Sport-Related National Pride in East and West Germany, 1992-2008: Persistent Differences or Trends Toward Convergence?

It is commonly assumed that international sport reinforces feelings of national pride and national identity. Using large-scale survey data from Germany, covering the period between 1992 and 2008, some unresolved key questions surrounding sportive nationalism are addressed. We examine the relative importance of sport as a source of national pride, analyze the sociodemographics of sportive nationalism, and describe its long-term development in East and West Germany after reunification. Results reveal that sport is an increasingly important source of pride in Germany. Sportive nationalism is more common among younger generations, males, and individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Prevailing differences between East and West Germany document persistent socialization effects of former sport-centered identity politics. Among East Germans, sport is more important for general national pride, and sportive nationalism is much more equally distributed between various social groups (with regard to age, gender, education). From 1992 to 2008, however, a trend toward convergence between East and West Germans is also demonstrated

Von Bosman zur Kollektivvereinbarung? Die Regulierung des Arbeitsmarktes für Profifußballer

"Der Arbeitsmarkt für Profi-Sportler ist wegen der Knappheit sportlichen Talents durch eine starke Nachfragekonkurrenz gekennzeichnet. Diese Besonderheit ist ursächlich für den Aufstieg der amerikanischen Spielergewerkschaften. In einem jüngeren Beitrag hat der Berater der internationalen Spielergewerkschaft, Braham Dabscheck, prognostiziert, dass sich auch die Arbeitsbeziehungen im europäischen Profifußball nach der Liberalisierung des Spielermarktes in Richtung auf das amerikanische Modell umfassender Kollektivvereinbarungen zwischen Profiligen und Spielergewerkschaften bewegen werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag beurteilt die Aussichten für einen solchen sozialen Dialog auf europäischer Ebene jedoch skeptischer. Die starke Involvierung politischer Anspruchsgruppen hat die potenziellen Sozialpartner von der Entwicklung der notwendigen institutionellen Kapazitäten abgehalten. Gleichzeitig hat der intergovernemental legitimierte Transferkompromiss den Spielraum für Kollektivverhandlungen reduziert." (Autorenreferat)"Because of the scarcity of prime athletic talent, the labour market for professional players is characterised by strong competition on the demand side. This peculiarity of the players' market caused the rise of American players' unions. The adviser of the international union for football players, Braham Dabscheck, has recently predicted that labour relations in European professional football after the liberalisation of the player's market would turn towards the American model of comprehensive collective agreements between sports leagues and player's unions. Yet, this article is more sceptical about the prospects for a social dialogue in European football. The strong involvement of political stakeholders prevented the social partners from developing the necessary institutional capabilities. At the same time the intergovernmental compromise on authorized transfers has reduced the scope for collective bargaining." (author's abstract

Protecting private transnational authority against public intervention: FIFA’s power over national governments

Scholars have controversially discussed whether the rise of transnational private authority is beneficial or undermines public legitimate authority. While the recent focus on civil regulation has emphasized the key role of public authorities and civil societies in such arrangements, the case of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) provides strong evidence that global policies can be formulated and administered by completely private institutions relying on strong enforcement mechanisms and able to confront public authorities. FIFA’s power results from its control of market access to global football, which represents a vital club good for national football industries. Therefore, FIFA is able to force European Union member states to deviate from national paths of sport regulation. Without orchestrating their efforts, public authorities are unlikely to succeed in challenging FIFA’s power. Although the recent corruption scandals might force FIFA to implement some reforms, FIFA has a vital interest in protecting its regulatory powers

Abandoning hopes for veto power: institutional options for sport’s governing bodies in the EU

For a long time, sport governing bodies have put high hopes in a consideration of sport in the European Union (EU) Treaties. Ideally, such a sport consideration should not only entitle the sport bodies to get access to the EU budget but, more importantly, also attach more weight to political considerations of sport specificity in proceedings before the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). While the Treaty of Lisbon denied the sport bodies once more any exception under EU law, it has set a new scenario under which to develop EU sports policy. This article explores what institutional status would be most beneficial for the sport bodies in that new scenario. By employing basic ideas of veto player (VP) theory, we arrive at the conclusion that veto power within EU policymaking would be likely to grant sport bodies more influence in policymaking, but could also result in bargaining deadlock without ending or solving the conflicts at stake. Only if the sport bodies would be given the status of a legitimate representative of the ‘sporting movement’, they could prevent any detrimental EUinduced policy change. Since such a status is unlikely to be achieved, our recommendation for the sport bodies is to continue to pursue a more inclusive approach towards other stakeholders in the sport sector

The power of FIFA over national governments: a new actor in world politics?

