Le chancre bacterien des agrumes: (Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri). Etude epidemiologique et ecologique dans le cadre de l'ile de la Reunion

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Risk Mitigation, Regimes Security, and Militias: Beyond Coup-proofing

In Thailand, India, Libya, and elsewhere, governments arm the populace or call up volunteers in irregular armed groups despite the risks this entails. The widespread presence of these militias, outside the context of state failure, challenges the expectation that governments uniformly consolidate the tools of violence. Drawing on the logic of delegation, we resolve this puzzle by arguing that governments have multiple incentives to form armed groups with a recognized link to the state but outside of the regular security forces. Such groups offset coup risks as substitutes for unreliable regular forces. Similar to other public-private collaborations, they also complement the work of regular forces in providing efficiency and information gains. Finally, these groups distance the government from the controversial use of force. These traits suggest that militias are not simply a sign of failed states or a precursor to a national military, but an important component of security portfolios in many contexts. Using cross-national data (1981–2005), we find support for this mix of incentives. From the perspective of delegation, used to analyze organizational design, global accountability, and policy choices, the domestic and international incentives for governments to choose militias raise explicit governance and accountability issues for the international community

Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads: Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan

This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin’s (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare

Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads: Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan

This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin’s (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare