Moral Combat in An Enemy of the People: Public Health versus Private Interests

Dr Thomas Stockmann, the protagonist of Ibsen's play, An Enemy of the People, discovers a serious health threat in the Baths of his Norwegian town. The Baths have been marketed as a health resort to lure visitors. Dr Stockmann alerts officials about the problem and assumes that they will close the Baths until it is corrected. He is met with fierce resistance, however. His brother, the town's mayor, favors keeping the Baths open and correcting the problem gradually. He advances multiple arguments that appeal to the economic interests of the town and Thomas's role-related obligation as a citizen. His wife, Katherine, wants him to cooperate with the mayor. She marshals several arguments that appeal to his obligations as a father. This paper reconstructs and examines the competing arguments, shows how Ibsen's play has both contemporary relevance and moral depth, and demonstrates how Dr Stockmann's responses can be interpreted as an argument that complying with his duties to protect the public health do not force him to renege on his core commitments as a parent and as a citizen

Moral absolutism and the problem of hard cases

Abstract: In The Theory of Morality Alan Donagan discusses two problems recently raised for anti-consequentialist moral theories. He calls these "cases of necessity" anti ''the problem of dirty hands." What is common to each is that anti-consequentialist theories seem to posit requirements the fulfillment of which sometimes results in disastrous consequences. Donagan argues that the anti-consequentialist theory which underlies the HebrewChristian moral tradition can avoid these problems. It is argued that Donagan's defense is inadequate. At the end of the paper what the anti-consequentialist must do to deal with these problems is discussed. Article: For the greater part of the last few decades consequentialists have been on the defensive, answering various well-known objections raised against their theory. Recently, however, they have launched an attack on anticonsequentialist theories, raising important new problems for those views. In response, Ala

'Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Scope of Moral Requirements

The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether moral requirements range over actions or attempts. In particular, I shall examine two contexts in ethics theory that some have thought provide a basis for believing that attempts are what are morally required of agents. In both of these contexts there is an implicit appeal to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In order to set the stage for my discussion of the central question, therefore, I need to begin by explaining how I think appeals to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' typically work

Hugh McCann’s The Works of Agency (Cornell University Press, 1998)

Review of The Works of Agency On Human Action, Will, and Freedom. Includes summary, analysis, and discussion of the book's arguments and conclusions

Moral Combat in An Enemy of the People: Public Health versus Private Interests

Dr. Thomas Stockmann, the protagonist of Ibsen's play, An Enemy of the People, discovers a serious health threat in the Baths of his Norwegian town. The Baths have been marketed as a health resort to lure visitors. Dr. Stockmann alerts officials about the problem and assumes that they will close the Baths until it is corrected. He is met with fierce resistance, however. His brother, the town's mayor, favors keeping the Baths open and correcting the problem gradually. He advances multiple arguments that appeal to the economic interests of the town and Thomas's role-related obligation as a citizen. His wife, Katherine, wants him to cooperate with the mayor. She marshals several arguments that appeal to his obligations as a father. This paper reconstructs and examines the competing arguments, shows how Ibsen's play has both contemporary relevance and moral depth, and demonstrates how Dr. Stockmann's responses can be interpreted as an argument that complying with his duties to protect the public health do not force him to renege on his core commitments as a parent and as a citizen

The Inalienable Right to Withdraw from Research

Consent forms given to potential subjects in research protocols typically contain a sentence like this: "You have a right to withdraw from this study at any time without penalty" If you have ever served on an institutional review board (IRB) or a research ethics committee, you have no doubt read such a sentence often. Moreover, codes of ethics governing medical research endorse such a right. For example, paragraph 24 of the Declaration of Helsinki says, "The subject should be informed of the right.., to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal." Similarly, section C of the Belmont Report says that subjects must be informed that they have the right "to withdraw at any time from the research" And in section 46.116 of the Common Rule (issued by the United States Department of Health and Human Services), it says that one of the elements of informed consent must include a statement that "the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefit to which the subject is otherwise entitled." (1) In each of these cases, there is no indication that the right is qualified in any way. There does appear to be a qualification in the first code of ethics for researchers, the Nuremberg Code, which says: "During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible." (2) It is important to note, however, that the Code says that this is a reason to allow subjects to withdraw; it does not imply that this is the only reason

On an alleged probletn for voluntary euthanasia

Dr Campbell presents proponents of euthanasia with a dilemma.1 Only voluntary euthanasia is permissible; involuntary euthanasia is always impermissible. The question of allowing euthanasia arises most frequently when patients are terminally ill and experiencing great pain. But in these cases, he argues, if patients request euthanasia, their decision "is not freely chosen but is compelled by the pain".2 It is easy to exaggerate the problem here; patients may have periods when they are pain-free and affirm repeatedly their desire that death be hastened. Putting this aside, however, what should we conclude if euthanasia performed on patients who are suffering greatly is not voluntary

The Inalienable Right of Conscience: A Madisonian Argument

Characterizing conscience is difficult. The way that this term is often used makes it sound as if it is a special power possessed by people. Unlike Bishop Butler, however, and more like recent authors, I deny that conscience is a special faculty that is a source of moral knowledge. Instead, when we speak of conscience, we speak of the act of applying one's moral beliefs to one's own conduct. Conscience is not itself a standard; rather, appeals to conscience involve an agent reflecting on his own past or (projected) future behavior and assessing that behavior in light of his own standards. A person who, in conversation with another, invokes conscience as an apparent justification of a proposed course of action has already made a judgment about that action. Such an appeal borrows its effectiveness from the conviction that one ought (in some sense) to think for oneself about moral matters and then act on one's considered judgments