The Effect of Preferential Admissions on the College Participation of Disadvantaged Students: The Role of Pre-College Choices

Exploiting the randomized expansion of preferential college admissions in Chile, we show they increased admission and enrollment of disadvantaged students by 32%. But the intended beneficiaries were nearly three times as many, and of higher average ability, than those induced to be admitted. The evidence points to students making pre-college choices that caused this divergence. Using linked survey-administrative data, we present evidence consistent with students being averse to preferential enrollment, misperceiving their abilities, and having social preferences towards their friends (although social preferences did not mediate the admission impacts). Simulations from an estimated structural model suggest that aversion to the preferential channel more than halved the enrollment impacts, by inducing some to forgo preferential admission eligibility, and that students' misperceptions worsened the ability-composition of college entrants, by distorting pre-college investments into admission qualifications. The results demonstrate the importance of understanding high school students' preferences and beliefs when designing preferential admissions

Heterogeneous Peer Effects and Rank Concerns: Theory and Evidence

Using a theoretical model where students care about achievement rank, I study effort choices in the classroom and show that rank concerns generate peer effects. The model’s key empirical prediction is that the effect on own achievement of increasing the dispersion in peer cost of effort is heterogeneous, depending on a student’s own cost of effort. To test this, I construct a longitudinal multi-cohort dataset of students, with data on the geographic propagation of building damages from the Chilean 2010 earthquake. I find that higher dispersion in home damages among one’s classmates led, on average, to lower own Mathematics and Spanish test scores. To be able to test the theory, I develop a novel nonlinear difference-in-differences model that estimates effect heterogeneity and that relates observed damages to unobserved cost of effort. I find that some students at the tails of the predicted cost of effort distribution benefit from higher dispersion in peer cost of effort, as predicted by the theoretical model. This finding suggests that observed peer effects on test scores are, at least partly, governed by rank concerns

Teacher labor markets, school vouchers and student cognitive achievement: Evidence from Chile

This dissertation develops and structurally estimates an equilibrium model of the Chilean school system and uses the model to assess the effect of teacher wage and accreditation policies on student achievement. In the model, potential teachers choose between teaching in a public school, teaching in a private school, working in the non-teaching sector and not working; parents choose whether to enroll their children in public or private schools; and private schools set tuition and teacher wages. The equilibrium of the model determines the distribution of student cognitive achievement. The estimation is based on a unique dataset that combines three rich data sources from Chile: student test score data, household survey data and teacher survey data. Chile is an ideal environment for studying school choice, because it has thirty years of experience with a school voucher system and a large private school sector. I use a two-step estimation approach that addresses the issue of potentially multiple equilibria. The estimated model fits the data well. Policy experiments show that an increase in the wages of public school teachers accompanied by minimum teacher competency requirements would increase average student test scores without a large increase in government costs. A larger increase in test scores could be achieved by making the wages of public school teachers more directly tied to their skills than in the current system. Under the existing voucher plan, both policies could be partially financed by the increased voucher revenues that result from an increased demand for public education

Teacher labor markets, school vouchers and student cognitive achievement: Evidence from Chile

This dissertation develops and structurally estimates an equilibrium model of the Chilean school system and uses the model to assess the effect of teacher wage and accreditation policies on student achievement. In the model, potential teachers choose between teaching in a public school, teaching in a private school, working in the non-teaching sector and not working; parents choose whether to enroll their children in public or private schools; and private schools set tuition and teacher wages. The equilibrium of the model determines the distribution of student cognitive achievement. The estimation is based on a unique dataset that combines three rich data sources from Chile: student test score data, household survey data and teacher survey data. Chile is an ideal environment for studying school choice, because it has thirty years of experience with a school voucher system and a large private school sector. I use a two-step estimation approach that addresses the issue of potentially multiple equilibria. The estimated model fits the data well. Policy experiments show that an increase in the wages of public school teachers accompanied by minimum teacher competency requirements would increase average student test scores without a large increase in government costs. A larger increase in test scores could be achieved by making the wages of public school teachers more directly tied to their skills than in the current system. Under the existing voucher plan, both policies could be partially financed by the increased voucher revenues that result from an increased demand for public education

Teacher labor markets, school vouchers, and student cognitive achievement: Evidence from Chile

I use administrative and survey data from Chile and a structural model to evaluate teacher policies in a market-based school system. The model accommodates equilibrium effects on parental sorting across school sectors (public or private), on the self-selection of individuals into teaching and across school sectors, and on teacher wages in private schools. I use the estimated model to simulate a reform that is planned to be implemented in Chile in 2023. Tying public school teacher wages to teacher skills and introducing minimum competency requirements for teaching is predicted to increase student test scores by 0.30 standard deviations and decrease the achievement gap between the poorest and richest 25% of students by a third. These impacts are ten times as large as the impact of a flat wage increase in public schools, and over twice as large as the impact of only introducing minimum competency requirements. The key driver of policy outcomes is an improvement in the pool of teachers, amplified by equilibrium effects on teacher wages in private schools. The equilibrium effects are large, accounting for 70% of estimated policy impacts

The Persistent Effect of Competition on Prosociality

We present the first causal evidence on the persistent impact of enduring competition on prosociality. Inspired by the literature on tournaments within firms, which shows that competitive compensation schemes reduce cooperation in the short-run, we explore if enduring exposure to a competitive environment persistently attenuates prosociality. Based on a large-scale randomized intervention in the education context, we find lower levels of prosociality for students who just experienced a 2-year competition period. 4-year follow-up data indicate that the effect persists and generalizes, suggesting a change in traits and not only in behavior

The Persistent Effect of Competition on Prosociality

We present the first causal evidence on the persistent impact of enduring competition on prosociality. Inspired by the literature on tournaments within firms, which shows that competitive compensation schemes reduce cooperation in the short-run, we explore if enduring exposure to a competitive environment persistently attenuates prosociality. Based on a large-scale randomized intervention in the education context, we find lower levels of prosociality for students who just experienced a 2-year competition period. 4-year follow-up data indicate that the effect persists and generalizes, suggesting a change in traits and not only in behavior

Teacher Quality in Public and Private Schools under a Voucher System: The Case of Chile

Chile is unusual in having long-term experience with nationwide school vouchers. A key criticism of school voucher systems is that they make it easier for private schools to attract better teachers to the detriment of public schools. This paper uses longitudinal data from Chile to estimate a discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) model of teacher and nonteacher labor supply decisions and to explore how wage policies affect the composition of the teacher labor force in public and private schools. In the model, individuals first decide whether to get a teaching degree and then choose annually from among five work/home sector alternatives. Empirical results show that private voucher schools attract better teachers than public schools. However, the existence of the private voucher sector also draws higher-productivity individuals into the teaching profession

The Persistent Effect of Competition on Prosociality

We present the first causal evidence on the persistent impact of enduring competition on prosociality. Inspired by the literature on tournaments within firms, which shows that competitive compensation schemes reduce cooperation in the short-run, we explore if enduring exposure to a competitive environment persistently attenuates prosociality. Based on a large-scale randomized intervention in the education context, we find lower levels of prosociality for students who just experienced a 2-year competition period. 4-year follow-up data indicate that the effect persists and generalizes, suggesting a change in traits and not only in behavior