Boundary restriction for negative emotional images is an example of memory amplification

We investigated whether boundary restriction—misremembering proximity to traumatic stimuli—is a form of memory amplification and whether re-experiencing trauma plays a role in boundary restriction errors. In four experiments, subjects viewed a series of traumatic photographs. Later, subjects identified the photographs they originally saw among distracters that could be identical, close-up, or wide-angled versions of the same photographs. Subjects also completed measures of mood, analogue PTSD symptoms, phenomenological experience of intrusions, and processing style. Across experiments, subjects were more likely to incorrectly remember the photographs as having extended boundaries: boundary extension. Despite this tendency, the extent to which subjects re-experienced traumatic aspects of the photographs predicted how often they incorrectly remembered the photographs as having narrower boundaries: boundary restriction. Our data suggest that although boundary extension is more common, boundary restriction is related to individual differences in coping mechanisms post-trauma. These results have theoretical implications for understanding how people remember trauma.Australian Research Council ARC DP14010266

Meta-awareness and the involuntary memory spectrum: Reply to Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015)

© 2015 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In their commentary, Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) raise several important issues about the definitions, characteristics and applications of various involuntary cognitive phenomena. Here we respond to the comments of Meyer et al. in ways that we hope will advance understanding of these issues, and inform future research. In particular, we have focused on the characteristics of involuntary phenomena—particularly in relation to meta-awareness—and the clinical relevance of mind-wandering

Current PTSD symptomatology distorts memory for past symptoms

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 12 month embargo from date of publication (February 2019) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyClinicians often rely on clients’ retrospective reports of past symptoms to diagnose and treat Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). However, there is limited research investigating memory for past PTSD symptoms. We asked sexual assault survivors to report their PTSD symptoms and then recall them 6 months later. Overall, symptom recall was consistent with initial reports. However, after dividing participants into PTSD-positive and negative groups, we found that people who were PTSD-negative at follow-up underestimated past PTSD symptom severity while people who were PTSD-positive overestimated past symptoms. For example, 2.8% of PTSD-negative participants versus 15.9% of PTSD-positive participants recalled experiencing 20+ more points on the PCL-5 at follow-up than at initial assessment. Further, people who adjusted over time greatly underestimated past symptoms unlike those who remained PTSD-positive. Our findings have important theoretical and clinical implications because they show that current symptom severity may influence the memory reconstruction of prior levels of adjustment

Explaining Memory Amplification: Is It All About the Test Format?

Takarangi, M. K. T., Oulton, J. M., & Strange, D. (2017). Explaining Memory Amplification: Is It All About the Test Format? Clinical Psychological Science, 6(3), 394–406. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617744326 which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617744326 Copyright © 2018 The Authors. DOI: 10.1177/2167702617744326Trauma-exposed people commonly exhibit a “memory amplification” effect, endorsing exposure to more traumatic events over time. Studies reporting this phenomenon have typically relied on checklists, where participants read event descriptions and indicate (yes/no) their exposure. We examined whether that approach is vulnerable to response biases and memory errors. In two experiments, participants viewed negative photos and completed an Old-New recognition test. In Experiment 1, participants completed either a photo recognition test or description test—composed of written descriptions of negative photos. In Experiment 2, we measured analogue PTSD symptoms and participants completed the description test twice, 24 hr apart. Those in the description test condition performed worse on the memory test and were more biased to endorse negative photos compared with the photo test condition. Furthermore, this bias to endorse negative photos increased over time and was related to analogue PTSD symptoms. Overall, our findings suggest that test format plays a role in memory amplification

Do meta-cognitive beliefs affect meta-awareness of intrusive thoughts about trauma?

© 2016 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Background and Objectives People exposed to trauma often experience intrusive thoughts and memories about that event. Research examining people's responses to trauma assumes that people can accurately notice the occurrence of symptoms. However, we know from the broader cognitive literature on ‘mind-wandering’ that people are not always aware of their current focus of attention. That lack of awareness has implications for our theoretical and practical understanding of how trauma survivors recover from their experience. In the current study we investigated whether people's meta-cognitive beliefs about controlling trauma-related intrusions influenced the occurrence and meta-awareness of those intrusions. Methods We recruited participants who scored high (strong beliefs) or low (weak beliefs) on beliefs regarding the importance of controlling intrusive thoughts. Participants viewed a trauma film then—during a subsequent reading task—reported any film-related intrusions they noticed. We also intermittently asked half the participants to report what they were thinking at that particular moment, to “catch” intrusions without meta-awareness. Results People are not always aware of their trauma intrusions, and importantly, people with strong beliefs are more likely to notice trauma related intrusions both with and without meta-awareness than people with weak beliefs. Limitations We used an analogue trauma, and focused on a particular metacognitive belief, both of which somewhat limit generalizability. We also cannot definitively rule out demand effects. Conclusions Our data add to existing research showing people may lack meta-awareness of trauma-related thoughts, and suggest that survivors with particular metacognitive characteristics may be more vulnerable to ‘mind-wandering’ about trauma without awareness

