Political antisemitism in Romania? Hard data and its soft underbelly

Public opinion polling on ethnic minorities has shown from the start that while negative or ambivalent attitudes to Jews in Romania are far from having vanished, they do not affect a spectrum as large as that of anti-Roma attitudes and prejudices. Subsequent surveying carried out in the late 1990s and early 2000s confirmed the earlier findings by studies measuring stereotypical perceptions or social distance. Yet it would be an exaggeration to state that antisemitism is not a factor influencing social attitudes or even the perception of politics by the population. The Romanian surveys available thus far did not measure latent antisemitism and they lack the sophistication inquiring what stands behind "non-committal don't knows" and "no answers". Holocaust-related surveys seem to indicate that only a small minority is interested in this aspect and even among its members information is often partial at best. It is therefore difficult to predict whether "political antisemitism" could emerge in post-communist Romania as it did in neighboring Hungary. The Hungarian and other experiences, however, demonstrate that political antisemitism can become a factor when for reasons other than anti-Jewish attitudes political parties, influential intellectuals and other social entrepreneurs condone and utilize themselves implicit antisemitism of which they are not always aware. The last part of the article illustrates such potentially contributing factors and actors utilizing qualitative rather than quantitative analysis

Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Policy makers typically approach human behavior from the perspective of the rational agent model, which relics on normativc, a priori analyses. The model assumes people make insightful, well-planned, highly controlled, and calculated decisions guided by considerations of personal utility. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in professional schools and has come to dominate much of the formulation and conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical behavioral research, and the one we will articulate here, provides a substantially difierent perspective on individual behavior and its policy and regulatory implications. According to the empirical perspective, behavior is the amalgam of perceptions, impulses, judgments, and decision processes that emerge from the impressive machinery that people carry behind the eyes and between the ears. Actual human behavior, it is argued, is often unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced behavioral perspective, it is suggested, can yield deeper understanding and improved regulatory insight

An Opt-Out Home Mortgage System

The current housing and financial crisis has led to significant congressional and executive action to manage the crisis and stem the harms from it, but the fundamental problems that caused the crisis remain largely unaddressed. The central features of the industrial organization of the mortgage market with its misaligned incentives, and the core psychological and behavioral phenomena that drive household financial decisionmaking remain. While the causes of the mortgage meltdown are myriad and the solutions likely to be multifaceted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive and much less risky than they really were—and borrowers took them. It is time for common-sense reform to the mortgage market. This paper develops a new framework for understanding the mortgage markets as the interaction between individuals with specific psychological biases and firms that respond to those psychologies within specific markets. We argue that regulation needs to take account of that interaction. Our new framework leads us to propose a sticky opt-out mortgage system, under which lenders would be required to offer borrowers loans with standard terms. Borrowers could opt out for other loans, but only after heightened disclosure requirements, and lenders would face increased exposure to liability or other sanctions

The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Policymakers approach human behavior largely through the perspective of the “rational agent” model, which relies on normative, a priori analyses of the making of rational decisions. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in professional schools, and has come to dominate much of the formulation and conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical behavioral research, provides a substantially different perspective on individual behavior and its policy implications. Behavior, according to the empirical perspective, is the outcome of perceptions, impulses, and other processes that characterize the impressive machinery that we carry behind the eyes and between the ears. These proclivities, research has shown, intrude upon and shape behavior, often quite independently of deliberative intent, and in contrast with normative ideals that people endorse upon reflection. The results are systematic behaviors that are unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced behavioral perspective, such research suggests, can yield deeper understanding and improved regulatory insight

