31 research outputs found
Relational Ethics and Partiality: A Critique of Thad Metzâs âTowards an African Moral Theoryâ
In this article, I question the plausibility of Metzâs African moral theory from an oft-neglected moral topic of partiality. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to properly value the individual for her own sake â this is called the
âfocus problemâ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relationship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral considerations grounded on the individual herself in her own right
Individualism in African Moral Cultures
This article repudiates the dichotomy that African ethics is communitarian (relational) and Western ethics is individualistic. âCommunitarianismâ is the view that morality is ultimately grounded on some relational properties like love or friendship; and, âindividualismâ is the view that morality is ultimately a function of some individual property like a soul or welfare. Generally, this article departs from the intuition that all morality including African ethics, philosophically interpreted, is best understood in terms of individualism. But, in this article, I limit myself to the literature in the African moral tradition; and, I argue that it is best construed in terms of individualism contrary to the popular stance of communitarianism. I defend my view by invoking two sorts of evidences. (1) I invoke prima facie evidence, which shows that both secular and religious moral thinkers in the tradition tend to understand it in individualistic terms. And, (2) I invoke concrete evidence, I show that the two terms that can be said to be definitive features of African ethical framework, namely: personhood and dignity, are individualistic. I conclude by considering possible objections against my defense of individualism as a central feature of African ethics
Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition
It is generally accepted that the normative idea of personhood is central to African moral thought, but what has not been done in the literature is to explicate its relationship to the Western idea of rights. In this article, I investigate this relationship between rights and an African normative conception of personhood. My aim, ultimately, is to give us a cursory sense why duties engendered by rights and those by the idea of personhood will tend to clash. To facilitate a meaningful philosophical discussion, I locate this engagement in the context of a debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye about the nature of Afro-communitarianism, whether it will ground rights as primary or secondary. I endorse Menkitiâs stance that duties are primary and rights secondary; and, I also problematize moderate communitarianism for taking a Western stance by employing a naturalist approach to rights
African Metaphysics and Religious Ethics
Scholars of African moral thought reject the possibility of an African religious
ethics by invoking at least three major reasons. The first objection to âethical
supernaturalismâ argues that it is part of those aspects of African culture that are
âanachronisticâ insofar as they are superstitious rather than rational; as such, they
should be jettisoned. The second objection points out that ethical supernaturalism
is incompatible with the utilitarian approach to religion that typically characterises
some African peoplesâ orientation to it. The last objection argues that religious ethics by their very nature require the feature (of revelation), which is generally lacking in African religious experiences. The facet of revelation is crucial for a religious ethics since it solves the epistemological problem of knowing the will of God or the content of morality. In this article, I construct a vitality-based African religious moral theory; and, I argue that it can successfully meet these objections
A Defence of Moderate Communitarianism: A Place of Rights in African Moral-Political Thought
This article attempts to defend Kwame Gyekyeâs moderate communitarianism (MC)
from the trenchant criticism that it is as defective as radical communitarianism (RC)
since they both fail to take rights seriously. As part of my response, I raise two critical
questions. Firstly, I question the supposition in the literature that there is such a thing
as radical communitarianism. I point out that talk of radical communitarianism is
tantamount to attacking a âstraw-man.â Secondly, I question the efficacy of the
criticism that MC does not take rights seriously, given that there is no account of what
it means to take rights seriously in the African tradition. This criticism, insofar as it
does not specify a criterion of what it means to take rights seriously, remains
defective. The central contribution of this article is to call our attention to the fact that
the intellectual culture of rights will surely be affected by Afro-communitarianism,
which emphasises our duties to all
Personhood and (Rectification) Justice in African Thought
This article invokes the idea of personhood (which it takes to be at the heart of Afrocommunitarian morality) to give an account of corrective/rectification justice. The idea of
rectification justice by Robert Nozick is used heuristically to reveal the moral-theoretical
resources availed by the idea of personhood to think about historical injustices and what
would constitute a meaningful remedy for them. This notion of personhood has three
facets: (1) a theory of moral status/dignity, (2) an account of historical conditions and (3)
the achievement of moral excellence by the agent (personhood). This article argues that a
just society is a function of (1) and (2), and it further argues that the aim of rectification
justice is to correct these two facets of a society, which are necessary for (3) to be possible.
The aim of correcting history just is to make personhood a possibility for all humanity,
particularly of those who were victims of past injustices
An African perspective on the partiality and impartiality debate: Insights from Kwasi Wiredu's moral philosophy
In this article, I attempt to bridge the gap between partiality and impartiality in moral philosophy from an oft-neglected African perspective. I draw a solution for this moral-theoretical impasse between partialists and impartialists from Kwasi Wiredu's, one of the most influential African philosophers, distinction between an ethic and ethics. I show how an ethic accommodates partiality and ethics impartiality. Wiredu's insight is that partialism is not concerned with strict moral issues
Personhood and Partialism in African Philosophy
This article ascertains what philosophical implications can be drawn from the moral idea of personhood dominant in African philosophy. This article aims to go beyond the oft-made submission that this moral idea of personhood is definitive of African moral thought. It does so by advancing discourse with regards to personhood by exploring its relationship with another under-explored idea in African ethics, the idea of partialism. This article ultimately argues that the idea of personhood can be associated with two (related) sorts of partialisms: agent-related and other-centered partialisms
A rejection of humanism in African moral tradition
In this article, I motivate for the view that the best account of the foundations of morality in the African tradition should be grounded on some relevant spiritual property â a view that I call âethical supernaturalismâ. In contrast to this position, the literature has been dominated by humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics, which typically is accompanied by a direct rejection of âethical supernaturalismâ and a veiled rejection of non-naturalism (Gyekye 1995: 129â43; Metz 2007: 328; Wiredu 1992: 194â6). Here primarily, by appeal to methods of analytic philosophy, which privileges analysis and (moral) argumentation, I set out to challenge and repudiate humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics; I leave it for a future project to develop a fully fledged African spiritual meta-ethical theory