The loyalty trap : regime ethnic exclusion, commitment problems, and civil war duration in Syria and beyond

This article examines the impact of the ethnic exclusiveness of regimes on commitment problems and hence on civil conflict duration. It argues that members of privileged in-groups in highly exclusive regimes can be trapped into compliance with the regime. Ethnic exclusion helps to construct privileged-group members as regime loyalists. They therefore fear rebel reprisals even if they surrender or defect and consequently persist in fighting. The article finds in particular that, in ethnically exclusive regimes, privileged-group members mistrust even rebels who mobilize on a nonethnic agenda and regard rebel reassurances, including nonethnic aims, as suspect. Exclusion therefore induces privileged-group cohesion, an effect more resistant to rebel reassurances than previously recognized. A case study of the Syrian civil war shows this dynamic at a micro level, and a cross-national statistical analysis gives partial evidence that it lengthens civil conflicts on a larg`e scale

The efficacy of ethnic stacking : military defection during uprisings in Africa

Does ethnic stacking in the armed forces help prevent military defection? Recent research, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, suggests so; by favoring in-groups, regimes can keep in-group soldiers loyal. In-group loyalty comes at the cost of antagonizing members of out-groups, but many regimes gladly run that risk. In this research note, we provide the first large-scale evidence on the impact of ethnic stacking on the incidence of military defection during uprisings from below, using data on fifty-seven popular uprisings in Africa since formal independence. We find clear evidence for the downside: ethnic stacking is associated with more frequent defection if out-group members are still dominant in the armed forces. We find more limited support for the hypothesized payoff. Ethnic stacking may reduce the risk of defection, but only in regimes without a recent history of coup attempts. Future research should therefore trace the solidification of ethnic stacking over time

Disloyalty and logics of fratricide in Civil War : executions of officers in republican Spain, 1936-19391

Violence within armed groups in civil wars is important and understudied. Linking literatures on civil war violence and military politics, this article asks when this fratricidal violence targets soldiers who try to defect, and when it does not. It uses a unique data set of executions of officers on the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War. The article finds that while much of the violence appeared to target those who actually tried to defect, many nondefectors were likely shot too, due most likely to a pervasive stereotype that officers in general were disloyal to the Republic. This stereotype was used as an information shortcut and was promoted by political actors. Accordingly, unlikely defectors were likelier to be shot in locations in which less information was available about loyalties and in which political forces that were suspicious of officers as a group were locally stronger

State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions

In Afghanistan, Libya, Liberia and beyond, armed rebellions have begun when armies fell apart. When does this occur? This paper conducts a large-N analysis of these army-splinter rebellions, distinct from both non-military rebellions from below and from coups, using new data. It finds that they follow a logic of state breakdown focusing on regime characteristics (personalist regimes and the loss of superpower support at the end of the Cold War) rather than drivers of mass mobilization from below. In contrast, these regime-level factors matter much less for the nonmilitary rebellions from below that dominate theorizing about civil war origins. This paper also shows that one option for military rebels lies in not attempting a coup but instead heading straight into a rebellion. This paper thus distinguishes highly different paths to armed conflict, validates the state breakdown approach to why armies fall apart, and extends the well-known tradeoff between coups and civil wars

How IMET your mother : revisiting foreign military training, human capital, and coup risk

How does foreign aid in the form of military training impact civil-military relations in recipient states? Savage and Caverley (2017) find that US foreign military training alters the balance of power between recipient state militaries and their governments, doubling the risk of a military coup. Despite data constraints that limit their analysis to just two training programs, and obvious concerns about selection effects and endogeneity, the result has been cited as evidence that US training increases coup propensity. Employing new and updated data on the full range of US military training programs, we find this effect limited to a single training program, IMET, and thus unrepresentative of the vast array of US training. Our results have implications for foreign aid, civil-military relations, and the design of foreign military training programs