Leadership in the European Union: Assessing the Significance of the Trio Council Presidency. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 8, No. 17, August 2008

[From the Introduction]. This analysis highlights potential challenges to rotation among successive Trio Presidencies by the new European Council President in the provision of leadership that accommodates divergent interests in a Union of 27+ members. The relationship between the Trio Presidency and the proposed European Council President is one that must be defined carefully in practice. This is necessary to ensure that the balance of power does not tip to advantage the latter personality at the expense of the former. Another feature of an increasingly complex institutional system that raises questions in terms of leadership capacity is the position defined in the Lisbon Treaty as the High Representative for Security Policy and Defense. Given all the responsibilities the person in this post inherits, it is necessary to ask if leadership on behalf of the Union is realistically possible to achieve. A corollary observation is that omni directional (tous azimuts) bilateral arrangements, often referenced in the literature as 'multiple bilateralism,' occur with greater frequency in a larger Union. This analysis draws the implications of these experiences for leadership in Europe’s transnational polity

Maastricht as Turning Point. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 5 No. 17, August 2008

[From the Introduction] Fifteen years have passed since the Danish people rejected the Treaty on European Union (TEU), known also by the name of the city in the Netherlands where the European Council negotiated its final provisions, Maastricht. The text was, in my experience, a historical turning point that occurred in European integration as the Continent lost the framework orientation of bipolarity and the world lost the structural underpinnings of the Cold War. For this reason, it is essential to question the relevance of Maastricht in the present context. We must understand the genuine disconnect among system, state, and society in the dynamics the Treaty introduced. The original European Communities were organized to suppress those nationalist motives that led neighboring countries to conduct fratricidal wars. The European Union (EU) of the 21st century must contend increasingly with intra-state conflict beyond and near its borders as EU members and institutions define its role as a global actor

EU3-Iranian Nuclear Diplomacy: Implications for US Policy in the Middle East. EUMA Papers, Vol. 4 No. 6 March 2007

[Introduction]. Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to analyze the impact of EU3-Iranian nuclear diplomacy starting in 2002-2003 and assess its implications for US regional policy. A logical place to start is Waltz’s third image,1 the international system, which influenced the Europeans to engage Iran. In order to understand the nature of negotiations about nuclear politics, it is essential to consider that our understanding of the internal context within Iran is defined by bounded rationality. The dynamics of the 2003 agreement with Tehran provide a point of reference before considering the ways in which Iranian domestic changes impacted on the Europeans diplomatic efforts over time, including the leadership demonstrated by an influential negotiator, High Representative Javier Solana. The focus is on the Iranian decision to enrich uranium. Action taken by the Europeans as well as the United States, Russia, and China to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and to impose sanctions on the regime in December 2006 illustrates the limits of EU3 diplomacy. The discussion closes with a perspective on the latest step at the United Nations in terms of US regional policy as the conflict with Iraq continues

The French Rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty: Implications of a National Debate for Europe’s Union. EUMA Papers, Vol. 7 No. 13 May 2007

[Introduction]. Unlike the 1992 French debate about the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), an analysis to explain the fate of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) must address the failure of the May 29, 2005 referendum to ratify the text in France. Why did a member state integral to European construction reject a document in which French interests, as defined by Mr. Chirac, were very well represented? In order to assemble the pieces of this puzzle, we must start within the French domestic context in order to grapple with decisions taken at the table when the French president and other heads of government negotiated in the European Council. We must then return to the scene of the drama’s climax, inside the hexagon during spring 2005. Mr. Chirac, the chief protagonist in this narrative, provides the main link between the domestic context and negotiations on constitutional treaty reform. A careful reading of one institutional analysis regarding French preferences on the future of Europe concludes: ‘In the end, therefore, the French president and his government were for the most part alone in deciding what France’s preferences were going to be: of course, it remains to be seen whether this will change as the debate on the future of Europe moves into the ratification phase – but that is another story’.1 The pieces in our puzzle begin to come together to reveal a picture in which the ratification is the integral part of the story. This paper argues that state-society relations must be revisited to assess their relevance as an explanation of the French referendum outcome

The Importance of the European Union’s Strategic and Diplomatic Cultures. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 5 No. 16, July 2008

