Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties’ compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. These conclusions are accentuated when monitoring for compliance to IEAs is inaccurate.International environmental agreements, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government. Key Words:

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.Voluntary agreements, self-enforcing agreements, emissions tax, enforcement

The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance enforcement to maintain compliance reduces the overall provision of the public good. The decrease in the provision of the public good is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a theoretically stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. When we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form, the average provision of the public good increases significantly. Key Words: stable coalitions, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement, public goods

The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger, and provide more of a public good, when their members are responsible for financing enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that member-financed enforcement of compliance reduces the provision of the public good. The decrease is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. Provision of the public good increases significantly when we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form.lab experiments

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players. Key Words:

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.public goods, coalition formation, inequality aversion, participation requirement, experiments

Identifying novel hypoxia-associated markers of chemoresistance in ovarian cancer

BACKGROUND Ovarian cancer is associated with poor long-term survival due to late diagnosis and development of chemoresistance. Tumour hypoxia is associated with many features of tumour aggressiveness including increased cellular proliferation, inhibition of apoptosis, increased invasion and metastasis, and chemoresistance, mostly mediated through hypoxia-inducible factor (HIF)-1α. While HIF-1α has been associated with platinum resistance in a variety of cancers, including ovarian, relatively little is known about the importance of the duration of hypoxia. Similarly, the gene pathways activated in ovarian cancer which cause chemoresistance as a result of hypoxia are poorly understood. This study aimed to firstly investigate the effect of hypoxia duration on resistance to cisplatin in an ovarian cancer chemoresistance cell line model and to identify genes whose expression was associated with hypoxia-induced chemoresistance. METHODS Cisplatin-sensitive (A2780) and cisplatin-resistant (A2780cis) ovarian cancer cell lines were exposed to various combinations of hypoxia and/or chemotherapeutic drugs as part of a 'hypoxia matrix' designed to cover clinically relevant scenarios in terms of tumour hypoxia. Response to cisplatin was measured by the MTT assay. RNA was extracted from cells treated as part of the hypoxia matrix and interrogated on Affymetrix Human Gene ST 1.0 arrays. Differential gene expression analysis was performed for cells exposed to hypoxia and/or cisplatin. From this, four potential markers of chemoresistance were selected for evaluation in a cohort of ovarian tumour samples by RT-PCR. RESULTS Hypoxia increased resistance to cisplatin in A2780 and A2780cis cells. A plethora of genes were differentially expressed in cells exposed to hypoxia and cisplatin which could be associated with chemoresistance. In ovarian tumour samples, we found trends for upregulation of ANGPTL4 in partial responders and down-regulation in non-responders compared with responders to chemotherapy; down-regulation of HER3 in partial and non-responders compared to responders; and down-regulation of HIF-1α in non-responders compared with responders. CONCLUSION This study has further characterized the relationship between hypoxia and chemoresistance in an ovarian cancer model. We have also identified many potential biomarkers of hypoxia and platinum resistance and provided an initial validation of a subset of these markers in ovarian cancer tissues