Huisseau-sur-Mauves – Le Bourg

Date de l'opération : 1985 - 1986 (SU) Inventeur(s) : Millière Jérôme De précédents travaux d'assainissement avaient fourni des éléments révélant la présence d'un important site gallo-romain et d'une nécropole mérovingienne (Gallia, 1985 : 342). En 1986, une intervention de sauvetage a été réalisée devant le porche de l'ancienne église abandonnée de Huisseau-sur-Mauves après la découverte d'ossements d'enfants au cours de travaux d'aménagement (Millière, 1989). Sept sarcophages en calcaire c..

Coulmiers – Hauteur d’Hotton

Date de l'opération : 1987 (SU) Inventeur(s) : Millière Jérôme Un souterrain a été découvert en 1987, après le passage d'un engin agricole qui en avait provoqué l'effondrement. L'absence quasi-totale de couche archéologique, si ce n'est le fin dépôt de terre sur le sol, les matériaux (tuf et marne calcaire) dans lesquels les boyaux ont été creusés et l'absence d'aménagement particulier laissent supposer que ce souterrain était une marnière. Cependant, il ne semble pas impossible que les galer..

Meung-sur-Loire – Îlot du Fort

Date de l'opération : 1989 - 1991 (SU) Inventeur(s) : Millière Jérôme L'intervention archéologique de 1989 était motivée par le souci d'obtenir des repères archéologiques sur le rempart médiéval et d'évaluer le potentiel archéologique autour de ce dernier. Il n'a pas été possible de dégager entièrement les fondations en raison des remontées d'eau provoquées par la rivière la Mauve. Cependant, l'opération a permis de mettre en évidence une porte contemporaine de la construction de la fortifica..

Drug-Induced Alterations of Bodily Awareness

Philosophical and empirical research on bodily awareness has mostly focused so far on bodily disorders – such as anorexia nervosa, somatoparaphrenia, or xenomelia (body integrity dysphoria) – and bodily illusions induced in an experimental setting – such as the rubber hand illusion, or the thermal grid illusion. Studying these conditions can be illuminating to investigate a broad range of issues about the nature, function, and etiology of bodily experience. However, a number of psychoactive compounds can also induce a remarkably wide variety of bodily effects that have received little attention despite their relevance to these issues. Some of these effects are similar to those associated with bodily disorders or experimental bodily illusions, while others appear to be unique. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of these lesser known bodily effects of psychoactive compounds, and outline some ways in which they can bear on recent debates regarding bodily awareness and bodily ownership

Self in Mind. A Pluralist Account of Self-Consciousness

This thesis investigates the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. I consider two broad claims about this relationship: a constitutive claim, according to which all conscious experiences constitutively involve self-consciousness; and a typicalist claim, according to which ordinary conscious experiences contingently involve self-consciousness. Both of these claims call for elucidation of the relevant notions of consciousness and self-consciousness. In the first part of the thesis ('The Myth of Constitutive Self-Consciousness'), I critically examine the constitutive claim. I start by offering an elucidatory account of consciousness, and outlining a number of foundational claims that plausibly follow from it. I subsequently distinguish between two concepts of self-consciousness: consciousness of one's experience, and consciousness of oneself (as oneself). Each of these concepts yields a distinct variant of the constitutive claim. In turn, each resulting variant of the constitutive claim can be interpreted in two ways: on a 'minimal' or deflationary reading, they fall within the scope of foundational claims about consciousness, while on a 'strong' or inflationary reading, they point to determinate aspects of phenomenology that are not acknowledged by the foundational claims as being aspects of all conscious mental states. I argue that the deflationary readings of either variant of the constitutive claim are plausible and illuminating, but would ideally be formulated without using a term as polysemous as 'self-consciousness'; by contrast, the inflationary readings of either variant are not adequately supported. In the second part of the thesis ('Self-Consciousness in the Real World'), I focus on the second concept of self-consciousness, or consciousness of oneself as oneself. Drawing upon empirical evidence, I defend a pluralist account of self-consciousness so construed, according to which there are several ways in which one can be conscious of oneself as oneself – through conscious thoughts, bodily experiences and perceptual experiences – that make distinct determinate contributions to one's phenomenology. This pluralist account provides us with the resources to vindicate the typicalist claim according to which consciousness of oneself as oneself – a sense of self – is pervasive in ordinary conscious experiences, as a matter of contingent empirical fact. It also provides us with the resources to assess the possibility that a subject might be conscious without being conscious of herself as herself in any way

Are There Degrees of Self-Consciousness?

It is widely assumed that ordinary conscious experience involves some form of sense of self or consciousness of oneself. Moreover, this claim is often restricted to a ‘thin’ or ‘minimal’ notion of self-consciousness, or even ‘the simplest form of self-consciousness’, as opposed to more sophisticated forms of self-consciousness which are not deemed ubiquitous in ordinary experience. These formulations suggest that self-consciousness comes in degrees, and that individual subjects may differ with respect to the degree of self-consciousness they exhibit at a given time. In this article, I critically examine this assumption. I consider what the claim that self-consciousness comes in degrees may mean, raise some challenges against the different versions of the claim, and conclude that none of them is both coherent and particularly plausible

The Varieties of Selflessness

Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. Such states can be said to be at least partially selfless, since they lack at least one of the ways in which one could be self-conscious. Furthermore, I argue that there is also preliminary empirical evidence that some states of consciousness lack all of these six putative forms of self-consciousness. Such states might be totally selfless, insofar as they lack all the ways in which one could be self-conscious. I conclude by addressing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness

Selfless Memories

Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problematic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysterious how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counter-examples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness