First aid in acute stroke: Introducing a concept of first action to laypersons

OBJECTIVE: First aid training is well established to teach the public how to recognize a medical emergency and take appropriate action. Though it is now handled as a high priority emergency stroke is not among the main topics of first aid. We investigated if first aid training may be useful for enhancing stroke awareness. METHODS: We developed a 15–20 minute teaching session about stroke as an emergency including signs and symptoms and first hands-on measures. The session was integrated in standard first aid training of the St John Ambulance of Germany and participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their knowledge about stroke. Subjects were questioned before the stroke lesson and again at the end of the training. RESULTS: 532 participants of the training responded to the questionnaire (mean age 28.6 years, 53.6% male). There was a significant increase in proportion of subjects correctly defining what stroke is (28.4% vs. 69.9%, p < 0,001) and in the mean number of stroke symptoms listed (1.52 vs. 3.35, p < 0,001) by the participants. The number of participants unable to list at least 1 symptom decreased significantly (12.8 vs. 3.6%, p<0.001). CONCLUSIONS: In our study a teaching lesson integrated in first aid training was effective in improving stroke knowledge of participants. First aid training should be used for stroke information complementary to other activities like mass media campaigns as it is effective, could reach younger people that are not primarily interested in stroke and provides connections to other health topics

Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform

This paper proposes to exploit a reform in legal rules of corporate governance to identify contractual incentives from the correlation of executive pay and firm performance. In particular, we refer to a major shift in the legal and institutional environment, the reform of the German joint-stock companies act in 1884. We analyze a sample of executive pay for 46 firms for the years 1870 to 1911. In 1884, a law reform substantially enhanced corporate control, strengthened the monitoring incentives of shareholders, and reduced the discretionary power of executives in Germany. Pay-performance sensitivity decreased significantly after this reform. While executives received a bonus of about three to five per cent in profits before 1884, after the reform this parameter decreased to a profit share of about two per cent. At least the profit share that is eliminated by the reform must have been incentive pay before. This incentive mechanism was replaced by other elements of corporate governance