"Risk Reduction in the New Financial Architecture: Realities, Fallacies, and Proposals"

Five times in a decade not yet completed, financial markets have floated to the edge of a whirlpool; in October 1998 they were about to drown when Alan Greenspan threw them a piece of string that, surprisingly, turned out to be a lifeline. The causes for this financial instability lie deep--in the economic theory that urges easy and efficient substitution of one piece of paper for another, always and everywhere; in the technology-driven tight articulation of receipts and payments that Hyman Minsky warned against a generation ago; and in the growth of leverage that diminishes the creditworthiness of major institutions when an interruption in their receipts requires them to seek funds. Meanwhile, as decision-making in finance moves from banks to markets, and the creators of derivative instruments find ways to present uncertainties as risks that can be modeled, time horizons fall and spurious interrelations promote "dynamic hedging" that communicates financial disturbance anywhere to price volatility everywhere. Prevention should be sought in rules to control the creation of leverage in the repo and derivatives markets and in limits on banks' freedom to back away from borrowers' cross-border liabilities in currencies other than their own. Crisis management when prevention fails will require "standstill" agreements to encourage the continuation of something like normal economic life while the losses from merely financial failure are sorted out.

"The Asian Disease: Plausible Diagnoses, Possible Remedies"

The Asian crisis is a textbook case of the "financial instability hypothesis" first expressed in 1966 by the late Hyman Minsky. Minsky's "hypothesis" was proposed to explain instability in a large, insulated, developed economy. Despite its intuitive appeal, it was not widely accepted among financial economists (Charles Kindleberger being a notable exception) because, they said, they could not find historical illustrations to fit the theory. The financial economist's machine runs smoothly in the best of all possible worlds. What makes trouble in the financial economist's world is the exogenous shock that affects everyone (war, oil prices) or government error (fiscal imbalance, monetary policy). "Financial distress," Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes write in their study of sovereign debt rescheduling, "normally results from a real shock or bad policies." But Asia presents a cumulation of apparently rational decisions that are precisely those Minsky predicted.

"Risk Reduction in the New Financial Architecture: Realities and Fallacies in International Financial Reform"

The causes for the instability that has marked the financial system over past decade lie deep-in the economic theory that urges easy and efficient substitution of one piece of paper for another, in the technology-driven tight articulation of receipts and payments, and in the growth of leverage that diminishes the creditworthiness of major institutions when an interruption in their receipts requires them to seek funds. Many of the proposals aimed at reducing risk in the financial system, however, do not recognize these changes or their importance. The call for greater bank transparency, for example, fails to take into account both that bankers and regulators are jealous of their "privacy" and that financial markets, not banks, have lately become the more important player in the financial system. Guidelines are needed that reflect the new financial architecture: controls on the creation of leverage in the repo and derivatives markets and limits on banks' freedom to back away from borrowers' cross-border liabilities in currencies other than their own. When such preventive measures fail, then crisis management will require "standstill" agreements to encourage the continuation of something like normal economic life while the losses from financial failure are sorted

"The Asian Disease: Plausible Diagnoses, Possible Remedies, Regulation of Cross-Border Interbank Lending and Derivatives Trade"

Asia presents a cumulation of apparently rational decisions that produced disastrous results- a textbook illustration of "financial instability" developing from the economics of euphoria. A combination of factors produced the crisis as enormous capital inflows were drawn to the "Asian miracle"-pegged exchange rates with fluctuating interest rates, integrated economies, moral hazard created by central banks, and short-term lending and derivatives trade without sufficient evaluation of risk and credit analysis of borrowers. The Asian tragedy demonstrates the need for improved regulation of cross-border interbank lending, improved accounting for both borrowers and lenders, and separation of the close

What Communities Can Do to Rein In Payday Lending: Strategies for Successful Local Ordinance Campaigns through a Texas Lens

Because New Mexico has one of the highest consumer usage rates and highest concentrations of payday and title loan shops in the nation,2 we thought it would be an ideal place to measure the public’s knowledge of and interest in these ubiquitous loans. We also measured knowledge of interest rate caps in the context of credit cards, as a point of comparison. Our data are consistent with that of previous studies showing that the general public overwhelmingly supports interest rate caps both in general and for certain types of loans. More uniquely, we also found that many consumers are unaware that there are no interest rate caps on many forms of consumer loans. These data are useful in explaining why consumers do not do more to change the law on interest rate caps

The Sociology of the Life Course and Life Span Psychology: Integrated Paradigm or Complementing Pathways?

The psychology of the life span and the sociology of the life course share the same object of scientific inquiry - the lives of women and men from birth to death. Both are part of an interdisciplinary field focused on individual development and life course patterns which also includes social demography and human capital economics. However, a closer look shows that life span psychology and life course sociology now to stand further apart than in the seventies. In this paper we reassess how this divergence can be understood in terms of necessary and legitimate strengths of both approaches, as well as avoidable weaknesses which could be overcome in the future by more re-combination and integration.