The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Policymakers approach human behavior largely through the perspective of the “rational agent” model, which relies on normative, a priori analyses of the making of rational decisions. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in professional schools, and has come to dominate much of the formulation and conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical behavioral research, provides a substantially different perspective on individual behavior and its policy implications. Behavior, according to the empirical perspective, is the outcome of perceptions, impulses, and other processes that characterize the impressive machinery that we carry behind the eyes and between the ears. These proclivities, research has shown, intrude upon and shape behavior, often quite independently of deliberative intent, and in contrast with normative ideals that people endorse upon reflection. The results are systematic behaviors that are unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced behavioral perspective, such research suggests, can yield deeper understanding and improved regulatory insight

Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation

Financial services decisions can have enourmous consequences for household well-being. Households need a range of financial services - to conduct basic transactions, such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills; to save for emergency needs and long-term goals; to access credit; and to insure against life\u27s key risks. But the financial services system is exceedingly complicated and often not well-designed to optimize house-hold behavior. In response to the complexity of out financial system, there has been a long running debate about the appropriate role and form of regulation. Regulation is largely stuck in two competing models - disclosure, and usury or product restrictions. This paper explores a different approach, based on insights from behavioral economics on one hand, and an understanding of industrial organization on the other. At the core of the analysis is the interaction between individual psychology and market competition. This is in contrast to the classic model, which relies on the interaction between rational choice and market competition. The introduction of richer psychology complicates the impact of competition. It helps us understand that firms compete based on how individuals will respond to products in the marketplace, and competitive outcomes may not always and in all contexts closely align with improved decisional choice and increased consumer welfare. This paper adopts a behavioral economic framework that considers firm incentives to respond to regulation. Under this framework, outcomes are an equilibrium interaction between individuals with specific psychologies and firms that responds to those psychologies within specific market contexts. Regulation must then address failures in this equilibrium. The model suggests, for example, that in some contexts market participants seek to overcome common human failings (as for example, with under-saving) while in other contexts market participants seek to exploit those failings (as for example, with over-borrowing). Behaviorally informed regulation needs to take account of these different contexts. The paper discusses the specific application of these forces to the case of mortage, credit card, and banking markets. The purpose of this paper is not to champion politics, but to illustrate how a behaviorally informed regulatory analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the costs and benefits of specific policies

An Opt-Out Home Mortgage System

The current housing and financial crisis has led to significant congressional and executive action to manage the crisis and stem the harms from it, but the fundamental problems that caused the crisis remain largely unaddressed. The central features of the industrial organization of the mortgage market with its misaligned incentives, and the core psychological and behavioral phenomena that drive household financial decisionmaking remain. While the causes of the mortgage meltdown are myriad and the solutions likely to be multifaceted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive and much less risky than they really were—and borrowers took them. It is time for common-sense reform to the mortgage market. This paper develops a new framework for understanding the mortgage markets as the interaction between individuals with specific psychological biases and firms that respond to those psychologies within specific markets. We argue that regulation needs to take account of that interaction. Our new framework leads us to propose a sticky opt-out mortgage system, under which lenders would be required to offer borrowers loans with standard terms. Borrowers could opt out for other loans, but only after heightened disclosure requirements, and lenders would face increased exposure to liability or other sanctions

Extrapolating human probability judgment

We advance a model of human probability judgment and apply it to the design of an extrapolation algorithm. Such an algorithm examines a person's judgment about the likelihood of various statements and is then able to predict the same person's judgments about new statements. The algorithm is tested against judgments produced by thirty undergraduates asked to assign probabilities to statements about mammals.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43846/1/11238_2005_Article_BF01079209.pd

Spurious Complexity and Common Standards in Markets for Consumer Goods

It has been argued that cognitively constrained consumers respond sub-optimally to complex decision problems, and that firms can exploit these limitations by introducing spurious complexity into tariff structures, weakening price competition. We model a countervailing force. Restricting one's choices to the most easily comparable options is a psychologically well-attested heuristic. Consumers who use this heuristic favour firms that follow common conventions about tariff structures. Because a 'common standard' promotes price competition, a firm's use of it signals that it offers value for money, validating the heuristic. This allows an equilibrium in which firms use common standards and set competitive prices