The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players. Key Words:

Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties’ compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. These conclusions are accentuated when monitoring for compliance to IEAs is inaccurate.International environmental agreements, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government. Key Words:

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.Voluntary agreements, self-enforcing agreements, emissions tax, enforcement

The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger, and provide more of a public good, when their members are responsible for financing enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that member-financed enforcement of compliance reduces the provision of the public good. The decrease is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. Provision of the public good increases significantly when we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form.lab experiments

A Delphi survey to determine how educational interventions for evidence-based practice should be reported:Stage 2 of the development of a reporting guideline

BACKGROUND: Undertaking a Delphi exercise is recommended during the second stage in the development process for a reporting guideline. To continue the development for the Guideline for Reporting Evidence-based practice Educational interventions and Teaching (GREET) a Delphi survey was undertaken to determine the consensus opinion of researchers, journal editors and educators in evidence-based practice (EBP) regarding the information items that should be reported when describing an educational intervention for EBP. METHODS: A four round online Delphi survey was conducted from October 2012 to March 2013. The Delphi panel comprised international researchers, educators and journal editors in EBP. Commencing with an open-ended question, participants were invited to volunteer information considered important when reporting educational interventions for EBP. Over three subsequent rounds participants were invited to rate the importance of each of the Delphi items using an 11 point Likert rating scale (low 0 to 4, moderate 5 to 6, high 7 to 8 and very high >8). Consensus agreement was set a priori as at least 80 per cent participant agreement. Consensus agreement was initially calculated within the four categories of importance (low to very high), prior to these four categories being merged into two (<7 and ≥7). Descriptive statistics for each item were computed including the mean Likert scores, standard deviation (SD), range and median participant scores. Mean absolute deviation from the median (MAD-M) was also calculated as a measure of participant disagreement. RESULTS: Thirty-six experts agreed to participate and 27 (79%) participants completed all four rounds. A total of 76 information items were generated across the four survey rounds. Thirty-nine items (51%) were specific to describing the intervention (as opposed to other elements of study design) and consensus agreement was achieved for two of these items (5%). When the four rating categories were merged into two (<7 and ≥7), 18 intervention items achieved consensus agreement. CONCLUSION: This Delphi survey has identified 39 items for describing an educational intervention for EBP. These Delphi intervention items will provide the groundwork for the subsequent consensus discussion to determine the final inclusion of items in the GREET, the first reporting guideline for educational interventions in EBP

Dietary Patterns and Cognitive Function among Older Community-Dwelling Adults.

Diet may be an important modifiable risk factor for maintenance of cognitive health in later life. This study aimed at examining associations between common dietary indices and dietary patterns defined by factor analysis and cognitive function in older community-dwelling adults. Dietary information for 1499 participants from the Rancho Bernardo Study was collected in 1988⁻1992 and used to calculate the alternate Mediterranean diet score, Alternate Healthy Eating Index (AHEI)-2010 score and factor scores derived from factor analysis of nutrients. Global cognitive function, executive function, verbal fluency and episodic memory were assessed at approximate four-year intervals from 1988⁻2016. Linear mixed models were used to examine associations between dietary patterns and cognitive trajectories. Estimates for the highest vs. lowest tertile in models adjusting for age, sex, education, energy intake, lifestyle variables and retest effect showed greater adherence to the Mediterranean score was associated with better baseline global cognitive function (β (95% CI) = 0.33 (0.11, 0.55)). The AHEI-2010 score was not significantly associated with cognitive performance. Higher loading on a plant polyunsaturated fatty acid (PUFA)/vitamin E factor was associated with better baseline global cognitive function and executive function (β = 0.22 (0.02, 0.42) and β = -7.85 (-13.20, -2.47)). A sugar/low protein factor was associated with poorer baseline cognitive function across multiple domains. Dietary patterns were not associated with cognitive decline over time. Adherence to a healthy diet with foods high in PUFA and vitamin E and a low sugar to protein ratio, as typified by a Mediterranean diet, may be beneficial for cognitive health in late life

A systematic review of how studies describe educational interventions for evidence-based practice:Stage 1 of the development of a reporting guideline

Abstract Background The aim of this systematic review was to identify which information is included when reporting educational interventions used to facilitate foundational skills and knowledge of evidence-based practice (EBP) training for health professionals. This systematic review comprised the first stage in the three stage development process for a reporting guideline for educational interventions for EBP. Methods The review question was ‘What information has been reported when describing educational interventions targeting foundational evidence-based practice knowledge and skills?’ MEDLINE, Academic Search Premier, ERIC, CINAHL, Scopus, Embase, Informit health, Cochrane Library and Web of Science databases were searched from inception until October - December 2011. Randomised and non-randomised controlled trials reporting original data on educational interventions specific to developing foundational knowledge and skills of evidence-based practice were included. Studies were not appraised for methodological bias, however, reporting frequency and item commonality were compared between a random selection of studies included in the systematic review and a random selection of studies excluded as they were not controlled trials. Twenty-five data items were extracted by two independent reviewers (consistency > 90%). Results Sixty-one studies met the inclusion criteria (n = 29 randomised, n = 32 non-randomised). The most consistently reported items were the learner’s stage of training, professional discipline and the evaluation methods used (100%). The least consistently reported items were the instructor(s) previous teaching experience (n = 8, 13%), and student effort outside face to face contact (n = 1, 2%). Conclusion This systematic review demonstrates inconsistencies in describing educational interventions for EBP in randomised and non-randomised trials. To enable educational interventions to be replicable and comparable, improvements in the reporting for educational interventions for EBP are required. In the absence of a specific reporting guideline, there are a range of items which are reported with variable frequency. Identifying the important items for describing educational interventions for facilitating foundational knowledge and skills in EBP remains to be determined. The findings of this systematic review will be used to inform the next stage in the development of a reporting guideline for educational interventions for EBP

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.public goods, coalition formation, inequality aversion, participation requirement, experiments