π΄Π΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²Π°Ρ ΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΠΎΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΡ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Ρ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΡΠ°Π±Π° ΠΈ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠ°. ΠΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΄Π΅Π½Π° Π³ΠΈΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π·Π° ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Ρ Π² ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π΄Π΅Π»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΡΠΌ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π²Π½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π½Π΅Π»ΠΈΠ½Π΅ΠΉΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ, Π² ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
Π½Π΅Π·Π½Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ ΠΈΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ², Π° Π½Π°ΠΈΠ±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠΌ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΈΡ
ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ Π°Π³Π΅Π½Ρ-ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ. Π Π΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π°Π³Π΅Π½Ρ-ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠΌ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π² ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ². ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π°Π³Π΅Π½Ρ-ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΡ Π½Π° Π²ΠΎΠΏΡΠΎΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠΊΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΊΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΈ Π±ΡΠ΄ΡΡ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π΄ΠΈΠ²ΠΈΠ΄ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡ
Π² ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΠ°Ρ
ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ.ΠΠ²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΡ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ², ΡΠ²ΡΠ·Π°Π½Π½Π°Ρ Ρ Π²Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ Π² ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ², ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠΈΠ»Π° ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠΊ, Π½ΠΎ Π·Π°ΡΡΡΠ΄Π½ΠΈΠ»Π° ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ², ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ ΡΠ°Π²Π½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΉ. Π Π°Π·Π½ΠΎΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΅Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π²ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ², Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΡ
Π½Π° ΠΈΡ
Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ, ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π»ΠΎ ΠΊ ΡΠΎΠΌΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°Ρ Π½Π΅Π»ΠΈΠ½Π΅ΠΉΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²ΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ. Π ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΡ
Π½Π΅Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠΊΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ ΠΈΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ², ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡ ΠΊ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΡΠ° ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π΄ΠΎΠ»Π³ΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π΄ΠΎΠ², Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π·Π°ΡΡΡΠ΄Π½Π΅Π½. Π ΡΡΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·ΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π»Ρ ΠΎΠ±Π·ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ², ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΊ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΊ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ², Π³Π΄Π΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²Π°Ρ ΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΠΎΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΡ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Ρ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΡΠ°Π±Π° ΠΈ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠ°. ΠΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΄Π΅Π½Π° Π³ΠΈΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π·Π° ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Ρ Π² ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π΄Π΅Π»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΡΠΌ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π²Π½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π½Π΅Π»ΠΈΠ½Π΅ΠΉΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ, Π² ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
Π½Π΅Π·Π½Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ ΠΈΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ², Π° Π½Π°ΠΈΠ±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠΌ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΈΡ
ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ Π°Π³Π΅Π½Ρ-ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ. Π Π΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π°Π³Π΅Π½Ρ-ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠΌ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π² ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ². ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π°Π³Π΅Π½Ρ-ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΡ Π½Π° Π²ΠΎΠΏΡΠΎΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠΊΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΊΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΈ Π±ΡΠ΄ΡΡ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π΄ΠΈΠ²ΠΈΠ΄ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡ
Π² ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΠ°Ρ
ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ.The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 20-110-50108.ΠΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΠΈΠ½Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΊΠ΅ Π Π€Π€Π Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
Π½Π°ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ° β 20-110-50108
The Influence of the Behavior of Economic Agents in a Decentralized Tax System on the Ransformation of the Institutional Environment
The transformation of the current tax system requires taking into account different types of behavior of taxpayers, characterized by different reaction to the actions of the state in the process of realization of control functions. The aim of the study is to develop a model of optimal strategy selection for the taxpayer to overcome institutional traps and assess the potential of the national tax system to move to a new qualitative level of development. The methodological basis for the study was provided by the background of the neoclassical theory describing the traditional paradigm of tax administration that is integrated into behavioral economics, which allowed us to consider relationships within the tax system as a situation of a social dilemma with individual interests. The proposed model is based on the mathematical apparatus of game theory with nature, the modeling of the mechanism of overcoming institutional traps in the tax system carried out with regard to their functional properties on the basis of the law of hierarchic compensations and the concept of path dependence. The simulation results show that maximizing the stateβs control functions of the tax system leads to the fact that an increase in its efficiency is possible only through an extensive growth of regulatory bodies. The optimal policy would be a partial replacement of the control functions of the state with coordination executed by autonomous self-organizing groups of taxpayers that formed as a result of the growth of entropy of the tax system. One can change the forms of tax control as regards the implementation of procedures of βhorizontal monitoringβ of βfair play initiativesβ, loyalty and trust through the introduction of strategies of cooperation between taxpayers and the regulatory authorities. It is important to note that taking into account present-day specifics of the existing relationships and the accumulated negative experience of cooperation in the tax area did not provide enough prerequisites and incentives for taxpayers to fully and timely to pay legally established taxes. Therefore, it is necessary to use a combined approach which is based on a cooperative strategy of self-regulation, and - as an exceptional measure - to use tough sanctions in order to counter deviant behaviour.