A model of self-discipline

In this paper, we propose a model of self-discipline where a decision-maker balances the benefits of regulating her moods against a cost of self-discipline effort. Self-discipline is beneficial as it reduces the chances of internal conflict, yet it is a costly effort to undertake. We provide an axiomatic characterization of our model in a menu-choice framework, and show how costs of self-discipline can be elicited and compared across individuals. Our model generalizes well-known models of temptation-driven behavior by viewing temptations as the endogenous outcome of a self-discipline choice problem.Preprin

An axiomatic characterization of Bayesian updating

We provide an axiomatic characterization of Bayesian updating, viewed as a mapping from prior beliefs and new information to posteriors, which is disentangled from any reference to preferences. Bayesian updating is characterized by Non-Innovativeness (events considered impossible in the prior remain impossible in the posterior), Dropping (events contradicted by new evidence are considered impossible in the posterior), and Proportionality (for other events, the posterior simply rescales the prior’s probabilities proportionally). The result clarifies the differences between the normative Bayesian benchmark, alternative models, and actual human behavior

Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs

We show how information acquisition costs can be identified using observable choice data. Identifying information costs from behavior is especially relevant when these costs depend on factors–such as time, effort and cognitive resources–that are difficult to observe directly, as in models of rational inattention. Using willingness-to-pay data for opportunity sets–which require more or less information to make choices–we establish a set of canonical properties that are necessary and sufficient to identify information costs. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the induced rationally inattentive preferences, and show how they reveal the amount of information a decision maker acquires.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Updating stochastic choice

When an economic agent makes a choice, stochastic models predicting those choices can be updated. The structural assumptions embedded in the prior model condition the updated one, to the extent that the same evidence produces different predictions even when previous ones were identical. We provide a general framework for models of stochastic choice allowing for arbitrary forms of (structural) updating and show that different models can be sharply separated by their structural properties, leading to axiomatic characterizations. Our framework encompasses Bayesian updating given beliefs over deterministic preferences (as implied by popular random utility models) and standard neuroeconomic models of choice, which update decision values in the brain through reinforcement learning

Reference-Dependent Ambiguity Aversion

This dissertation contributes to the growing literature in economics on ambiguity aversion. I identify an implicit reference-point assumption in the multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), generalize their decision theory to allow for stochastic reference-points, and study the market implications of endowment-dependent ambiguity aversion. Chapter 2 identifies the implicit reference-point assumption in the multiple priors model and provides an axiomatic characterization of a reference-dependent multiple priors model. I also provide an axiomatic characterization of a reference-dependent version of the Choquet Expected Utility model of Schmeidler (1989), which can accommodate different attitudes towards ambiguity. Chapter 3 studies the implications of reference-dependent ambiguity aversion when reference points are given by the endowment in an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy. I illustrate that no-trade and underinsurance are robust implications of ambiguity aversion when investors view ambiguity from the perspective of their endowments. Chapter 4 extends the decision model to intertemporal choice problems and studies the effects of reference-dependent ambiguity aversion in the context of a dynamic asset pricing model

Rationally Inattentive Preferences

We study preferences over menus of acts and provide axiomatic foundations for a model of rational inattention (Sims [37, 38]). The axioms are motivated by the idea that the decision maker faces an abundance of information, which requires attention to select and process. In the representation, the decision maker evaluates menus by solving an information acquisition problem, where the information costs are measured by a function monotone in the Blackwellorder. We show that all parameters of the model – the utility function on consequences, prior beliefs, and the information cost function – can be uniquely identified from preferences satisfying the axioms. The connection with the Blackwell order also allows us to characterize behavioral measures of comparative inattention