Company ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited

Following the ECJ’s recent case law on EC freedom of establishment (the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases), regulatory competition for corporate law within the European Union takes place at an early stage of the incorporation of new companies. In contrast, as regards the ‘moving out’ of companies from the country of incorporation, the ECJ once considered a tax law restriction against the transfer abroad of a company’s administrative seat as compatible with EC freedom of establishment (the Daily Mail case). For years, this decision has been regarded as applicable to all restrictions imposed by countries of incorporation, even the forced liquidation of the ‘emigrating’ company. This paper addresses the question whether EC freedom of establishment really allows Member States to place any limit on the ‘emigration’ of nationally registered companies. It argues that EC freedom of establishment covers the transfer of the administrative seat as well as the transfer of the registered office and, therefore, that the country of incorporation cannot liquidate ‘emigrating’ companies. In addition, it addresses the question whether a new Directive is needed to allow the transfer of a com- pany’s registered office and the identity-preserving company law changes. It argues that such a Directive is necessary to avoid legal uncertainty and to protect the interests of employees, creditors and minority shareholders, among others, who could be detrimentally affected by the ‘emigration’ of national companies

Not Just Efficiency: Insolvency Law in the EU and Its Political Dimension

Certain insolvency law rules, like creditors’ priorities and set-off rights, have a distributive impact on creditors. Distributional rules reflect the hierarchies of values and interests in each jurisdiction and, as a result, have high political relevance and pose an obstacle to reforming the EU Insolvency Regulation. This paper will show the difficulty of reform by addressing two alternative options to regulate cross-border insolvencies in the European Union. The first one is the ‘choice model’, under which companies can select the insolvency law they prefer. Although such a model would allow distressed firms to select the most efficient insolvency law, it would also displace Member States’ power to protect local constituencies. The choice model therefore produces negative externalities and raises legitimacy concerns. The opposite solution is full harmonisation of insolvency law at EU level, including distributional rules. Full harmonisation would have the advantage of internalising all externalities produced by cross-border insolvencies. However, the EU legislative process, which is still based on negotiations between states, is not apt to decide on distributive insolvency rules; additionally, if harmonisation includes such rules, it will indirectly modify national social security strategies and equilibria. This debate shows that the choice regarding power allocation over bankruptcies in the EU depends on the progress of European integration and is mainly a matter of political legitimacy, not only of efficiency

La Société européenne : Organisation juridique et fiscale, intérêts, perspectives

Le règlement sur la Société européenne (societas europaea ou SE) et la directive complétant son statut pour ce qui concerne l’implication des travailleurs ont été adoptés, le 8 octobre 2001 et entrent en vigueur la 8 octobre 2004. Une période de réflexion engageant les législateurs nationaux, la doctrine et la pratique est désormais ouverte. Le présent ouvrage rassemble les contributions du colloque international qui s’est déroulé les 2 et 3 octobre 2002 au Sénat et à la Sorbonne sous la présidence du sénateur Philippe Marini et du vicomte Étienne Davignon. Cette conférence a véritablement lancé, en France, la discussion sur l’organisation juridique et fiscale de la SE ainsi que sur ses intérêts et perspectives. Quatre parties structurent les analyses. Tout d’abord, la création de la SE. Pour quelles raisons créer une société européenne ? Quelles sont les techniques de constitution de la SE ? Et quel droit est-il applicable : le droit communautaire, le droit national ou les deux ? En cas de cumul, quel est le champ d’application respectif du droit communautaire et du droit national ? Enfin, quelle est l’interaction entre les ordres communautaires et nationaux et qui est l’ultime arbitre en la matière ? Ensuite, l’implication des salariés dans la SE. Qu’en est-il de la pierre d’achoppement de la SE, à l’origine de l’atermoiement du projet pendant des dizaines d’années, et surtout de l’épineux problème de la cogestion, en particulier la cogestion paritaire de conception allemande si redoutée en dehors de l’Allemagne et parfois aussi en Allemagne elle-même ? Puis le fonctionnement détaillé de la SE avec plusieurs questions essentielles relatives aux organes de direction, aux actionnaires, au capital, aux comptes sociaux et au droit des groupes. Il convient de déterminer si les réponses données par la SE sont capables de satisfaire ou non la pratique. Il y va de la réception future de la SE par les entreprises. Enfin, il est nécessaire d’élargir le cadre d’analyse. L’acceptation de la SE devrait dépendre de deux questions fondamentales : la SE peut-elle être un instrument de planification fiscale et dans quelle mesure est-il possible de transférer son siège social à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne ? Mais d’autres perspectives doivent être brossées, concernant par exemple la liberté statutaire ou la concurrence juridique entre États. L’ensemble de ces perspectives est retracé dans un rapport de synthèse cherchant à éclairer, sous un angle international, les aspects essentiels dont dépendra probablement l’avenir de la SE

Takeover Bids European Law and Corporate Governance

Le norme relative all'offerta pubblica d'acquisto (OPA) sono pacificamente considerate un elemento centrale nel dibattito in tema di corporate governance. Il rischio di un'OPA – e del conseguente avvicendamento nel controllo della società – dovrebbero motivare gli amministratori ad agire nel miglio interesse degli azionisti (c.d. disciplinary mechanism). Le norme europee sull'OPA sono dettate nella Direttiva 2004/25/EC, che trova applicazione alle offerte di strumenti finanziari di emittenti assoggettati agli ordinamenti degli Stati Membri. Il lavoro analizza le regole europee sull'OPA, sottolineando le diverse scelte di attuazione compiute, ove possibile, dai singoli Stati Membri. Il lavoro si occupa inoltre del processo di riforma della Direttiva che dovrebbe basarsi, innanzitutto, sui vantaggi e gli svantaggi dell'applicazione della Direttiva registrati dal 2004 ad oggi.The rules on takeover bids are generally considered to be an important factor within the debate on corporate governance. The risk of a takeover bid – and of a consequent change in company control – should motivate a company’s board to act in the best interests of the shareholders (the so-called disciplinary mechanism). The European rules on takeover bids are enshrined in Directive 2004/25/EC (which is also known as the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law), which applies to bids for securities of companies (issuers) governed by the laws of Member States. This chapter analyses the European rules on takeover bids, and highlights certain national options for implementing the Directive, although a revision of the European Directive, which will be based, among other things, on an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of its application, has been under way since 2004. The chapter also considers the revisions currently being proposed by the European Commission and the European Parliament