A theory of constitutional change -- Game theoretical analysis of socio-political processes in Poland, 1976-81.

This study develops a theoretical framework to explain processes of constitutional change and applies it to socio-political processes in Poland, 1976-81.1 develop a dynamic game- theoretical approach within the framework of public choice theory. Events are explained by individual actions under given structural conditions. The study contributes to this field in two aspects. First, through theoretical arguments and empirical analysis it illuminates how structural changes and dynamics of collective action influence individuals' beliefs and preferences. Secondly, it provides a framework for the analysis of constitutional change specifying the starting and ending conditions as well as the mechanism of such processes. The study explains events of constitutional change as the outcomes of complex processes of belief change in which three interacting factors play a major role: the available information to the players, the level of coordination within the dominant groups in the process and individual entrepreneurship. Asymmetries in these parameters influence power relations thus leading to particular institutional changes. The theoretical arguments are used to explain two events of constitutional change which took place in Poland during 1976-81: 1) the Gdansk agreement (31.8.80) which granted political rights to Polish workers allowing the establishment of Solidarity as an independent trade union; 2) the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981. These events provide a special environment to study the internal mechanism of constitutional change since they were isolated from any 'wave' of transition or major international events. They involved complex interactions between social and political factors which have not been systematically analyzed so far. The empirical analysis explains the Polish events using primary sources in form of statements, documents, the full transcript of the August 1980 negotiations and secret Politburo protocols as well as historical and journalistic descriptions. These events demonstrate the power embodied in individual entrepreneurship and in citizens' collective action. Explaining them by theoretical models contributes to the theory of democracy and political participation

A Two-Level Analysis of Israel’s Strategy toward Peace during the 1990s

This paper suggests a two-level game analysis of Israel’s strategy toward peace during the 1990s. The paper shows how various paradoxes in Israeli society create domestic obstacles and internal opposition that weaken Israel’s bargaining position toward neighboring countries. Treating domestic parameters in these countries as a given, we argue that Israeli leaders can hardly use this weakness to manipulate information in the bargaining process, because neighboring countries can observe Israel’s internal processes. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards neighboring polities, especially the Palestinians, without actually creating the necessary internal conditions for such a policy, may finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – in terms of territory and deterrent ability – since it will have to compromise under difficult conditions. Several practical implications as to the preferred bargaining process under these conditions follow

C-reactive protein serum levels as an early predictor of outcome in patients with pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus infection

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Data for predicting which patients with pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection are likely to run a complicated course are sparse. We retrospectively studied whether the admission serum C-reactive protein (CRP) levels can serve as a predictor of illness severity.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Included were all consecutive adult patients who presented to the emergency department (ED) between May-December, 2009 with a flu-like illness, a confirmed diagnosis of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection and a serum CRP level measured within 24 hours of presentation. Patients with a proven additional concurrent acute illness (e.g., bacteremia) were excluded. We used the ROC curve analysis, Kaplan-Meier curves and the Cox proportional hazard model to evaluate the predictive ability of CRP as a prognostic factor.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Seventeen (9%) of the 191 enrolled patients were admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU), of whom eight (4%) required mechanical ventilation and three (2%) died. The median admission serum CRP levels were significantly higher among patients who required subsequent ICU care and mechanical ventilation than among patients who did not (123 mg/L and 112 mg/L vs. 40 mg/L, <it>p </it>< .001 and 43 mg/L, <it>p </it>= .017, respectively). A Cox proportional hazard model identified admission serum CRP levels and auscultatory findings over the lungs as independent prognostic factors for ICU admission. Admission serum CRP levels were the only independent prognostic factor for mechanical ventilation. Thirty days after presenting to the ED, none of the patients with admission serum CRP level <28 mg/L (lower tertile) required either ICU admission or mechanical ventilation. At the same time point, 19% of the patients with admission serum CRP level ≥70 mg/L (upper tertile) needed to be admitted to the ICU and 8% of the same upper tertile group required mechanical ventilation. The differences in the rates between the lower vs. upper tertile groups were significant (Log-Rank <it>p </it>< .001 for ICU and <it>p </it>< .024 for mechanical ventilation).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>In our study group, serum CRP levels obtained in the early ED admission stage from patients presenting with pandemic H1N1 influenza A infection were found to serve as a useful gauge for predicting disease course and assisting in patient management.</p

A signaling model of peaceful political change

The interaction between social activists and politicians is modeled by a signaling game in which activists send messages and politicians interpret them, attempting to understand the activists' goals. These goals range between extreme radical and very moderate changes that activists wish to achieve in policy or in the political system. The formal model shows the conditions for equilibrium with separating and pooling regions dependent on the type of social activists and the demands they raise. In the pooling region an activist who wants to achieve a certain degree of radical change sends a false signal, thus possibly leading politicians to enter negotiations under unfavorable conditions. This creates a momentum of peaceful political change.

A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action

The paper offers a complex and systematic model of the bandwagon effect in collective action using continuous time equations. The model treats the bandwagon effect as a process influenced by ratio between the mobilization efforts of social activists and the resources invested by the government to counteract this activity. The complex modeling approach makes it possible to identify the conditions for specific types of the bandwagon effect, and determines the scope of that effect. Relying on certain behavioral assumptions, these conditions are only indirectly connected to individual beliefs, so that a given bandwagon effect can be explained and planned without knowing the exact preferences of the players' preferences.