Interview with John and Prin Mitchell by Andrea L’Hommedieu

Biographical NoteJohn Peter Mitchell was born in Massachusetts in 1927 to Mary (Saad) and George J. Mitchell, Sr. His mother worked as a weaver in the local woolen mills and his father worked for the Central Maine Power Company, and later for Colby College. John attended Waterville High School where he participated in football, baseball, and was an outstanding basketball player, earning him the nickname “Swisher.” He served in the Navy and attended the University of Rhode Island, where he was a star basketball player. He taught school and coached for many years at Colby College. John is the brother of Senator George Mitchell, Paul Mitchell, Robbie Mitchell and Barbara (Mitchell) Atkins. At the time of this interview he continued to live in Waterville, Maine, with his wife, Prin. SummaryInterview includes discussion of: family and educational background; Waterville, Maine Boy’s Club; athletics growing up; “funny books” anecdote; Mitchell family history; Lebanese culture of Waterville during childhood; meeting his future wife, Prin; reading the Epistle and the role of the church; high school English teacher Mrs. Whitten; importance of Bowdoin in molding George Mitchell; Mitchell Institute; George Mitchell’s 1974 Maine gubernatorial campaign; George Mitchell’s career; media attention in Waterville; and traditional Lebanese food and family traditions

Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return

Many advocates of social security privatization argue that rates of return under a defined contribution individual account system would be much higher for all than they are under the current social security system. This claim is false. The mistake comes from ignoring accrued benefits already promised based on past payroll taxes, and from underestimating the riskiness of stock investments. Confusion arises because three distinct reforms are muddled. By privatization we mean creating individual accounts (which could, for example, be invested exclusively in bonds). By diversification we mean investing in stocks, and perhaps other assets, as well as bonds; diversification might be undertaken either by individuals in their private social security accounts, or by the social security trust fund. By prefunding we mean closing the gap between social security benefits promised to date and the assets on hand to pay for them. Any one of these reforms could be implemented without the other two. If the system were completely privatized, with no prefunding or diversification, the social security system would need to raise taxes and/or issue new debt in order to pay benefits already accrued. If the burden were spread evenly across all future generations via a constant proportional tax, the added taxes would completely eliminate any rate of return advantage on the individual accounts. We estimate that the required new taxes would amount to about 3 percent of payroll, or about a quarter of all social security contributions, in perpetuity. Unlike privatization, prefunding would raise rates of return for later generations, but at the cost of lower returns for today's workers. For households able to invest in the stock market on their own, diversification would not raise rates of return, correctly adjusted to recognize risk. Households that are constrained from holding stock, due to lack of wealth outside of social security or to fixed costs from holding stocks, would gain higher risk-adjusted returns and would benefit from diversification. If this group is large, diversification would raise stock values, thus helping current stockholders, but it would lower future stock returns, thus hurting young unconstrained households. Overall, since the number of truly constrained households is probably not that large, privatization and diversification would have a much smaller effect on returns than reformers typically claim.

Social Security Money's Worth

This paper describes how three money's worth measures the benefit-to-tax ratio, the internal rate of return, and the net present value are calculated and used in analyses of social security reforms, including systems with privately managed individual accounts invested in equities. Declining returns from the U.S. social security system prove to be the inevitable result of having instituted an unfunded (pay-as-you-go) retirement system that delivered $7.9 trillion of net transfers (in 1997 present value dollars) to people born before 1917, and will deliver another$1.8 trillion to people born between 1918 and 1937. But young and future workers cannot necessarily do better by investing their payroll taxes in capital markets. If the old system were closed down, massive unfunded liabilities of $9-10 trillion would still have to be paid unless already accrued benefits were cut. Alternative methods of calculating these accrued benefits yield somewhat different numbers: the straight line calculation is$800 billion less than the constant benefit calculation we propose as the benchmark. Using this benchmark in a world with no uncertainty, we show that privatization without prefunding would not increase returns at all, net of the new taxes needed to pay for unfunded liabilities. These new taxes would amount to 3.6 percent of payroll, or about 29 percent of social security contributions. Prefunding, implemented by reducing accrued benefits or by raising taxes, would eventually increase money's worth for later generations, but at the cost of lower money's worth for today's workers and/or retirees. Computing money's worth when there is uncertainty is much more difficult unless four conditions hold prices into stocks and out of bonds has no effect whatsoever on money's worth when it i adjusted for risk: a dollar of stock is worth no more than a dollar of bonds. diversification can raise welfare for constrained households, but the exact money's worth must depend on specific assumptions about household attitudes toward risk. Calculations lik the Social Security Advisory Council that attribute over $2.85 of net present va$1 shifted from bonds to stocks completely overlook the disutility of risk. By estimate that a 2 percent of payroll equity fund carved out of social security w present value by about 59 cents per dollar of bonds switched into equities When the likely reductions in income and longevity insurance are factored in privatization and diversification is substantially less than popularly perceived

Social Security Money\u27s Worth

This paper describes how three money’s worth measures — the benefit-to-tax ratio, the internal rate of return, and the net present value — are calculated and used in analyses of social security reforms, including systems with privately managed individual accounts invested in equities. Declining returns from the U.S. social security system prove to be the inevitable result of having instituted an unfunded (pay-as-you-go) retirement system that delivered $7.9 trillion of net transfers (in 1997 present value dollars) to people born before 1917, and will deliver another$1.8 trillion to people born between 1918 and 1937. But young and future workers cannot necessarily do better by investing their payroll taxes in capital markets. If the old system were closed down, massive unfunded liabilities of $9–10 trillion would still have to be paid unless already accrued benefits were cut. Alternative methods of calculating these accrued benefits yield somewhat different numbers: the straight line calculation is$800 billion less than the constant benefit calculation we propose as the benchmark. Using this benchmark in a world with no uncertainty, we show that privatization without prefunding would not increase returns at all, net of the new taxes needed to pay for unfunded liabilities. These new taxes would amount to 3.6 percent of payroll, or about 29 percent of social security contributions. Prefunding implemented by reducing accrued benefits or by raising taxes, would eventually increase money’s worth for later generations, but at the cost of lower money’s worth for today’s workers and/or retirees. Computing money’s worth when there is uncertainty is much more difficult unless four conditions hold, namely optimization, time homogeneity, stable prices, and spanning. Under these conditions, the diversification of social security investments into stocks and out of bonds has no effect whatsoever on money’s worth when it is properly adjusted for risk: a dollar of stock is worth no more than a dollar of bonds. When spanning fails, diversification can raise welfare for constrained households, but the exact money’s worth must depend on specific assumptions about household attitudes toward risk. Calculations like those of the Social Security Advisory Council that attribute over $2.85 of net present value gain to each$1 shifted from bonds to stocks completely overlook the disutility of risk. By contrast, we estimate that a 2 percent of payroll equity fund carved out of social security would increase net present value by about 59 cents per dollar of bonds switched into equities, instead of $2.85. When the likely reductions in income and longevity insurance are factored in, the net advantage of privatization and diversification is substantially less than popularly perceived

Geometry and Topology of Escape. II. Homotopic Lobe Dynamics

We continue our study of the fractal structure of escape-time plots for chaotic maps. In the preceding paper, we showed that the escape-time plot contains regular sequences of successive escape segments, called epistrophes, which converge geometrically upon each end point of every escape segment. In the present paper, we use topological techniques to: (1) show that there exists a minimal required set of escape segments within the escape-time plot; (2) develop an algorithm which computes this minimal set; (3) show that the minimal set eventually displays a recursive structure governed by an “Epistrophe Start Rule:” a new epistrophe is spawned Δ=D+1 role= presentation style= display: inline; line-height: normal; word-spacing: normal; overflow-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative; \u3eΔ=D+1Δ=D+1 iterates after the segment to which it converges, where D role= presentation style= display: inline; line-height: normal; word-spacing: normal; overflow-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative; \u3eD is the minimum delay time of the complex

Use of the interRAI CHESS Scale to Predict Mortality among Persons with Neurological Conditions in Three Care Settings

Background: Persons with certain neurological conditions have higher mortality rates than the population without neurological conditions, but the risk factors for increased mortality within diagnostic groups are less well understood. The interRAI CHESS scale has been shown to be a strong predictor of mortality in the overall population of persons receiving health care in community and institutional settings. This study examines the performance of CHESS as a predictor of mortality among persons with 11 different neurological conditions. Methods: Survival analyses were done with interRAI assessments linked to mortality data among persons in home care (n = 359,940), complex continuing care hospitals/units (n = 88,721), and nursing homes (n = 185,309) in seven Canadian provinces/territories. Results: CHESS was a significant predictor of mortality in all 3 care settings for the 11 neurological diagnostic groups considered after adjusting for age and sex. The distribution of CHESS scores varied between diagnostic groups and within diagnostic groups in different care settings. Conclusions: CHESS is a valid predictor of mortality in neurological populations in community and institutional care. It may prove useful for several clinical, administrative, policy-development, evaluation and research purposes. Because it is routinely gathered as part of normal clinical practice in jurisdictions (like Canada) that have implemented interRAI assessment instruments, CHESS can be derived without additional need for data collection.Public Health Agency of Canada, Project #6271-15-2010/3970773, Ontario Home Care Research and Knowledge Exchange Chair (to JPH) through the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Car