An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks

“Democracy in the European Union.” CEPS Working Document No. 286, February 2008

In this Working Document, Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime, argues that once the Union is recognised for what it is – an innovative polity, where power is shared by a large number of players with many participation and influence-wielding mechanisms, – it becomes apparent that on the whole it complies with democratic legitimisation standards no less than do member states, even if multiple, and potentially conflicting legitimisation channels and principles may confuse observers

Overcoming the gridlock in EMU decision-making. CEPS Policy Insights No 2020-03 / March 2020

The completion of EMU, and banking union as its critical component, requires that certain taboos in the policy debate are brought out in the open. First, the Commission must stop pretending that Italian public debt is sustainable under current policies and shift from politically motivated forbearance to serious implementation of the SGP and notably its debt rule. Second, it is necessary to acknowledge that crisis management by the ESM is crippled as long as its financial assistance can only be granted after the country in need is close to losing market access and, in addition, this threatens the financial stability of the entire euro area. The already-existing alternative to assist a country that is not respecting the SGP is to utilise the enhanced conditional credit line (ECCL) introduced by the ESM reform, approved by the European Council and awaiting national ratifications, in order to agree on a full-fledged adjustment programme before any euro area member (Italy) comes to the brink again – without any preventive conditions on the sustainability of public debt. And, third, the completion of the banking union requires a reduction of banks’ home sovereign portfolios, that can be incentivised by the introduction of mild concentration charges. However, the system will not work without simultaneously offering the banks and financial investors in general a true European safe asset, fully guaranteed by its member states. Our proposal is that such a safe asset could be offered by the ESM, which would purchase in exchange the sovereigns held by the ESCB as a result of the quantitative easing asset purchase programme. The risk of losses on these sovereigns would continue to lie with the national central banks, thus avoiding the transfer of new risks to the ESM

Overhauling corporate taxation in the digital economy. CEPS Policy Insights No 2019-15/October 2019

Is the corporate income tax (CIT) still an efficient system for taxing companies today? The CIT was introduced when economies were characterised primarily by tangible assets and goods and by limited international trade. Globalisation, digitalisation and the increasing weight of immaterial goods in company transactions and balance sheets have rendered that system outdated. These radical changes call for equally radical reflections on how to reform the CIT, bearing in mind the need for a corporate tax system that is fit for both the digital and the traditional economy, in developing and developed countries alike. Rather than offering a complete solution, this paper discusses various approaches that could contribute to a solution. First, we suggest that the CIT base should always be strictly aligned with the accounting profit and loss account, eschewing special adjustments for tax purposes. Second, a more radical possibility would be to abandon altogether the reference to corporate income and tax companies instead on cash flow, based on destination. And, third, the possibility could also be explored to tax companies with reference to ‘presumptive’ indicators of activity, rather than on the basis of public accounts. Presumptive indicators are already used in federal systems to allocate corporate income among decentralised jurisdictions. These propositions would not be viable without international agreement, at least at the level of the European Union. Such an agreement may prove difficult given the conflicts of interest between EU member states and between them and the United State

‘Soft Brexit’ is not an option. CEPS Commentary, 24 November 2016

IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON BREXIT, analysts and political observers tend to presume that negotiations on a new framework for the relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom will revolve around a compromise that would allow the UK to limit the free circulation of EU workers, while maintaining access to the EU single market, especially for services, more or less under the current rules.[1] Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016) have gone so far as to propose a Continental Partnership (CP), in which the UK would not only be able to limit the free movement of persons, but would also have a seat in a ‘Council’ in charge of legislative coordination between the UK and the EU with the power to propose amendments to draft European legislation (although the European Parliament would not be obliged to accept them).[2] These ideas in reality mimic arrangements already in existence within the European Economic Area (EEA). However, the more time passes and issues are dissected, the more I grow convinced that an agreement on those terms with the UK will prove impossible

Time for the ECB to bite the bullet. CEPS Commentary, 19 January 2015

This Commentary summarises the main reasons why the ECB can no longer delay launching a massive bond-buying programme, also including sovereigns of eurozone member countries, and why such interventions will indeed be effective in raising inflation, thus restoring the ECB’s credibility and spurring economic activity. A credible programme must continue either until an explicit inflation target has been achieved or the ECB balance sheet has reached the €2 trillion target already announced by the ECB’s Governing Council. Regardless of how such interventions will be undertaken, they will reduce interest-rate spreads between eurozone markets, but it is nevertheless important that the ECB designs its operations so as to avoid any implication of direct support or deficit financing facilitation for the eurozone’s most indebted countries. Finally, some kind of guarantee against first losses by the ECB on its sovereign bonds may be appropriate, while entrusting open market operations to each national central bank for their own sovereigns could threaten the very survival of monetary union

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start