Vertical Coordination Through Renegotiation

This paper analyzes the strategic use of bilateral supply contracts in sequential negotiations between one manufacturer and two differentiated retailers. Allowing for general contracts and retail bargaining power, I show that the first contracting parties have incentives to manipulate their contract to shift rent from the second contracting retailer and these incentives distort the industry profit away from the fully integrated monopoly outcome. To avoid such distortion, the first contracting parties may prefer to sign a contract which has no commitment power and can be renegotiated from scratch should the manufacturer fail in its subsequent negotiation with the second retailer. Renegotiation from scratch induces the first contracting parties to implement the monopoly prices and might enable them to capture the maximized industry profit. A slotting fee, an up-front fee paid by the manufacturer to the first retailer, and a menu of tariff-quantity pairs are sufficient contracts to implement the monopoly outcome. These results do not depend on the type of retail competition, the level of differentiation between the retailers, the order of sequential negotiations, the level of asymmetry between the retailers in terms of their bargaining power vis-à-vis the manufacturer or their profitability in exclusive dealing

Hepatic profile analyses of tipranavir in Phase II and III clinical trials

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The risk and course of serum transaminase elevations (TEs) and clinical hepatic serious adverse event (SAE) development in ritonavir-boosted tipranavir (TPV/r) 500/200 mg BID recipients, who also received additional combination antiretroviral treatment agents in clinical trials (TPV/r-based cART), was determined.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Aggregated transaminase and hepatic SAE data through 96 weeks of TPV/r-based cART from five Phase IIb/III trials were analyzed. Patients were categorized by the presence or absence of underlying liver disease (+LD or -LD). Kaplan-Meier (K-M) probability estimates for time-to-first US National Institutes of Health, Division of AIDS (DAIDS) Grade 3/4 TE and clinical hepatic SAE were determined and clinical actions/outcomes evaluated. Risk factors for DAIDS Grade 3/4 TE were identified through multivariate Cox regression statistical modeling.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Grade 3/4 TEs occurred in 144/1299 (11.1%) patients; 123/144 (85%) of these were asymptomatic; 84% of these patients only temporarily interrupted treatment or continued, with transaminase levels returning to Grade ≤ 2. At 96 weeks of study treatment, the incidence of Grade 3/4 TEs was higher among the +LD (16.8%) than among the -LD (10.1%) patients. K-M analysis revealed an incremental risk for developing DAIDS Grade 3/4 TEs; risk was greatest through 24 weeks (6.1%), and decreasing thereafter (>24-48 weeks: 3.4%, >48 weeks-72 weeks: 2.0%, >72-96 weeks: 2.2%), and higher in +LD than -LD patients at each 24-week interval. Treatment with TPV/r, co-infection with hepatitis B and/or C, DAIDS grade >1 TE and CD4⁺> 200 cells/mm³at baseline were found to be independent risk factors for development of DAIDS Grade 3/4 TE; the hazard ratios (HR) were 2.8, 2.0, 2.1 and 1.5, respectively. Four of the 144 (2.7%) patients with Grade 3/4 TEs developed hepatic SAEs; overall, 14/1299 (1.1%) patients had hepatic SAEs including six with hepatic failure (0.5%). The K-M risk of developing hepatic SAEs through 96 weeks was 1.4%; highest risk was observed during the first 24 weeks and decreased thereafter; the risk was similar between +LD and -LD patients for the first 24 weeks (0.6% and 0.5%, respectively) and was higher for +LD patients, thereafter.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Through 96 weeks of TPV/r-based cART, DAIDS Grade 3/4 TEs and hepatic SAEs occurred in approximately 11% and 1% of TPV/r patients, respectively; most (84%) had no significant clinical implications and were managed without permanent treatment discontinuation. Among the 14 patients with hepatic SAE, 6 experienced hepatic failure (0.5%); these patients had profound immunosuppression and the rate appears higher among hepatitis co-infected patients. The overall probability of experiencing a hepatic SAE in this patient cohort was 1.4% through 96 weeks of treatment. Independent risk factors for DAIDS Grade 3/4 TEs include TPV/r treatment, co-infection with hepatitis B and/or C, DAIDS grade >1 TE and CD4⁺> 200 cells/mm³at baseline.</p> <p>Trial registration</p> <p>US-NIH Trial registration number: NCT00144170</p

RNA localization in neurite morphogenesis and synaptic regulation: current evidence and novel approaches

It is now generally accepted that RNA localization in the central nervous system conveys important roles both during development and in the adult brain. Of special interest is protein synthesis located at the synapse, as this potentially confers selective synaptic modification and has been implicated in the establishment of memories. However, the underlying molecular events are largely unknown. In this review, we will first discuss novel findings that highlight the role of RNA localization in neurons. We will focus on the role of RNA localization in neurotrophin signaling, axon outgrowth, dendrite and dendritic spine morphogenesis as well as in synaptic plasticity. Second, we will briefly present recent work on the role of microRNAs in translational control in dendrites and its implications for learning and memory. Finally, we discuss recent approaches to visualize RNAs in living cells and their employment for studying RNA trafficking in neurons

Collusive Effects of a Monopolist's Use of an Intermediary to Deliver to Retailers

A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further if the upstream firm chooses a mixed distribution system in which it makes use of an intermediary to distribute the good to a subset of the retailers and delivers directly only to the remaining downstream firms