Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections: Economics, Politics, and Foreign Affairs

While views of President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have declined from their heights immediately after the nuclear deal, the University of Maryland has found through opinion polls -- among other viewpoints -- that the two leaders continue to enjoy very high levels of popular support in Iran, and their allies have good prospects in the upcoming elections. Views of the nuclear deal continue to be very positive, though some of its less popular aspects have become more apparent. Going forward there is support for growing engagement with the international community, especially in regard to dealing with the problem of Syria and the fight against ISIS. A new University of Maryland survey of the Iranian public finds that that nearly 8 in 10 Iranians say they have a favorable opinion of Rouhani (82 percent) and Zarif (78 percent). With Iran's parliamentary elections about a month away, nearly 6 in 10 Iranians (59 percent) want Rouhani supporters to win. More than 7 in 10 Iranians still approve of the nuclear deal. Rouhani's new efforts to engage with the international community on dealing with the conflict in Syria have received overwhelming support, with 80 percent approving. Of those who know about the Vienna agreement, 7 in 10 (72 percent) approve of it.Rouhani receives high marks for improving Iran's security (86 percent) and deepening its relations with European countries (80 percent). Two thirds (66 percent) say relations with Europe have improved and 54 percent have a favorable view of Germany -- up 10 points from 2014. Nonetheless, views of the U.S. continue to be quite negative. Seventy-one percent have an unfavorable view of the U.S. Only 1 in 3 (34 percent) have confidence that the U.S. will fulfill its obligations under the nuclear deal -- down 11 points from September 2015

Shifting from Individualism to Genericism: Personalization as a Conspiracy Theory

With severe mistrust around classical approaches to consciousness, this paper claims that arguments around the notion of “personalization” of media or messages are grounded on a misinterpretation. Based on the two presuppositions of respective differentiation of human beings and the power to make choices based on reasoning, these approaches have been the reference for many well-known scientific studies, mainly in the fields of media studies, economics, political sciences, and psychology. Despite refuting their results via meta-analyses, such theories have so far sought to maintain their position by resorting to conspiracy theories, the promotion of which, ironically, leads to the syndrome of skepticism, which supports its origins in a vicious circle. While these approaches have been ubiquitous in so-called cognitive priming, projection of mass movements and political abuses of the concepts such as misinformation or disinformation, the mainstream workouts in the fields including but not limited to Perception Management, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning have significantly relied on both de-individualistic and irrational processes. This article aims to prove that the ontological claims about the centrality of individualism in the latest fields of all media and communication technological procedures are grounded in a conspiracy theory. Relying on the method of epistemological reasoning, this article attempts to prove that individualism and personalization in the field of the media industry are the principal tools of social control through the spread of skepticism, which takes advantage of the fictitious nature of the new media sphere for commercial and political purposes

The End of Information Age Society 5.0 and the L[e]ast Man

Through an epistemological lens, this article asserts that the dawn of the internet of data (IoD) era marks a profound shift in our understanding of human existence, one that challenges the notion of modern man as a singular and distinct entity. Delving deeper, the analysis presents an ontological exploration of the transition from a human-centric approach of the 19th and 20th centuries to the added-value man of the 21st century, examining the ideological underpinnings of concepts such as the Information Society and Society 5.0 respectively as representatives of the above two insights. In particular, the article meticulously dissects the stance of each approach towards humanity, highlighting the paradigm shift in our perception of the human experience. This piece offers an insightful commentary on the evolution of our understanding of human nature, encouraging us to rethink our place in the rapidly changing digital landscape

The Power and Politics of Media and Information Literacy

We are living in a media-saturated world. Not only we receive information, we have become prosumers and are able to communicate with the ‘world.’ This has been widely reflected in the academic texts. But is there a dark side to this ‘age of information freedom?’ My argument in this paper is that although we have gotten rid of one sort of tyranny and can more freely speak up, a more suppressive and widespread process of control and surveillance is underway. Worse than that, we the users seem to be comfort with that

Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Agreement

The current study was conducted shortly after the JCPOA was released and approved by the U.N. Security Council. The survey seeks to understand how attitudes and expectations have changed since the nuclear deal was achieved. It also explores the relationship between Iranians’ assumptions about the terms of the deal, their expectations about its benefits and risks, and their attitudes toward their current political leaders, the United States, and the other countries in the negotiations. These assumptions, expectations, and attitudes set the context in which Iranian leaders will decide whether or not to approve the deal. They are also likely to influence how Iranian policymakers and the public respond to whatever actions the United States takes as it reviews the JCPOA and reassesses its policies towards Iran. The telephone poll of 1,000 Iranians was conducted August 8-18, 2015, by IranPoll.com, an independent, Toronto-based polling organization, for the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. The margin of error was +/- 3.2%. Full Report | Questionnaire and frequency tables. Summary of Findings 1. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Agreement Vast majorities of Iranians approve of the nuclear agreement that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Vienna, whereas only a fifth disapprove of it. While about a third sees the agreement as mostly a victory for Iran, over four in ten see it as beneficial for both Iran and the P5+1, though Iran is perceived to have made fewer concessions. Iranians overwhelmingly approve of the performance of their negotiators. A majority of Iranians are optimistic that both the UN Security Council and the United States are likely to act in good faith and remove sanctions as the deal requires. Nevertheless, three in four continue to believe that the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) should be able to prevent the agreement from taking effect if it finds the terms to be at odds with Iran’s national interests. Also, almost all Iranians continue to believe that it is very important for Iran to develop its nuclear program. 2. Views of Rouhani As a result of the nuclear agreement, a large majority says it now has a better opinion of President Hassan Rouhani. As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, three in five Iranians now want Rouhani’s supporters to win, while only about one in five favor his critics. President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s already high approval ratings have risen even more since the agreement was reached while their opponents’ popularity has declined slightly. 3. Misperceptions about the Nuclear Agreement While Iranians have a positive view of the nuclear agreement, they also underestimate the scope and extent of the commitments Iran has made under the deal. Substantial majorities incorrectly believe that according to the agreement: -all U.S. sanctions, not just nuclear-related ones—will be lifted eventually; - the sanctions on Iran will start to be lifted either before or at the same time as Iran takes most of the steps it has agreed to take under the deal; -Iran has not agreed to any limitations on its nuclear research and development activities; -the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot inspect Iranian military sites under any conditions. Those who hold these misperceptions are far more supportive of the deal than those who don’t. Among those who don’t hold these misperceptions, support is lower, but generally half or more still approve of the deal. Also, Rouhani supporters are more likely to hold these misperceptions than critics. 4. High Expectations about Positive Effects of the Deal Iranians express high expectations that the nuclear deal will have significant positive effects in the near term. Growing majorities say that as a result of the deal they expect to see, within a year, better access to foreign medicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, a significant drop in Iran’s unemployment rate, and tangible improvement in living standards. Almost three in five Iranians now think that the economic conditions in Iran are getting better. Half of Iranians now think that rather than aiming to achieve self-sufficiency, Iran should strive to increase its trade with other countries—up from four in ten a year ago. 5. Iran’s Relations with the United States in the Wake of the Deal A majority of Iranians believes that relations with the United States will improve after the nuclear deal. Several trend questions show strong shifts on views of the United States. A majority no longer believes that Iran’s nuclear concessions will likely lead the United States to use pressure to extract more concessions on other issues. Majorities approve of Iran and the United States collaborating with each other to help the government of Iraq and counter ISIS. Large majorities continue to say that they have an unfavorable view of the United States, but a growing number believe that Iran and the United States should strive to mitigate conflicts between the two countries. 6. Changing Views of Other Countries and Economic Relations Iranians show warming attitudes toward the P5+1 countries as a whole and toward Europe. A plurality now says that it trusts the P5+1 countries, and large majorities say they expect relations with Europe to improve. Iranians also believe that as a result of the agreement, other countries view their country with more respect. Views of all P5+1 countries have become a bit more favorable and majorities now have favorable attitudes toward Germany, Russia, and China. Iranians are also showing increasing openness to economic relations with other countries

Intra/Inter communications in Social Network and Intermediary of the Media Influencers

This paper focuses on the role of influencers as an element of modern governance. As the fields of media, entertainment industry, and politics become increasingly interconnected, the phenomenon of influencer potentially affects many aspects of political life, such as campaigning and voting, policymaking, and international affairs. Using the network analysis method and applying a triple typification of influencers consists of media influencers, influencer politicians in power, and influencer opposition politicians out of power, and selecting 245 nodes on Instagram accounts, the article focuses on how do influencers interact within communication networks? Based on the triple typification, the article tries to find the pattern of networked political communications between influencers in the social network. The results prove that all three types of influencers are more interested in intra-group communication. However, both influencer politicians in power and influencer opposition politicians out of power have relatively similar tendencies to associate with media influencers

Iranian Public Opinion, One Year After the Nuclear Deal

On July 14, 2015, the United States, Iran, and five other world powers announced that they had agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. In return for Iran strengthening its commitments never to pursue nuclear weapons, sharply limiting its dual-use capabilities, and allowing greater international scrutiny of its nuclear program, the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States agreed to lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. Both the nuclear deal and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani were immensely popular in Iran right after the JCPOA was announced, in part because the public thought that the terms were more generous toward Iran than they actually were, and because people had high expectations about economic and political benefits. Reactions in the United States were much more mixed. A smaller majority of the American public supported the deal, but critics in Congress came close to blocking its implementation because they worried about what Iran would do if it received a windfall from sanctions relief and hoped that tightening sanctions further could convince Iran to give up all dual-use nuclear capabilities. It’s appropriate to assess how Iranian public opinion has changed in the year since the deal was signed and the six months since sanctions relief began to be implemented, given that U.S. and European leaders frequently assert that Rouhani was elected with a mandate to improve Iran’s economy by using nuclear diplomacy to get sanctions relief. Comparing shifts in Iranian public opinion over time also offers a way to test some of the predictions made by congressional critics, including that there would be a crack-down on human rights in Iran to appease the opponents of increased engagement with the West, or that giving the Iranian public only a small taste of the economic and political benefits that could flow from becoming a “normal” country would increase pressure for more sweeping changes to Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. This survey of Iranian public opinion is the sixth in a series conducted during and after the negotiations that produced the JCPOA by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland in collaboration with the Program on Public Consultation and Iranpoll.com. Some of the same questions have been asked consistently since July 2014, when negotiations had been underway for many months, but the two sides remained far apart on some important issues. Some were reworded to reflect important contextual changes, such as public understanding about the main elements of the JCPOA and the Iranian parliamentary elections earlier this year. Some new questions have been added to find out what the Iranian public thinks about issues that have become particularly salient in recent months, such as the extent to which those who have not yet seen any economic benefits from the JCPOA hold Rouhani responsible or blame factors beyond his control. The previous reports in this series, a set of assessments about American attitudes towards nuclear diplomacy with Iran, and a collection of related articles are available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/projects/security-cooperation-iran-challenges-and-opportunities

Internet (Information/Skill) Literacy in Iran

This study examines the associations of internet information literacy with two variables: (1) the ability to work with technical aspects of the internet (internet skill), and (2) attitudes about the need for qualitative necessities in the development of e-services. A hierarchical regressions software analyzes data from a national sample of 2134 internet users. In this paper, internet literacy is considered as a literacy which has two-dimensional aspects including information literacy and skill literacy. In an articulation as this, many of the capabilities associated with the internet such as technical, critical, analytical, and structural factors are studied. In addition, abilities that lead users to make distinctions between useful, safe and healthy data and fake, hateful and unhealthy data are taken into account. The analysis shows that the internet information literacy is positively related to internet skills. It is also shown that more internet information literacy leads to more demands for e-services’ qualitative necessities (in the eight indicators of cheapness, availability, usability, quickness, security, integrity, reliability, and transparency). Furthermore, some sociodemographic characteristics (i.e. age, gender, education, income, and place of residence) are explicitly associated with internet skills. Strategy suggestions are concluded for policy making in the respective fields

Iranian Public Attitudes Before & After Parliamentary Elections

This report is the latest in a series of in-depth studies about Iranian public opinion regarding the nuclear negotiations, political and economic conditions in Iran, security in the Middle East, and Iran’s foreign relations that the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) and Iranpoll.com, an independent Toronto-based polling company. It builds on a January 2016 study conducted shortly before the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran had fulfilled the nuclear commitments made in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and could start receiving sanctions relief. It includes some data collected in a second pre-election survey, as well as data from a survey done shortly after the first round of elections. CISSM’s previous studies of Iranian public opinion, and related articles and studies of American public opinion towards the nuclear negotiations with Iran are available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/projects/program-public-consultation

Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations

As the marathon negotiation between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) nears its third self-imposed deadline on June 30, many around the world wonder if this round of negotiations is going to resolve all remaining issues, and if so, whether the officials involved are going to be able to sell the deal they have worked out back in their own capitals. As to whether or not a deal will be reached, diplomats from Iran as well as the P5+1 countries have consistently been cautiously optimistic. While all sides indicate that they are committed to reaching a deal by the June 30 deadline, recent reports suggest that gaps remain between concrete positions on the main elements of a deal. And as negotiators struggle with various elements of the deal outside their capitals, there is significant controversy inside the capitals on what would constitute a “good deal.” The U.S. Congress has passed legislation giving Congress at least a month to review the details of any agreement reached before President Obama could waive any congressionally imposed sanctions on Iran. Lawmakers and officials in Tehran have been pressing their case that any deal that would not result in speedy termination of sanctions or would open Iran’s sensitive non-nuclear military and security installations to Iran-specific inspections is unacceptable. To better understand the domestic political environments that constrain how much negotiating room the key players have, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has conducted several studies of American and Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations. Its first study of American public opinion, “Americans on Negotiations with Iran,” was conducted in collaboration with the Program for Public Consultation in July 2014, followed by another study which was released on March 3, 2015. Both of these reports are available at www.cissm.umd.edu. CISSM also conducted a study of Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations in collaboration with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) in July 2014, focusing mostly on the steps Iran would be willing to take in return for removal of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and published the results of that study on September 17, 2014. The current study was conducted after Iran and the P5+1 reached an understanding regarding the main elements of the final deal in Lausanne, Switzerland. It seeks to illuminate the specific views and preferences of Iranian citizens regarding the ongoing nuclear negotiations, their support for a deal along the lines of the framework understanding, their assumptions regarding the elements of the final deal, and their expectations from a deal. This study also explores a broad range of Iranian political preferences and attitudes that shape the context in which the nuclear negotiations are occurring