Feeling, Not Freedom: Nietzsche Against Agency

Despite his rejection of the metaphysical conception of freedom of the will, Nietzsche frequently makes positive use of the language of freedom, autonomy, self-mastery, self-overcoming, and creativity when describing his normative project of enhancing humanity through the promotion of its highest types. A number of interpreters have been misled by such language to conclude that Nietzsche accepts some version of compatibilism, holding a theory of natural causality that excludes metaphysical or “libertarian” freedom of the will, while endorsing morally substantial alternative conceptions of freedom, autonomy, and responsibility. I argue to the contrary that although Nietzsche’s rejection of..

Generating High-Order Threshold Functions with Multiple Thresholds

In this paper, we consider situations in which a given logical function is realized by a multithreshold threshold function. In such situations, constant functions can be easily obtained from multithreshold threshold functions, and therefore, we can show that it becomes possible to optimize a class of high-order neural networks. We begin by proposing a generating method for threshold functions in which we use a vector that determines the boundary between the linearly separable function and the high-order threshold function. By applying this method to high-order threshold functions, we show that functions with the same weight as, but a different threshold than, a threshold function generated by the generation process can be easily obtained. We also show that the order of the entire network can be extended while maintaining the structure of given functions.Comment: 7 page

Nietzsche contra Freud on Bad Conscience

While much has been made of the similarities between the work of Nietzsche and Freud, insufficient attention has been paid to their differences. Even where they have been noted, the degree of these differences, which sometimes approaches direct opposition, has often been underestimated. In the following essay, I will suggest that on the topic of conscience Nietzsche and Freud have radically opposed views, with profoundly different moral consequences. Despite superficial similarities, Nietzsche’s conception of conscience is opposed to that of Freud in almost every conceivable way. For Freud, conscience is primarily associated with bad will, repression, subordination to social prohibition, and the feeling of guilt. For Nietzsche, conscience is primarily related to affirmation, memory, individual sovereignty, and the feelings of pride and power. To be sure, Freudian “bad conscience” has its parallel in Nietzsche’s philosophy—but only as a modality of conscience, not as its foundation. Freudian conscience is, on the contrary, an essentially bad conscience

Unknown Japanese Woman interview

Topics Include: Japanese, Japan, school, education, food, California, bank, familyhttps://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/witw/1010/thumbnail.jp

Biplanar Crossing Numbers of Bipartite Graphs

The goal of this thesis is to compute upper and lower bounds on the biplanar crossing numbers of complete bipartite graphs. The concept of a biplanar crossing number was first introduced by Owens (Owens 1971) as an optimization problem in circuit design. To prove upper bounds, we follow a method used by Czabarka et. al. (Czabarka et. al. 2006), in which they start from an optimal drawing of a small bipartite graph and use it to generate drawings of larger bipartite graphs. We explore several possibilities for computing lower bounds. One is using Ramsey theory, via the Bipartite Ramsey Number and the Connected Bipartite Ramsey Number. We prove that these numbers are equal for complete bipartite graphs, except in a few trivial cases. The other method we use is a heavily computer-aided derivation, based on the counting method, of lower bounds for small complete bipartite graphs. This is the method used in Shavali and Zarrabi-Zadeh (Shavali and Zarrabi-Zadeh 2019). We present a slight improvement over their results

Nietzsche's Naturalist Morality of Breeding: A Critique of Eugenics as Taming

In this paper, I directly oppose Nietzsche ’s endorsement of a morality of breeding to all forms of comparative, positive eugenics: the use of genetic selection to introduce positive improvement in individuals or the species, based on negatively or comparatively defined traits. I begin by explaining Nietzsche ’s contrast between two broad categories of morality: breeding and taming. I argue that the ethical dangers of positive eugenics are grounded in their status as forms of taming, which preserves positively evaluated character traits and types through the active de-selection of negatively evaluated ones. The morality of taming is not a form of selection, but de-selection: the production of counter or anti-traits and types. Consequently, in its attempt to improve humanity, it tends necessarily toward violence as the elimination of de-selected forms of human life. In contrast, Nietzsche ’s morality of breeding selects traits and types by protecting them from de-selection—specifically, by attacking moral ideas, values, and practices designed to eliminate them. It tends not towards the destruction but preservation of types; its negativity targets not life but the ideas that disable, disempower, and eradicate forms of life. I argue, further, that the fundamental ethical difference between breeding and taming, and so between Nietzschean morality and eugenics, is found in their attitudes toward the natural world. The violence of eugenics as taming is grounded in its status as anti-natural, while Nietzsche ’s morality of breeding resists violence through its foundational affirmation of the conditions and limitations of the natural world: its resolute moral naturalism. Finally, I apply my interpretation of breeding and taming to two cases of comparative, positive eugenics: the historical case of racial eugenics and the so-called “designer baby” case in contemporary liberal eugenics. Nietzsche must condemn both as forms of the anti-natural morality of taming, to which the morality of breeding is diametrically opposed

Freud or Nietzsche: the Drives, Pleasure, and Social Happiness

Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is not essentially distinct from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects