103 research outputs found
Does "skin in the game" reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal financial reforms
We examine how the Banking Acts of the 1933 and 1935 and related New Deal legislation influenced
risk taking in the financial sector of the U.S. economy. Our analysis focuses on contingent liability of
bank owners for losses incurred by their firms and how the elimination of this liability influenced
leverage and lending by commercial banks. Using a new panel data set that compares balance sheets
of state and national banks, we find contingent liability reduced risk taking, particularly when coupled
with rules requiring banks to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Leverage ratios are
higher in states with limited liability for bank owners. Banks in states with contingent liability
converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could sustain larger loan losses (as a
fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. The New Deal replaced a regime of
contingent liability with stricter balance sheet regulation and increased capital requirements, shifting
the onus of risk management from banks to state and federal regulators. By separating investment
banks from commercial banks, the Glass-Steagall Act left investment banks to manage their own
leverage, a feature of financial regulation that, in part, depended on their partnership structur
Pegxit Pressure: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard
We develop a simple model that highlights the costs and benefits of fixed exchange rates as they relate to trade, and show that negative export-price shocks reduce fiscal revenue and increase the likelihood of an expected currency devaluation. Using a new high-frequency data set on commodity-price movements from the classical gold standard era, we then show that the model’s main prediction holds even for the canonical example of hard pegs. We identify a negative causal relationship between export-price shocks and currency-risk premia in emerging market economies, indicating that negative export-price shocks increased the probability that countries abandoned their pegs
Branch Banking as a Device for Discipline: Competition and Bank Survivorship During the Great Depression
Because California was a pioneer in the development of intrastate branching, we use its experience during the 1920s and 1930s to assess the effects of the expansion of large-scale, branch-banking networks on competition and the stability of banking systems. Using a new database of individual bank balance sheets, income statements, and branch establishment, we examine the characteristics that made a bank a more likely target of a takeover by a large branching network, how incumbent unit banks responded to the entry of branch banks, and how branching networks affected the probability of survival of banks during the Great Depression. We find no evidence that branching networks expanded by acquiring "lemons"; rather those displaying characteristics of more profitable institutions were more likely targets for acquisition. We show that incumbent, unit banks responded to increased competition from branch banks by changing their operations in ways consistent with efforts to increase efficiency and profitability. Results from survivorship analysis suggest that unit banks competing with branch bank networks, especially with the Bank of America, were more likely to survive the Great Depression than unit banks that did not face competition from branching networks. Our statistical findings thus support the hypothesis that branch banking produces an externality in that it improves the stability of banking systems by increasing competition and forcing incumbent banks to become more efficient.
Branch Banking, Bank Competition, and Financial Stability
It is often argued that branching stabilizes banking systems by facilitating diversification of bank portfolios; however, previous empirical research on the Great Depression offers mixed support for this view. Analyses using state-level data find that states allowing branch banking had lower failure rates, while those examining individual banks find that branch banks were more likely to fail. We argue that an alternative hypothesis can reconcile these seemingly disparate findings. Using data on national banks from the 1920s and 1930s, we show that branch banking increases competition and forces weak banks to exit the banking system. This consolidation strengthens the system as a whole without necessarily strengthening the branch banks themselves. Our empirical results suggest that the effects that branching had on competition were quantitatively more important than geographical diversification for bank stability in the 1920s and 1930s.
Capital Market Integration in Japan
We construct new quarterly estimates of lending rates for the 47 Japanese prefectures for the period 1886-1922, and test the extent to which regional capital markets integrated during this period. We analyze whether the Japanese capital market was efficient, estimate the speed of convergence among the rates, and assess the degree to which different regions were integrated with the main financial centers of Japan. Interest rate differentials between the financial centers of Japan and other regions do not follow a random walk, and hence are suggestive of market efficiency-in the sense that arbitrage opportunities did not persist. Results from cointegration tests suggest that the integration in Japan is characterized by multiple stochastic elements. We find the existence of four long-run cointegrating relationships. We also find evidence that shocks occurring in a financial center, such as the Kanto region in which Tokyo is located, were transmitted to outlying regions and had permanent but small effects on their rates.Financial market development; Capital market integration; Economic integration; Japanese banks
Capital controls and recovery from the financial crisis of the 1930s
We examine the first widespread use of capital controls in response to a global or regional financial crisis.