Trauma-related versus positive involuntary thoughts with and without meta-awareness

© 2016 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In earlier work, we asked subjects to report involuntary thoughts relating to a trauma film and also probed subjects periodically. Subjects often reported involuntary thoughts in response to probes, suggesting they lacked meta-awareness of those thoughts. But it is possible that some or all probe-detected thoughts were continuations of thoughts subjects had spontaneously reported, leading us to overestimate involuntary thoughts lacking meta-awareness. It is also unclear whether failures in meta-awareness occur for other emotional events. We exposed subjects to a negative or positive film. Subsequently, they reported involuntary film-related thoughts and responded to probes that distinguished new from continuing thoughts. Many (54%) but not all probe-caught thoughts were thought continuations. This result supports our earlier finding that people can lack meta-awareness for trauma-related thoughts, but suggests caution in how meta-awareness is assessed. We also found that self-caught negative and positive involuntary thoughts occurred at a similar frequency, with different characteristics

Imagining trauma: Memory amplification and the role of elaborative cognitions

© 2018 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 24 month embargo from date of publication (April 2018) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyBackground and objectives: Trauma victims, such as war veterans, often remember additional traumatic events over time: the “memory amplification effect”. This effect is associated with the re-experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including frequent and intrusive images of the trauma. One explanation for memory amplification is that people gradually incorporate new, imagined information about the trauma with what they actually experienced, leading to an amplified memory for what actually happened. We investigated this proposal here. Methods: Participants viewed highly negative and graphic photographs and recorded their intrusions. Critically, we instructed some participants to elaborate on their intrusions—that is, we asked them to imagine details about the trauma beyond what they actually witnessed. We assessed memory for the traumatic photos twice, 24-hours apart. Results: The elaboration condition experienced fewer intrusions about the photos compared to the control condition. Furthermore, the elaboration condition were less susceptible to memory amplification compared to controls. Limitations: The use of negative photos allowed experimental control, however does not permit generalization of our findings to real-world traumatic experiences. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that effortful imagination of new trauma-related details leads to a reduction in intrusions and an increased tendency to not endorse trauma exposure over time. One explanation for this finding is that elaboration enhanced conceptual processing of the trauma analogue, therefore reducing intrusions. Critically, this reduction in intrusions affected participants’ tendency to endorse trauma exposure, which is consistent with the realitymonitoring explanation for memory amplification

Juror Perceptions of Bystander and Victim Intoxication by Different Substances

This study examined the effects of bystander or victim intoxication during a crime on juror perceptions and decision-making. Mock jurors (N = 261) read testimony from a bystander or victim to an assault, who mentioned that they had consumed alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines, or no substances prior to the crime. Participants delivered a verdict, rated the defendant’s guilt, and rated the bystander/victim on their honesty, credibility, and cognitive competence. Witness intoxication and witness role did not influence defendant guilt. However, participants judged any witness intoxicated by amphetamines as less credible and cognitively competent than a sober witness. Furthermore, victims were judged to have lower credibility, cognitive competence, and honesty than bystanders. These findings suggest that jurors’ decision-making about defendant guilt might not be influenced by witness intoxication or witness type. A witness’ testimony, however, might be evaluated as less credible when delivered by a victim or an amphetamine-intoxicated witness

Juror Perceptions of Bystander and Victim Intoxication by Different Substances

This study examined the effects of bystander or victim intoxication during a crime on juror perceptions and decision-making. Mock jurors (N = 261) read testimony from a bystander or victim to an assault, who mentioned that they had consumed alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines, or no substances prior to the crime. Participants delivered a verdict, rated the defendant’s guilt, and rated the bystander/victim on their honesty, credibility, and cognitive competence. Witness intoxication and witness role did not influence defendant guilt. However, participants judged any witness intoxicated by amphetamines as less credible and cognitively competent than a sober witness. Furthermore, victims were judged to have lower credibility, cognitive competence, and honesty than bystanders. These findings suggest that jurors’ decision-making about defendant guilt might not be influenced by witness intoxication or witness type. A witness’ testimony, however, might be evaluated as less credible when delivered by a victim or an amphetamine-intoxicated witness