Prosecute the Cheerleader, Save the World?: Asserting Federal Jurisdiction Over Child Pornography Crimes Committed Through “Sexting”

This comment explores the possible scenarios in which sexting could give rise to prosecution under Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (“PCASEA”) for transporting, distributing, receiving, or possessing child pornography.2 Part II provides background information on the practice and prevalence of sexting. Part III discusses the definition of child pornography within the meaning of federal law and applies that definition to sexting. Part IV presents the concept of the transporting or shipping in interstate or foreign commerce jurisdictional hook and its potential relation to sexting. Part V applies the principles of statutory interpretation to the relevant provisions of the PCASEA to determine the proper application of the statute’s current jurisdictional language. Part VI discusses the application of sexting to the particular offenses of transporting, distributing, receiving, or possessing child pornography under the PCASEA, including distinct jurisdictional issues for each offense.3 Part VII delineates issues that are collateral to the jurisdictional question, but that are necessarily raised by attempting to resolve it. Part VIII concludes that prosecution of child pornography offenses committed through sexting is within the purview of the PCASEA and future judicial interpretations of the PCASEA will result in broad subject matter jurisdiction to do so

The Unavoidable Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia

Section 5 7-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division within the Episcopal Church\u27s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church property litigation that ensued following the division. This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and provides a specific analysis of Virginia\u27s statutory scheme for doing so. Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization\u27s adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach. Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving church property disputes within the Supreme Court\u27s established framework for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57- 9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision

The Unavoidable Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia

Section 5 7-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division within the Episcopal Church\u27s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church property litigation that ensued following the division. This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and provides a specific analysis of Virginia\u27s statutory scheme for doing so. Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization\u27s adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach. Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving church property disputes within the Supreme Court\u27s established framework for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57- 9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision

The Unaviodable Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia

Section 57-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division within the Episcopal Church’s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church property litigation that ensued following the division. This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and provides a specific analysis of Virginia’s statutory scheme for doing so. Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization’s adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach. Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving church property disputes within the Supreme Court’s established framework for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57- 9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision

Much Ado About Nothing Much: Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro Church

This essay reviews the issues the Supreme Court of Virginia resolved in Truro and notes important issues it did not resolve. Part II supplies the factual background and procedural history ofthe dispute. Part III summarizes the court\u27s opinion and the reasoning underlying its determination that Virginia Code section57-9(A) is not applicable to this particular action. Part IV critiques the opinion, noting the issues the court resolved and how it resolved them. Part V briefly addresses issues that remain unresolved by the court\u27s decision and discusses the implications of leaving those issues unresolved. Part VI presents the authors\u27 conclusions

The politics of platform capitalism: A case study on the regulation of Uber in New York

First published online: 14 August 2020Platform companies like Uber not only disrupt existing markets but also contest existing regulatory regimes. This raises the question of how, when, and why such companies are regulated. This article develops, tests, and defends a theoretical framework that explains the politics of regulatory response to the rise of platform capitalism. Using discourse network analysis and a case study on the regulation of Uber in New York, it shows that the success or failure of regulations depends on the ability of actors to mobilize broad coalition; that narratives affect the composition of these coalitions; and that platform companies have both unique political strengths and vulnerabilities. This article makes substantive contributions to our understanding of the politics of platform capitalism, and it makes theoretical contributions to the literature studies on coalitional politics, ideational institutionalism, and business power