Π’ΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡ Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΡΡΠ΅Π±ΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ° ΡΠ°Π·Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΠΏΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ², ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ΡΡ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ Π½Π° Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° Π² ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠΌ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ. Π¦Π΅Π»ΡΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΊΠ° ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡΠ° ΠΎΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ° Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π»ΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ΅ΠΊ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π° Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ Π½Π° Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΉ ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½Ρ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ. Π ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ»ΠΊΠΈ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈΠ³ΠΌΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΠΎΠΉ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΠΈΠ»ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΡ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π² Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π΄ΠΈΠ»Π΅ΠΌΠΌΡ Ρ ΠΈΠ½Π΄ΠΈΠ²ΠΈΠ΄ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π° Π½Π° ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ Π°ΠΏΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠ³Ρ Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΉ, ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅Ρ
Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π»ΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ΅ΠΊ Π² Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΎ Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ² Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ½Π° ΠΈΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΡ
ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΉ ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ Β«path dependencyΒ». Π Π΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΌΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΌΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΡΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ½Ρ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡ ΠΊ ΡΠΎΠΌΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ Π΅Π΅ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠΊΠΎ Π·Π° ΡΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΠΊΡΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΎΡΡΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΎΠ². ΠΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ½Π°Ρ Π·Π°ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΎΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΡ ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π²ΡΠΈΡ
ΡΡ Π² ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΎΡΡΠ° ΡΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠΏΠΈΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ Π°Π²ΡΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΎΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΡ Π³ΡΡΠΏΠΏ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ². ΠΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠΎΡΠΌ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Ρ Π² ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡ Β«Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ½ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ½Π³Π°Β» Β«ΡΠ΅ΠΉΡ-ΠΏΠ»Π΅ΠΉ ΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΠΈΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Β», ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π»ΠΎΡΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠΈΡ Π·Π° ΡΡΠ΅Ρ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ΄Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΎΠ². ΠΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΎΠΌ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΠΎ ΡΡΠΈΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΡ, ΡΡΠΎ Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ ΡΠ»ΠΎΠΆΠΈΠ²ΡΠΈΡ
ΡΡ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΈ Π½Π°ΠΊΠΎΠΏΠ»Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π½Π΅Π³Π°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠΏΡΡΠ° Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π² Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΡΡΡΡΡΡΠ²ΡΠ΅Ρ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ°ΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠΊ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΡΠΌ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Ρ. ΠΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΌΡ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΠΎ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π°, Π² ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π»Π΅ΠΆΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½Π°Ρ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΡ ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΎΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, Π° Π² ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ ΠΈΡΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Ρ ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π΄Π΅Π²ΠΈΠ°Π½ΡΠ½ΡΠΌ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ.Π Π°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΠΈΠ½Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΊΠ΅ Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ½Π΄Π° ΡΡΠ½Π΄Π°ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΉ (ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡ β17-32-01024/17-ΠΠΠΠ
Π‘ΠΎΠ±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ΄Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΈ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ ΠΎΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ Π°Π³Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ²
ΠΠ½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΡΠΎΠ±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ΄Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΡΠ΅Π±ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π±Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π΄ΠΎΠΏΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ, ΡΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΡΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠΉ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π°Π³Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ. Π¦Π΅Π»ΡΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΎΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΡ
ΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Ρ. ΠΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π° Π½Π° ΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π·Π΅ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡΠ° ΠΈΠ½Π΄ΠΈΠ²ΠΈΠ΄Π° ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ»ΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΠΈΠ»ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌΡ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π°Π³Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² Π² Π΄Π΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π΄ΠΈΠ²ΠΈΠ΄ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ². Π Π΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π»ΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Ρ ΠΎΡΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅Ρ Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΎΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π°Π²ΡΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠ½ΡΡ
Π³ΡΡΠΏΠΏ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡ ΠΊ ΡΠΎΡΡΡ Π²Π΅ΡΠΎΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡΠ° ΠΈΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π΅Π²ΠΈΠ°Π½ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ. Π ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ ΡΠΎΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, Π²ΡΡΠ°ΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π² ΠΌΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΌΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π±ΡΠ΄ΠΆΠ΅ΡΠ°, Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ ΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠΊΠΎ Π·Π° ΡΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΠΊΡΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Ρ. ΠΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π°, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΉ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ Π½Π° ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΡ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΡΡΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΠ² Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡ Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠ½ΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π΅ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ ΠΎΠΏΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠ½ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ², Π° Π² ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ ΠΈΡΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Ρ ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ Π΄Π΅Π²ΠΈΠ°Π½ΡΠ½ΡΠΌ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ. Π’ΠΎΠ³Π΄Π° ΠΎΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ° Π±ΡΠ΄Π΅Ρ Π΄ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡ ΠΎΡ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π½ΠΎΡΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ·ΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄Ρ.The strategy analysis of taxpayer behavior while observing tax law requires weakening of traditional initial assumptions in order to take into account the subjective character of economic agentsβ reaction to tax system changes. The aim of the given research is to identify the appropriate model of taxpayersβ behavior in conditions of the tax control procedures transformation. The research methodology is based on the synthesis of the neo-classical concept of individualβs rational choice, and on the assumptions of behavioral economics, which allowed considering the problem of tax evasion as the situation of social interaction among economic agents in decentralized system by taking into account their individual interests. The results of modeling demonstrated that tightening tax surveillance procedures undermines the coordination of interaction among autonomous tax groups. It leads to the growth of the possibility to select deviant behavior models. In this case the growth of tax management system efficiency expresses in budget income maximization, and is possible only by means of the extensive development of tax control procedures. The optimal strategy of the government behavior is using multimodal approach based on the partial replacement of control function for the cooperative strategy of tax subjectsβ interaction to reduce the natural taxpayer opportunism rate. And as an exceptional measure the harsh sanctions aimed to resist the deviant models of behavior are used. In this case the optimal choice for a taxpayer will depend additionally on the changes of social norms and stereotypes of behavior that characterize the quality of the institutional environment changes.ΠΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΠΈΠ½Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΊΠ΅ Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ½Π΄Π° ΡΡΠ½Π΄Π°ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΉ (Π Π€Π€Π) (ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡ β 17-32-01024/17)Work was prepared with financial support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) (project No. 17-32-01024/17
Pancreatic toxicity of influenza A/H1N1-California virus infection in mice at the background of hyperglycemia induced by streptozotocin administration
Particular attention in the study of comorbid conditions is paid to viral diseases, in particular, those caused by the pandemic influenza virus type A subtype H1N1, as one of the most pathogenic and contagious. Investigation of the effect of this virus in the development of diabetes mellitus will make it possible to more effectively carry out preclinical studies to find the most effective methods of treating a viral infection against the background of a pre-existing somatic pathology. Purpose of the study was to evaluate the pancreatic toxicity effect of exposure to influenza A/H1N1-California virus in the development of streptozotocin diabetes in DBA/2 and BALB/c mice. Material and methods. Groups of mice DBA/2 (n = 36) and BALB/c (n = 58) were formed: infected with influenza A/H1N1-California virus (at different doses); with the introduction of a solution of streptozotocin at a dose of 150 mg / kg; with the combined use of agents. Life expectancy, blood glucose and insulin level, pathomorphological changes in the pancreas were assessed. Results and discussion. The death of animals was observed only in mice of the DBA/2 line: with the introduction of streptozotocin β 12.5 %, with intranasal infection with the virus (at a dose of 5.7 lg TCID50) β 80 %, with combined exposure β 78 %. A comparative study of mice of the DBA/2 and BALB/c lines showed the possibility of using mice of both lines to study the combined effect of influenza A/H1N1 virus and experimental diabetes, taking into account the dose of infection. Infection of BALB/c mice caused the formation of morphological changes only in the exocrine part of the pancreas. In mice of both lines, after the administration of streptozotocin, persistent hyperglycemia was formed, and pathomorphological changes in the pancreas were recorded mainly in the endocrine part. Similar changes in the pancreas, but more severe, involving the exocrine zone, were found during subsequent infection: in mice of the DBA/2 line in the form of a focal disorder of the acinar structure with degeneration of acinocytes and a compensatory regenerative reaction of cells in intact areas; in mice of the BALB/c line in the form of more significant damage to the ductal system than in DBA/2 with the formation of powerful periductal fibrosis and mononuclear infiltrates. Conclusions. A comparative study showed that DBA/2 mice had more pronounced changes in both the exocrine and endocrine apparatus of the pancreas when infected with influenza A/H1N1-California virus and experimental diabetes mellitus
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