The role of economic actors and transnational corporations in transforming the world’s political and economic order has received increased attention. However, it is still controversial to what extent private governance regimes operate in an effective ‘shadow of hierarchy’. In other words, it is debated the extent to which governments and international organizations are able to regulate and exert their powers over transnational social and economic actors. This paper uses the case of world football’s governing body, FIFA, to investigate the extent to which sport international actors may condition the decisions of democratically elected national governments. The paper provides comparative case study evidence that FIFA as football’s global regulator has been able to force national governments to abandon legislation and interference in football’s matters even in case of blatant failures of football’s governance. Research supports the claim that private regimes providing unique governance contributions represent an institutional equilibrium able to resist challenges. FIFA’s ‘victories’ over national governments demonstrate the political leverage of football and its governing body, but they are highly problematic since they discourage national governments to fight misconduct in sport, while it can be doubted that sport organizations alone can deal with the regulatory problems at stake

Global sport power Europe? The efficacy of the European Union in global sport regulation

The effectiveness of the European Union (EU) as global regulator is controversial. Some scholars characterize the EU as one of the most important shapers of global regulations; others argue that the EU’s effectiveness critically depends on its regulatory cohesion, the political opportunity structure and regulatory capacity of its interlocutors. Since global sport represents a regionally segmented industry and is governed by private actors of diverse regulatory capacity, global sport regulation represents an excellent domain to study these propositions systematically. Comparative case studies on global sport regulation support the idea that the EU can impose its regulatory ambitions on sport governing due to market size and regulatory capacity. However, the broader political opportunity structure is found to be relevant and the EU does not appear as a strong regulator of global sports

Keeping private governance private: is FIFA blackmailing national governments?

Governance by non-state actors has received increased attention. However, it is still controversial to what extent private governance regimes operate in an effective ‘shadow of hierarchy’. We focus on international football where a private governance regime actively claiming autonomy from public authorities has been established since 1904. We provide comparative case study evidence that FIFA as football’s global regulator has been able to force national governments and regulators to abandon interference in football’s matters even in case of blatant failures of private governance. Research supports the claim that private regimes providing unique governance contributions represent an institutional equilibrium able to resist challenges. Moreover, private governance arrangements that generate positive feedbacks for political stakeholders can shape their political environment. FIFA’s victories are highly problematic since they discourage national governments to fight misconduct in sport while it can be doubted that private governance alone can deal with the regulatory problems at stake

Limits of interest empowerment in the European Union: The case of football

The European Union (EU) represents an emerging opportunity structure refining societal actors’ chances to get access to and influence over policy-making. While research has mainly focused on lobbying within the legislative arena we provide evidence that competition policy can also be understood as a venue of interest group politics by taking the case of European football. The specific institutional features of competition policy have the potential to increase probability of access and lower costs for political action for certain interest groups but also to limit potential benefits from interest group politics. Professional football players and clubs in Europe have used competition policy procedures as an avenue to challenge the supremacy of governing bodies such as UEFA in the game’s organisational structures. Whilst managing some impact in terms of policy, the challengers have attained only moderate influence in football’s sectoral governance

A tale of two scandals: scale shift and the inefficacy of crisis communication management in Olympic scandals

IntroductionMega sporting events, such as the Olympic Games, provide niche sports with unique opportunities to attract public attention. However, scandals during these events can pose serious threats to these sports. In particular, if a sport scandal enables hostile stakeholders to achieve a scale shift, it becomes almost impossible for a niche sport organization to manage the scandal.MethodsThe article employs a comparative research design that examines the trajectory of two scandals related to the German Olympic team that differ with regard to the occurrence of a scale shift. The first scandal involved a racist slur made by a German official during a cycling event; the second scandal was a case of animal cruelty during the modern pentathlon's equestrian event. Research relies on a mix of qualitative document analyses and quantitative analyses of the German Twitter discourse on both scandals. The analyses focus on the vulnerability to scandals, the potential for contentious politics, the scandal triggering events, the crisis communication, the reception, and the outcomes of both scandals.Results and discussionOur results show the detrimental impact of a scale shift on niche sports. The animal cruelty scandal put the future of the modern pentathlon at the Olympics at risk and triggered far-reaching reforms. The case supports the idea that a scale shift becomes more likely if there exists an effective collective action frame. In contrast, the German sports organizations effectively ended the racist slur scandal by imposing a limited sanction on the offender