Particle creation as the quantum condition for probabilistic events to occur

A new version of non-relativistic quantum theory is proposed, according to which probabilistic events occur whenever new stationary or bound states are created as a result of inelastic collisions. The new theory recovers the experimental success of orthodox quantum theory, but differs from the orthodox theory for as yet unperformed experiments

The Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein

A basic idea of the 18th century French Enlightenment was to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. Unfortunately, the philosophes developed this profoundly important idea in a seriously defective form, and it is this defective form that came to be built into the institutional structure of academia in the early 20th century with the creation of departments of social science. We still suffer from it today. This article discusses four versions of the Enlightenment programme, each correcting mistakes of its predecessor, the upshot being that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry if the basic Enlightenment idea is to be properly implemented

Scientists should stop deceiving us

If scientists acknowledged the real, problematic aims of science which have, associated with them, problematic assumptions concerning metaphysics, values and the use of science, it would become clear the public should be involved in exploring questions about aims and priorities of research, and this might improve relations between science and the public

Liberal education in crisis?

It is argued that the plea for rational inquiry devoted to wisdom is not Eurocentric in character

Are philosophers responsible for global warming?

Global warming has come about as a result of rapid population increase plus our whole modern way of life, all made possible by modern science. In order to tackle global warming successfully, we need a new kind of inquiry that gives intellectual priority to tackling problems of living over problems of knowledge. If we had had this new kind of inquiry fifty years ago, we might have begun to do something about global warming long ago, in the early 1960s, when Keeling first discovered that carbon dioxide was increasing in the atmosphere. Our long-standing failure to respond to global warming is in part due to our failure to develop a genuinely rigorous kind of inquiry devoted to helping us tackle our global problems, which is, in turn, a philosophical failure. Philosophers are responsible for global warming to the extent that they have failed to highlight this philosophical blunder inherent in academia in part responsible for our tardy response to global warming

The Metaphysics of Science: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories, Craig Dilworth, Dordrecht, Springer, 2007, 2nd ed.

This book propounds an immensely important idea. Science makes metaphysical presuppositions. I must, however, at once declare an interest. For well over thirty years I have myself been expounding and arguing for just this idea

What's wrong with science?

Here is an idea that might help save the world. It is that science, properly understood, provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity. First, we need to acknowledge the actual problematic aims of science, which make problematic assumptions about metaphysics, values and use. Then we need to represent these aims in the form of a hierarchy of aims, which become increasingly unproblematic as one goes up the hierarchy, thus creating a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods within which much more problematic aims and methods may be improved as scientific knowledge improves. Then, we need to generalize this hierarchical, aims-and-methods-improving methodology so that it becomes fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile endeavour with problematic aims. Finally, we need to apply this methodology to the immensely problematic task of making progress towards as good a world as feasible

Do We Need a Scientific Revolution?

Many see modern science as having serious defects, intellectual, social, moral. Few see this as having anything to do with the philosophy of science. I argue that many diverse ills of modern science are a consequence of the fact that the scientific community has long accepted, and sought to implement, a bad philosophy of science, which I call standard empiricism. This holds that the basic intellectual aim is truth, the basic method being impartial assessment of claims to knowledge with respect to evidence. Standard empiricism is, however, untenable. Furthermore, the attempt to put it into scientific practice has many damaging consequences for science. The scientific community urgently needs to bring about a revolution in both the conception of science, and science itself. It needs to be acknowledged that the actual aims of science make metaphysical, value and political assumptions and are, as a result, deeply problematic. Science needs to try to improve its aims and methods as it proceeds. Standard empiricism needs to be rejected, and the more rigorous philosophy of science of aim-oriented empiricism needs to be adopted and explicitly implemented in scientific practice instead. The outcome would be the emergence of a new kind of science, of greater value in both intellectual and humanitarian terms

Relativity Theory May not Have the Last Word on the Nature of Time: Quantum Theory and Probabilism

Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and time - in space-time in short. Special and general relativity rule out the first view. There is, according to relativity theory, no such thing as an unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. However, we have every reason to hold that both special and general relativity are false. Not only does the historical record tell us that physics advances from one false theory to another. Furthermore, elsewhere I have shown that we must interpret physics as having established physicalism - in so far as physics can ever establish anything theoretical. Physicalism, here, is to be interpreted as the thesis that the universe is such that some unified "theory of everything" is true. Granted physicalism, it follows immediately that any physical theory that is about a restricted range of phenomena only, cannot be true, whatever its empirical success may be. It follows that both special and general relativity are false. This does not mean of course that the implication of these two theories that there is no unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" at each instant is false. It still may be the case that the first view of time, indicated at the outset, is false. Are there grounds for holding that an unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" does exist, despite special and general relativity, both of which imply that it does not exist? There are such grounds. Elsewhere I have argued that, in order to solve the quantum wave/particle problem and make sense of the quantum domain we need to interpret quantum theory as a fundamentally probabilistic theory, a theory which specifies how quantum entities - electrons, photons, atoms - interact with one another probabilistically. It is conceivable that this is correct, and the ultimate laws of the universe are probabilistic in character. If so, probabilistic transitions could define unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "nows" at each instant. It is entirely unsurprising that special and general relativity have nothing to say about the matter. Both theories are pre-quantum mechanical, classical theories, and general relativity in particular is deterministic. The universe may indeed be three dimensional, with a past and a future, but not spread out in four dimensional space-time, despite the fact that relativity theories appear to rule this out. These considerations, finally, have implications for views about the arrow of time and free will