Industry Valuation Driven Earnings Management

This paper investigates whether industry valuation impacts firms’ earnings management decisions. Existing accounting literature assumes that industry valuation has a constant impact on this decision. We argue that a higher industry valuation increases the perceived benefits of earnings management at a time when the negative consequences associated with accrual reversal and the probability of detection are believed to be lower. Using a sample of quarterly data of U.S. firms from 1985 to 2005, we find that the four-quarter lagged industry valuation has a positive relationship with industry aggregate (current) discretionary accruals. More specific, one standard deviation increase in the aggregate industry valuation is associated with a significant increase of 2.4 cents in quarterly earnings per share. Our results are robust after controlling for several factors, including bubble years, size, leverage and performance.Industry valuation;Earnings management;Market to book ratio

The Impact of Media Attention on the Use of Alternative Earnings Measures

The practice of reporting earnings measures that deviate from generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP measures) has received negative attention in the media. Regulators argue in favour of reporting GAAP earnings measures and utter their concerns that investors may be misled by the use of non-GAAP measures. In a period of increased regulatory concern for these reporting practices, we explore whether there has been a shift away from the use of non-GAAP metrics. We analyse a sample of earnings press releases in the period 1999-2004 from companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam. Our findings indicate that reporting non-GAAP measures is a common practice and that the frequency of reporting non-GAAP earnings measures has increased despite the concerns voiced by regulators. On the other hand, investors seem to have become more hesitant towards the use of alternative earnings measures for their decision-making. Our findings suggest that investors find non-GAAP measures informative before 2003, but they turn away from these measures in the following years and price GAAP earnings metrics instead. Together, these findings suggest that the negative media attention for non-GAAP measures has influenced the perception of investors, but not of managers.Regulation;Event study;Non-GAAP earnings;Information content;Value relevance

Royal Ahold: A Failure of Corporate Governance and an Accounting Scandal

Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) was one of the major success stories in the 1990s and is one of the major failures, suffering a complete meltdown, in 2003.We investigate the strategy, accounting transparency and corporate governance of Ahold; elements which jointly drive the firm s performance over this period of time.In general, the corporate governance, accounting transparency, strategy and firm performance relationships are complex.There is not a fully specified model available to address the inter-relationships, including the endogeneity problem.The econometrics are difficult and constrained not only by the lack of a fully specified theory but also by data availability. Our clinical study overcomes these problems by providing an in-depth analysis of the inter-relationships among corporate governance, accounting transparency and strategy that lead to Ahold s downfall.We provide insights into these relationships and their complexity that present theory and empirical studies cannot address.international economics;financial economics;financial reporting;law and economics;corporate governance;regulation

The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Netherlands

The purpose of this paper is to gather evidence on the success of market forces in promoting investor interests through self-regulation.Corporate governance is a complex mechanism design problem that is both economic and legal/political based.As such there is great interest in whether (and when) market forces alone are sufficient to prompt change, and whether (and when) additional legal/political actions are required to write and enforce contracts between the owners and managers of capital.The Netherlands provides an excellent opportunity to gather such information.In 1996, a private sector Committee was formed to initiate debate and change in the balance of power between a company's management and investors.In 1997, the Committee issued its recommendations and one year later the Committee initiated a project to assess the impact of the report.We identify the corporate governance variables that are linked to firm value and assess the impact of the committee's recommendations on the identified variables.Finally, we use event study techniques to assess investors reactions to the various events associated with the evolution of corporate governance practices in the Netherlands during this period.international economics;financial economics;law and economics;corporate governance

The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance

This paper assesses the effectiveness of self-regulation to promote investor interests. TheNetherlands provides an excellent opportunity to gather such evidence for two reasons. First,characteristics of the Dutch corporate governance structure have made it the recent focus ofattention by the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and countries (e.g., Korea)when deliberating issues of corporate governance. Second, during the period 1996-1998, aprivate sector initiative was undertaken to promote change in the balance of power betweenmanagement and investors. Not surprisingly, the United States Securities and ExchangeCommission has closely followed the Dutch "experiment" in self-regulation. We begin byidentifying corporate governance characteristics that are linked to firm value. We thencompare corporate governance characteristics and the relation between firm value and thesecharacteristics before and after the private sector initiative. We find that therecommendations of the private sector initiative had no substantive effect on corporategovernance characteristics or their relationship with firm value. Using event study techniqueswe document the market's skepticism about the successful evolution of corporate governancepractices in the Netherlands through self-regulation. The one exception to this generalconclusion is the market for new listings. Overall, our results confirm the importance ofshareholder voting rights, and who controls these rights, when considering the design of asuccessful self-regulation process.corporate governance;law and economics;financial economics;International economics

The Impact of Media Attention on the Use of Alternative Earnings Measures

The practice of reporting earnings measures that deviate from generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP measures) has received negative attention in the media. Regulators argue in favour of reporting GAAP earnings measures and utter their concerns that investors may be misled by the use of non-GAAP measures. In a period of increased regulatory concern for these reporting practices, we explore whether there has been a shift away from the use of non-GAAP metrics. We analyse a sample of earnings press releases in the period 1999-2004 from companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam. Our findings indicate that reporting non-GAAP measures is a common practice and that the frequency of reporting non-GAAP earnings measures has increased despite the concerns voiced by regulators. On the other hand, investors seem to have become more hesitant towards the use of alternative earnings measures for their decision-making. Our findings suggest that investors find non-GAAP measures informative before 2003, but they turn away from these measures in the following years and price GAAP earnings metrics instead. Together, these findings suggest that the negative media attention for non-GAAP measures has influenced the perception of investors, but not of managers