1,215 research outputs found

    The isoperimetric constant of the random graph process

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    The isoperimetric constant of a graph GG on nn vertices, i(G)i(G), is the minimum of SS\frac{|\partial S|}{|S|}, taken over all nonempty subsets SV(G)S\subset V(G) of size at most n/2n/2, where S\partial S denotes the set of edges with precisely one end in SS. A random graph process on nn vertices, G~(t)\widetilde{G}(t), is a sequence of (n2)\binom{n}{2} graphs, where G~(0)\widetilde{G}(0) is the edgeless graph on nn vertices, and G~(t)\widetilde{G}(t) is the result of adding an edge to G~(t1)\widetilde{G}(t-1), uniformly distributed over all the missing edges. We show that in almost every graph process i(G~(t))i(\widetilde{G}(t)) equals the minimal degree of G~(t)\widetilde{G}(t) as long as the minimal degree is o(logn)o(\log n). Furthermore, we show that this result is essentially best possible, by demonstrating that along the period in which the minimum degree is typically Θ(logn)\Theta(\log n), the ratio between the isoperimetric constant and the minimum degree falls from 1 to 1/2, its final value

    The New Activist Non-Profits: Four Models Breaking from the Non-Profit Industrial Complex

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    Twenty-first century activists—inspired by recent social movements and criticisms of the “non-profit industrial complex”—have increasingly sought to avoid pursuing their activism through the hierarchical, professionally managed non-profit corporations that have been the norm for social justice organizations since the 1970s. While many of these activist groups have chosen to remain unincorporated, some activists have been experimenting with new, innovative structures for non-profit organizations, structures that aim to better align activists’ organizations with their values. This Article presents four models of activist non-profits: (1) sociocratic non-profits, (2) worker self-directed non-profits, (3) hub-and-spoke counter-institutions, and (4) swarm organizations. It describes how these approaches increase volunteer participation, deepen organizational democracy, connect more closely with social movements, and aim to maintain accountability among and between organizational members and other stakeholders. It presents legal constraints on the governance structures of these new organizations and concludes with a description of some best practices for these groups and their lawyers

    How The 1 Percent Pays Taxes; How The 99 Percent Could: The Subchapter T Worker Cooperative Tax Loophole

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    The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution granted Congress the right to tax income “from whatever source derived.” Since its inception, the tax code has become long and complicated, filled with broad taxation rules and innumerable exceptions. Over time, the tax code has been amended with the stated purpose of promoting “fairness, efficiency, and enforceability.” However, the complexity of the tax code has led to abuse of “tax loopholes” by wealthy taxpayers who want to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. While abuse is likely to continue, as legislators remain intent on lowering taxes on the wealthy, there exists a “tax loophole” that can benefit the working class. Subchapter T of the Tax Code provides that worker cooperatives, businesses that are jointly owned by their workers, can pass through their income to their worker-owners in the form of patronage dividends, avoiding the entity level taxes that corporations are generally required to pay. However, the IRS has maintained that worker cooperatives must pay their worker-owners a “reasonable salary,” subject to payroll taxes, rather than allowing worker-owners to be paid their entire salaries as patronage dividends to circumvent payroll taxes. This Note argues that the IRS has incorrectly interpreted Subchapter T of the tax code, as Subchapter T allows worker cooperatives to avoid corporate taxes at the entity level and allows worker-owners to avoid payroll taxes on their entire income by structuring their salaries as patronage dividends. Further, this Note argues that, as a matter of policy, the IRS ought to endorse this understanding of Subchapter T, as offering tax incentives to worker cooperatives will benefit the working class

    How The 1 Percent Pays Taxes; How The 99 Percent Could: The Subchapter T Worker Cooperative Tax Loophole

    Get PDF
    The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution granted Congress the right to tax income “from whatever source derived.” Since its inception, the tax code has become long and complicated, filled with broad taxation rules and innumerable exceptions. Over time, the tax code has been amended with the stated purpose of promoting “fairness, efficiency, and enforceability.” However, the complexity of the tax code has led to abuse of “tax loopholes” by wealthy taxpayers who want to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. While abuse is likely to continue, as legislators remain intent on lowering taxes on the wealthy, there exists a “tax loophole” that can benefit the working class. Subchapter T of the Tax Code provides that worker cooperatives, businesses that are jointly owned by their workers, can pass through their income to their worker-owners in the form of patronage dividends, avoiding the entity level taxes that corporations are generally required to pay. However, the IRS has maintained that worker cooperatives must pay their worker-owners a “reasonable salary,” subject to payroll taxes, rather than allowing worker-owners to be paid their entire salaries as patronage dividends to circumvent payroll taxes. This Note argues that the IRS has incorrectly interpreted Subchapter T of the tax code, as Subchapter T allows worker cooperatives to avoid corporate taxes at the entity level and allows worker-owners to avoid payroll taxes on their entire income by structuring their salaries as patronage dividends. Further, this Note argues that, as a matter of policy, the IRS ought to endorse this understanding of Subchapter T, as offering tax incentives to worker cooperatives will benefit the working class

    Finite size effects and scaling in lattice CP(N-1)

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    We present model predictions for the spectrum of CPN1CP^{N-1} in a periodic box and use them to interpret the strong finite size effects observed in lattice simulations at medium values of NN. The asymptotic scaling behaviour of alternative lattice actions is discussed along with some aspects of multigrid algorithm efficiency.Comment: 6 pages of text plus 2 pages of figures, Liverpool Preprint LTH28
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