Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 5 figure

Social exchange:Relations and networks

In this short paper, I review the literature on social exchange networks, with specific attention to theoretical and experimental research. I indicate how social exchange theory is rooted in general social theory and mention a few of its main links to social network analysis and empirical network research. The paper provides an accessible entry into the literature on social exchange

Team sports performance analysed through the lens of social network theory: implications for research and practice

This paper discusses how social network analyses and graph theory can be implemented in team sports performance analyses to evaluate individual (micro) and collective (macro) performance data, and how to use this information for designing practice tasks. Moreover, we briefly outline possible limitations of social network studies and provide suggestions for future research. Instead of cataloguing discrete events or player actions, it has been argued that researchers need to consider the synergistic interpersonal processes emerging between teammates in competitive performance environments. Theoretical assumptions on team coordination prompted the emergence of innovative, theoretically-driven methods for assessing collective team sport behaviours. Here, we contribute to this theoretical and practical debate by conceptualising sports teams as complex social networks. From this perspective, players are viewed as network nodes, connected through relevant information variables (e.g., a ball passing action), sustaining complex patterns of interaction between teammates (e.g., a ball passing network). Specialized tools and metrics related to graph theory could be applied to evaluate structural and topological properties of interpersonal interactions of teammates, complementing more traditional analysis methods. This innovative methodology moves beyond use of common notation analysis methods, providing a richer understanding of the complexity of interpersonal interactions sustaining collective team sports performance. The proposed approach provides practical applications for coaches, performance analysts, practitioners and researchers by establishing social network analyses as a useful approach for capturing the emergent properties of interactions between players in sports teams

Risk and Cooperation: Managing Hazardous Fuel in Mixed Ownership Landscapes

Managing natural processes at the landscape scale to promote forest health is important, especially in the case of wildfire, where the ability of a landowner to protect his or her individual parcel is constrained by conditions on neighboring ownerships. However, management at a landscape scale is also challenging because it requires cooperation on plans and actions that cross ownership boundaries. Cooperation depends on people’s beliefs and norms about reciprocity and perceptions of the risks and benefits of interacting with others. Using logistic regression tests on mail survey data and qualitative analysis of interviews with landowners, we examined the relationship between perceived wildfire risk and cooperation in the management of hazardous fuel by nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners in fire-prone landscapes of eastern Oregon. We found that NIPF owners who perceived a risk of wildfire to their properties, and perceived that conditions on nearby public forestlands contributed to this risk, were more likely to have cooperated with public agencies in the past to reduce fire risk than owners who did not perceive a risk of wildfire to their properties. Wildfire risk perception was not associated with past cooperation among NIPF owners. The greater social barriers to private–private cooperation than to private–public cooperation, and perceptions of more hazardous conditions on public compared with private forestlands may explain this difference. Owners expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with others in future cross-boundary efforts to reduce fire risk, however. We explore barriers to cooperative forest management across ownerships, and identify models of cooperation that hold potential for future collective action to reduce wildfire risk

Clustering in large networks does not promote upstream reciprocity

Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.Comment: 5 figure

Fairy Tales: Attraction and Stereotypes in Same-Gender Relationships

We examine the process of romantic attraction in same-gender relationships using open and closed-ended questionnaire data from a sample of 120 men and women in Northern California. Agreeableness (e.g., kind, supportive) and Extraversion (e.g., fun, sense of humor) are the two most prominent bases of attraction, followed by Physical Attractiveness (e.g., appearance, sexy). The least important attractors represent traits associated with material success (e.g., financially secure, nice house). We also find evidence of seemingly contradictory attraction processes documented previously in heterosexual romantic relationships, in which individuals become disillusioned with the qualities in a partner that were initially appealing. Our findings challenge common stereotypes of same-gender relationships. The results document broad similarities between same-gender and cross-gender couples in attraction