The FOMC in 1988: uncertainty's effects on monetary policy

Federal Open Market Committee ; Monetary policy

On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within

This paper develops a positive analysis of stable group formation, highlighting the role of conflict management within groups. The analysis is based on a model of sequential conflict, starting with a "winner- take-all" contest for control of some resource. When a group forms, members pool their efforts in that contest and, if successful, apply the resource to a joint production process. While reducing the severity of conflict over the contestable resource relative to the case of individual conflict, the formation of groups adds another layer of conflict---that is, one between the members of the winning group over the distribution of their joint product. The effectiveness of conflict management in enabling groups to resolve this second layer of conflict in more "peaceful" ways involving less "social waste" has some important implications for the equilibrium structure of groups as well as for the allocation of resources.Endogenous group formation, competitive appropriation, conflict management.

The causes and consequences of leveraged buyouts

Leveraged buyouts

The FOMC in 1989: walking a tightrope

Federal Open Market Committee

The economic consequences of reducing military spending

Defense contracts ; Economic policy

What is an "acceptable" rate of inflation?--a review of the issues

Inflation (Finance)

Strategic considerations in monetary policy with private information: can secrecy be avoided?

Monetary policy

Strategic considerations in monetary policy with private information: can secrecy be avoided?

Monetary policy

Economics of Conflict: An Overview

In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure from the traditional paradigm of economics. The research we emphasize, however, takes an economic perspective. Specifically, it applies conventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities— productive and otherwise appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one’s own product and wealth. In contrast to other economic activities in which inputs are combined cooperatively through production functions, the inputs to appropriation are combined adversarially through technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the determinants of the distribution of output (or power) and how an individual party’s share can be inversely related to its marginal productivity; when settlement in the shadow of conflict and when open conflict can be expected to occur, with longer time horizons capable of inducing conflict instead of settlement; how conflict and appropriation can reduce the appeal of trade; the determinants of alliance formation and the importance of intra-alliance commitments; how dynamic incentives for capital accumulation and innovation are distorted in the presence of conflict; and the role of governance in conflict management.Anarchy; Bargaining; Conflict technology; Economic growth; Exchange; Governance; Group formation; Open conflict; Power; Shadow of the future