Preventing Others from Commercializing Your Innovation: Evidence from Creative Commons Licenses

Online innovation communities are an important source of innovation for many organizations. While contributions to such communities are typically made without financial compensation, these contributions are often governed by licenses such as Creative Commons that may prevent others from building upon and commercializing them. While this can diminish the usefulness of contributions, there is limited work analyzing what leads individuals to impose restrictions on the use of their work. In this paper, we examine innovators imposing restrictive licenses within the 3D-printable design community Thingiverse. Our analyses suggest that innovators are more likely to restrict commercialization of their contributions as their reputation increases and when reusing contributions created by others. These findings contribute to innovation communities and the growing literature on property rights in digital markets

The octopus effect: when and who platform companies acquire

After their launch, Amazon, Apple, Airbnb, and Google, giant platforms of the digital economy, all followed a similar pattern. They quickly bought competing platform companies in their same market niche before growing tentacles through acquisitions in other sectors. Margherita Pagani, Milan Miric, and Omar El Sawy call this phenomenon “octopus effect” and wonder what the next evolutionary stage of platforms will be

A biomechanical assessment of modular and monoblock revision hip implants using FE analysis and strain gage measurements

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The bone loss associated with revision surgery or pathology has been the impetus for developing modular revision total hip prostheses. Few studies have assessed these modular implants quantitatively from a mechanical standpoint.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Three-dimensional finite element (FE) models were developed to mimic a hip implant alone (Construct A) and a hip implant-femur configuration (Construct B). Bonded contact was assumed for all interfaces to simulate long-term bony ongrowth and stability. The hip implants modeled were a Modular stem having two interlocking parts (Zimmer Modular Revision Hip System, Zimmer, Warsaw, IN, USA) and a Monoblock stem made from a single piece of material (Stryker Restoration HA Hip System, Stryker, Mahwah, NJ, USA). Axial loads of 700 and 2000 N were applied to Construct A and 2000 N to Construct B models. Stiffness, strain, and stress were computed. Mechanical tests using axial loads were used for Construct A to validate the FE model. Strain gages were placed along the medial and lateral side of the hip implants at 8 locations to measure axial strain distribution.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>There was approximately a 3% average difference between FE and experimental strains for Construct A at all locations for the Modular implant and in the proximal region for the Monoblock implant. FE results for Construct B showed that both implants carried the majority (Modular, 76%; Monoblock, 66%) of the 2000 N load relative to the femur. FE analysis and experiments demonstrated that the Modular implant was 3 to 4.5 times mechanically stiffer than the Monoblock due primarily to geometric differences.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>This study provides mechanical characteristics of revision hip implants at sub-clinical axial loads as an initial predictor of potential failure.</p

Trade-offs to using standardized tools: Innovation enablers or creativity constraints?

Research Summary: In platform ecosystems, the creation of new products is often based on standardized development tools. Complementors often have a choice between either using these tools or creating the functionality themselves. In this paper, we study how the use of standardized development tools is related to the type of products created. By using data on the use of middleware (e.g., game engines) in the console video game market, we show that the use of development tools is associated with products that are less novel but with higher sales on average. We exploit a policy change that affected the ability of U.S.-based developers to hire foreign workers as an instrument for the use of development tools and find further support for these patterns. Managerial Abstract: When developing new products, firms often have to decide whether they base their technology on preexisting components and standardized tools or develop that technology themselves. In general, it has not been clear how using standardized third-party tools that may be available to all firms in an industry affects the nature of the products that are created. Using data on middleware components, such as game engines, in the console video game industry, this paper shows the use of such standardized tools is associated with the creation of products that are less novel but generate higher sales on average. This is an important strategic consideration for firms, but also for platforms that make decisions regarding whether such tools should be allowed on their platform

Using supervised machine learning for large-scale classification in management research: The case for identifying artificial intelligence patents

10.1002/smj.3441STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL442491-51

When and Who Do Platform Companies Acquire? Understanding the Role of Acquisitions in the Growth of Platform Companies

The success of platform companies often depends on their ability to “scale” their customer and supplier base. Existing studies have focused on a variety of approaches that platforms may use to scale but have not systematically considered that platforms might acquire other companies as part of this growth strategy. In this paper, we study the acquisition patterns of digital platform companies and contrast these with the acquisition patterns of digital non-platform companies. We find that platform companies acquire earlier (shortly after founding) when compared with non-platform companies, and they often first acquire competing platform companies from the same market niche. As platform companies mature, they begin to acquire non-platform companies from other market niches. This contrasts with how acquisitions are made by non-platform companies, as shown in our analysis