24 research outputs found
Animals and Objectivity
Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of
conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and
philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states
are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in
crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an
interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though
extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective
Book Review: Brandom, Robert. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars.
One of the better known of the many bons mots of the Sellarsian corpus concerns his definition of philosophy: it is the attempt to understand âhow things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.â When applied to Sellarsâs philosophy in particular, one might be forgiven for doubting the possible success of such an endeavor. Richard Rorty once quipped of Sellarsâs followers that they were either âleft-wingâ or âright-wing,â emphasizing one line of thought in Sellarsâs work to the exclusion of the other. The two lines of thought to which Rorty referred were, first, Sellarsâs conception of the normativity of all thought and language, famously captured by his evocative phrase âthe space of reasons.â Second, and equally important to Sellars, was his âscientia mensura,â the notion Ă°shared with contemporaries such as Quine that âin the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is notâ Wilfrid Sellars, âEmpiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,â Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 [1956]: 41,303). The left-wing adherents to the normativity thesis included Rorty himself, along with John McDowell and Robert Brandom. Among the right-wing naturalists are such as Ruth Milliken, Jay Rosenberg, and Paul Churchland. Such a disparate group of philosophers suggests irreconcilable differences. Brandom himself reports in the introduction to his newest book, From Empiricism to Expressivism, that, âfor a dismayingly long time, I did not really see how all the pieces of [Sellar\u27s] work hung together, even in the broadest possible sense of the termâ (24)
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect
Kant holds that the applicability of the moral âoughtâ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify âcognitive controlâ in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing
âI Am the Original of All Objectsâ: Apperception and the Substantial Subject
Kantâs conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or âpure apperceptionâ, for scientiïŹc knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of \u3csubstance\u3e. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept \u3csubstance\u3e depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the actual intellectual awareness of oneself in such apperception. I then defend this interpretation from a variety of objections
Fellow Creatures, by Christine Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 0198753853. 272 pp. $24.95
Brandom, Robert. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. 289. $35.00
Rationality: What difference does it make?
A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as âtransformedâ, in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesnât result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless signiïŹcantly differentiates human beings from other animals
Henry E. Allison, Kantâs Conception of Freedom: A Developmental and Critical Analysis Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020 Pp. xxiii + 531 ISBN 9781107145115 (hbk), $140
Book Review: Brandom, Robert. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars.
One of the better known of the many bons mots of the Sellarsian corpus concerns his definition of philosophy: it is the attempt to understand âhow things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.â When applied to Sellarsâs philosophy in particular, one might be forgiven for doubting the possible success of such an endeavor. Richard Rorty once quipped of Sellarsâs followers that they were either âleft-wingâ or âright-wing,â emphasizing one line of thought in Sellarsâs work to the exclusion of the other. The two lines of thought to which Rorty referred were, first, Sellarsâs conception of the normativity of all thought and language, famously captured by his evocative phrase âthe space of reasons.â Second, and equally important to Sellars, was his âscientia mensura,â the notion Ă°shared with contemporaries such as Quine that âin the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is notâ Wilfrid Sellars, âEmpiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,â Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 [1956]: 41,303). The left-wing adherents to the normativity thesis included Rorty himself, along with John McDowell and Robert Brandom. Among the right-wing naturalists are such as Ruth Milliken, Jay Rosenberg, and Paul Churchland. Such a disparate group of philosophers suggests irreconcilable differences. Brandom himself reports in the introduction to his newest book, From Empiricism to Expressivism, that, âfor a dismayingly long time, I did not really see how all the pieces of [Sellar\u27s] work hung together, even in the broadest possible sense of the termâ (24)