In particular, we analyze whether capital controls mitigated capital flight in the 1930s and assess their
causal effects on macroeconomic recovery from the Great Depression. We find evidence that they
stemmed gold outflows in the year following their imposition; however, time-shifted, difference-indifferences
(DD) estimates of industrial production, prices, and exports suggest that exchange controls did
not accelerate macroeconomic recovery relative to countries that went off gold and floated. Countries
imposing capital controls also appear to perform similar to the gold bloc countries once the latter group of
countries finally abandoned gold. Time series regressions further demonstrate that countries imposing
capital controls refrained from fully utilizing their newly acquired monetary policy autonomy. Even so,
capital controls remained in place as instruments for manipulating trade flows and for preserving foreign
exchange for the repayment of external debt
The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 1890s
The Baring Crisis is the nineteenth century's most famous sovereign debt crisis. Few studies, however, have attempted to understand the extent to which the crisis mattered for countries other than Argentina and England. Using a new database consisting of more than 15,000 observations of weekly sovereign debt prices, we assess the extent to which the Barings Crisis affected other emerging market borrowers and find empirical evidence of a regional crisis. We find that Latin American yield spreads increased by more than 200 basis points during the crisis relative to the rest of the world, even after controlling for macroeconomic, trade, political-institutional factors, and other country-specific effects. Our evidence suggests that European investors may have sold off or reduced their holdings of Latin American securities in the wake of the Baring Crisis.
The evolution of bank supervision : evidence from U.S. states
We use a novel data set spanning 1820-1910 to examine the origins of bank supervision
and assess factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across
U.S. states. We show that it took more than a century for the widespread adoption of
independent supervisory institutions tasked with maintaining the safety and soundness of
banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double
liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift
from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks propelled policymakers to adopt
costly and permanent supervisory institutions
Searching for Irving Fisher
There is a long-standing debate as to whether the Fisher effect operated during the classical gold
standard period. We break new ground on this question by developing a market-based measure of
inflation expectations during the gold standard. We derive a measure of silver-gold inflation
expectations using the interest-rate differential between Austrian silver and gold perpetuity bonds.
Our use of the silver-gold interest rate differential is motivated by the fact that both gold and
silver served as numeraires in the pre-WWI period, so that a change in the price of either precious
metal would impact the prices of all goods and services. The empirical evidence suggests that
silver-gold inflation expectations exhibited significant persistence at the weekly, monthly, and
annual frequencies. Further, we find that there is a one-to-one relationship between silver-gold
inflation expectations and the interest rate on Austrian perpetuity bonds that were denominated in
paper currency. The analysis suggests the operation of a Fisher effect during the classical gold
standard period
Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment
Theoretical models have suggested that sanctions may be important for enforcing sovereign debt contracts (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a, 1989b). This paper examines the role of sanctions in promoting debt repayment during the classical gold standard period. We analyze a wide range of sanctions including gunboat diplomacy, external fiscal control over a country's finances, asset seizures by private creditors, and trade sanctions. We find that "supersanctions," instances where military pressure or political control were applied in response to default, were an important and commonly used enforcement mechanism from 1870-1913. Following the implementation of supersanctions, on average, ex ante default probabilities on new debt issues fell by more than 60 percent, yield spreads declined approximately 800 basis points, and defaulting countries experienced almost a 100 percent reduction of time spent in default. We also find that debt defaulters that surrendered their fiscal sovereignty for an extended period of time were able to issue large amounts of new debt on international capital markets. Consistent with policies advocated by Caballero and Dornbusch (2002) for Argentina, our results suggest that third-party enforcement mechanisms, with the authority to enact financial and fiscal reforms, may be beneficial for resuscitating the capital market reputation of sovereign defaulters.
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