Ku Klux Klan activism in the 1960s is linked to the South’s swing to the Republican Party

After the midterm elections, the Democratic Party is now very nearly unrepresented in the Southern states of the U.S., the culmination of a political realignment that began in the 1960s. In new research, Rory McVeigh finds that those counties that experienced greater levels of activism by the racist Ku Klux Klan experienced a five percent greater swing to the Republican Party. He argues that these results show that social movement activism can be effective in bringing about change, as people’s votes changed because of racial interests as opposed to party loyalties

Voting to Ban Same-Sex Marriage: Interests, Values, and Communities

From 2000 through 2008, initiatives proposing to ban same-sex marriage were on the ballot in 28 states. Although same-sex marriage opponents scored lopsided victories in most cases, voting outcomes varied substantially at the county level. This article examines sources of that variation and argues that opposition to same-sex marriage should be strong in communities characterized by the predominance of traditional gender roles and family structure. Perhaps more interestingly, the analysis also shows that the effects of traditional family structure and gender roles are especially strong in counties characterized by weak community cohesion, as indicated by residential instability, low rates of home ownership, and high crime rates.Yeshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guideline

Modern American populism: Analyzing the economics behind the Silent Majority, the Tea Party and Trumpism

This article researches populism, more specifically, Modern American Populism (MAP), constructed of white, rural, and economically oppressed reactionarianism, which was borne out of the political upheaval of the 1960’s Civil Rights movement. The research looks to explain the causes of populism and what leads voters to support populist movements and politicians. The research focuses on economic anxiety as the main cause but also examines an alternative theory of racial resentment. In an effort to answer the question, what causes populist movements and motivations, I apply a research approach that utilizes qualitative and quantitative methods. There is an examination of literature that defines populism, its causes and a detailed discussion of the case studies, including the 1972 election of Richard Nixon; the Tea Party election of 2010; and the 2016 election of Donald Trump. In addition, statistical data analysis was run using American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys associated with each specific case study. These case studies were chosen because they most represent forms of populist movements in modern American history. While ample qualitative evidence suggested support for the hypothesis that economic anxiety is a necessary condition for populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, the Tea Party and Trump, the statistical data only supported the hypothesis in two cases, 2010 and 2016, with 1972 coming back inconclusive. The data also suggested that both economic anxiety and racial resentment played a role in 2010 and 2016, while having no significant effect in 1972 in either case. This suggests that further research needs to be conducted into additional populist case studies, as well as an examination into the role economic anxiety and economic crises play on racial resentment and racially motivated voting behavior

State-Level Determinants of Hate Crime Reporting: Examining the Impact of Structural and Social Movement Influences

In this article, we investigate factors affecting hate crime policies by examining anti‐LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) hate crime reports as a type of policy implementation. Analyzing state‐level data drawn primarily from the US Census between 1995 and 2008, we examine how structural and social movement mobilization factors explain hate crime reporting. We find that anti‐LGBT hate crimes are more likely to be reported in more urbanized states and in states with both split political elites and a greater number of LGBT social movement organizations. We discuss the implications of our findings for separating the drivers of policy passage from policy implementation and for complementary criminological and social movement explanations for hate crime reporting