93 research outputs found
Overdemand and underdemand in economies with indivisible goods and unit demand
We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods. Further, we give characterizations for the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of this economy. Using our characterizations, we give a suncient set of rules that generates a broad class of ascending and descending auctions in which truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
Minimum Cost Arborescences
In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also signifcant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices.directed networks ; cost allocation ; core stability ; continuity ; cost monotonicity
Minimum cost arborescences
In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also signilcant dikerences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices.directed networks, cost allocation, core stability, continuity, cost monotonicity
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive
compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive
compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment model. If the common prior of the
agents is a uniform prior, then a large class of random mechanisms are OBIC
with respect to this prior -- this includes the probabilistic serial mechanism.
We then introduce a robust version of OBIC: a mechanism is locally robust OBIC
if it is OBIC with respect all independent priors in some neighborhood of a
given independent prior. We show that every locally robust OBIC mechanism
satisfying a mild property called elementary monotonicity is strategy-proof.
This leads to a strengthening of the impossibility result in Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2001): if there are at least four agents, there is no locally robust
OBIC and ordinally efficient mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals
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