Keplerian integrals, elimination theory and identification of very short arcs in a large database of optical observations

Modern asteroid surveys produce an increasingly large number of observations, which are grouped into very short arcs (VSAs) each containing a few observations of the same object in one single night. To decide whether two VSAs collected in different nights correspond to the same observed object we can attempt to compute an orbit with the observations of both arcs: this is called the linkage problem. Since the number of linkages to be attempted is very large, we need efficient methods of orbit determination. Using the first integrals of Kepler’s motion we can write algebraic equations for the linkage problem, which can be put in polynomial form. In Gronchi et al. (Celest Mech Dyn Astron 123(2):105–122, 2015) these equations are reduced to a polynomial equation of degree 9: the unknown is the topocentric distance of the observed body at the mean epoch of one VSA. Here we derive the same equations in a more concise way, and show that the degree 9 is optimal in a sense that will be specified in Sect. 3.3. We also introduce a procedure to join three VSAs: from the conservation of angular momentum we obtain a polynomial equation of degree 8 in the topocentric distance at the mean epoch of the second VSA. For both identification methods, with two and three VSAs, we discuss how to discard solutions. Finally, we present some numerical tests showing that the new methods give satisfactory results and can be used also when the time separation between the VSAs is large. The low polynomial degree of the new methods makes them well suited to deal with the very large number of asteroid observations collected by the modern surveys

Prospex:ProtocolSpecificationExtraction

Protocol reverse engineering is the process of extracting application-level specifications for network protocols. Such specificationsare very useful in a numberof security-related contexts, forexample, to perform deep packet inspectionand black-box fuzzing, or to quickly understand custom botnet command and control (C&C) channels. Since manual reverse engineering is a time-consuming and tedious process, a number of systems have been proposed that aim to automate this task. These systems either analyze network traffic directly or monitor the execution of the application that receivestheprotocolmessages.While previoussystemsshow thatprecise message formatscanbe extractedautomatically, they do not provide a protocol specification. The reason is that they do not reverse engineerthe protocol state machine. In this paper, we focus on closing this gap by presenting a system that is capable of automatically inferring state machines. This greatly enhances the results of automatic protocol reverse engineering, while further reducing the need for human interaction. We extend previous work that focuses on behavior-based message format extraction, and introduce techniques for identifying and clustering different types of messages not only based on their structure, but also accordingto the impact of each message on server behavior. Moreover, we present an algorithm for extracting the state machine. We have applied our techniques to a number of real-world protocols, including the command and control protocol used by a malicious bot. Our results demonstrate that we are able to extract format specifications for different types of messages and meaningful protocol state machines. We use these protocol specifications to automatically generate input for a stateful fuzzer, allowing us to discover security vulnerabilities in real-world applications. 1

The BepiColombo MORE gravimetry and rotation experiments with the ORBIT14 software

open6noopenG. Schettino, S. Di Ruzza, S. Cicalò, G. Tommei; A. Milani Comparetti; E.M. AlessiSchettino, G.; DI RUZZA, Sara; Cicalò, S.; Tommei, G.; Milani Comparetti, A.; Alessi, E. M