[From the Introduction] This paper identifies culture as a variable underlying the establishment of a distinct policy area in the European Union (EU). An inquiry into the evolution of strategic culture in the Union must reference the agreement taken by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac in 1998 at Saint-Malo. Why did these two leaders take a step in the direction of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)? Do structural or institutional explanations trump the cultural analysis? In each case, the decision taken may be explained with reference to the culture of the country in question. Each leader was confronted with a tension between the need for his state to continue participation, to varying degrees, in the European integration process and the reluctance or indifference of the national population toward this objective. Culture is a variable that must be taken into account to explain the contestation resulting from gap between national leaders’ attempts to define their states’ medium to long-term interests at the center of European Union policymaking and the populaces’ attitudes of disinterest or downright hostility to these goals

The Road Not Taken: Why the Dutch Referendum on the Constitutional Treaty ‘Made All The Difference’ for Europe. EIPA Working Paper 08/W/2005

[Introduction]. The Dutch referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty was the first one in over a hundred years in a country that has no political culture of referendums to decide issues of national importance. The idea to call a consultative referendum originated in the country’s parliament, which, unlike the Dutch executive, wanted to consult the population about the latest developments in the history of European integration. (Crum, 2005) This is in contrast to the debate concerning the Treaty on European Union 13 years ago, for which the call to conduct a consultative referendum lacked a consensus among Dutch parliamentarians (Hartog, 1994). The Netherlands is a founding member state of the original European Communities, created in the 1950s with the goal to assure security, prosperity and stability on the Continent. Why did this small country, whose people are still very strong advocates of European integration, reject the latest step in that project’s evolution? This is a question that requires a period of time to answer. The Dutch Prime Minister, Mr. Jan Peter Balkenende, has called for us to ‘think about how to make the most of this opportunity for reflection and reform.’ (Balkenende, 2005) The remarks in this article reflect the thoughts of someone who acknowledges just how far the countries of Europe have travelled in the 60 years since the end of World War II. In the midst of the destruction of a civilization, there were decisive choices to make about how to learn from the past so as to live in peace. This fact can never be taken for granted: in the aftermath of rivalries that caused generations to be lost, Europe’s leaders started to write a new chapter in their shared history. Physical survival was at stake. Inherent in the journey on the road ‘less travelled by’ was a calculated risk, that in time a part of Europe would distinguish its project from that of the American and Soviet empires. The fundamental choice the leaders in Europe made at that time was to reject war among countries whose history for centuries had been ‘painted in blood.’ The European Coal and Steel Community set those founding member states, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg on a different course. By rejecting the egoism that had led to incessant strife, The Netherlands chose to join its larger neighbours in a quest: to discover through steps in time no ordinary community. Europe’s project for peace had as a goal to speak truth to power by placing the equality of peoples before that of balances among states. Through the years the Dutch remained faithful to that initial choice. The Europe in which they also thrived was one with which they could identify because the Communities fulfilled a promised goal: security, prosperity and stability provided a port in an otherwise stormy ocean. Once the world’s traders with an empire that included my birthplace, Brooklyn, the Dutch in this new millennium seek the assurance of a Europe in which their voice is not only recognized, but listened to, by the states The Netherlands traditionally fears will dominate the Continent – France and Germany. (Harryvan and Harst, 2005

Future of the European Union and the European Constitutional Treaty: The Future of the European Union and its Importance for Transatlantic Relations. EUMA Papers, Vol. 4 No. 4 February 2007

[From the introduction]. The rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) by France on 29 May 2005 and the Netherlands on 1 June 2005 left the future of European Union (EU) in question. After the failed referendums, the Heads of State and Government in the European Council called for a reflection period to give member states time to decide on next steps. Under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), the German Presidency, in the Chair from January through June 2007, has established a timetable to reach agreement among the 27 member states as to how to proceed with the European Constitutional Treaty. The German Presidency’s efforts are sincere and its effort has been substantial

The Troika and Iran: France’s Contributions to EU3 Nuclear Diplomacy Theory Encounters the Real World of Multilateral Negotiations

[From the introduction]. Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to inquire as to the influence of a sub-group of European Union (EU) member states in the negotiation process with Iran. These negotiations, which began in 2002-2003, address the issue of nuclear diplomacy. This paper concentrates on France’s contributions within the Troika. This is a sub-group consisting of the 'big Three,' Britain, France and Germany, which focus their diplomatic efforts in a unique, ad hoc case in the Union’s external security. This analysis is a response to the lack of theoretical literature concerning the actual process of the multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues between the EU3 and Iran. In this context, we must distinguish between the early agreements that were achieved between the EU3 and Iran during 2003 and 2004, and the stalemate that followed, which led to the imposition of sanctions against Iran by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006 and 2007