Auxotrophy to Xeno-DNA: an exploration of combinatorial mechanisms for a high-fidelity biosafety system for synthetic biology applications.

BACKGROUND: Biosafety is a key aspect in the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition, which offers student teams an amazing opportunity to pursue their own research projects in the field of Synthetic Biology. iGEM projects often involve the creation of genetically engineered bacterial strains. To minimize the risks associated with bacterial release, a variety of biosafety systems were constructed, either to prevent survival of bacteria outside the lab or to hinder horizontal or vertical gene transfer. MAIN BODY: Physical containment methods such as bioreactors or microencapsulation are considered the first safety level. Additionally, various systems involving auxotrophies for both natural and synthetic compounds have been utilized by iGEM teams in recent years. Combinatorial systems comprising multiple auxotrophies have been shown to reduced escape frequencies below the detection limit. Furthermore, a number of natural toxin-antitoxin systems can be deployed to kill cells under certain conditions. Additionally, parts of naturally occurring toxin-antitoxin systems can be used for the construction of 'kill switches' controlled by synthetic regulatory modules, allowing control of cell survival. Kill switches prevent cell survival but do not completely degrade nucleic acids. To avoid horizontal gene transfer, multiple mechanisms to cleave nucleic acids can be employed, resulting in 'self-destruction' of cells. Changes in light or temperature conditions are powerful regulators of gene expression and could serve as triggers for kill switches or self-destruction systems. Xenobiology-based containment uses applications of Xeno-DNA, recoded codons and non-canonical amino acids to nullify the genetic information of constructed cells for wild type organisms. A 'minimal genome' approach brings the opportunity to reduce the genome of a cell to only genes necessary for survival under lab conditions. Such cells are unlikely to survive in the natural environment and are thus considered safe hosts. If suitable for the desired application, a shift to cell-free systems based on Xeno-DNA may represent the ultimate biosafety system. CONCLUSION: Here we describe different containment approaches in synthetic biology, ranging from auxotrophies to minimal genomes, which can be combined to significantly improve reliability. Since the iGEM competition greatly increases the number of people involved in synthetic biology, we will focus especially on biosafety systems developed and applied in the context of the iGEM competition

Auxotrophy to Xeno-DNA: an exploration of combinatorial mechanisms for a high-fidelity biosafety system for synthetic biology applications

Whitford CM, Dymek S, Kerkhoff D, et al. Auxotrophy to Xeno-DNA: an exploration of combinatorial mechanisms for a high-fidelity biosafety system for synthetic biology applications. Journal of Biological Engineering. 2018;12(1): 13

Expanding The Genetic Code

Karsten L, Bergen D, Drake C, et al. Expanding The Genetic Code. Bielefeld University; 2017.We worked in many different scientific fields to find suitable ways for the translational incorporate of non-canonical amino acids into proteins. Repurposing existing codons or incorporating new bases are two possible ways. We realized both ways to expand the genetic code of Escherichia coli. The repurposing of a codon for the incorporation of a non-canonical amino acid (ncAA) is possible using the rarely used amber stop codon UAG or other rarely used codons like the leucine codon CUA. To incorporate a non-canonical amino acid using these codons, an orthogonal tRNA/aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase (tRNA/aaRS) pair is necessary, which can charge the ncAA to the tRNA. We designed and synthetized the novel ncAA Nγ‑2‑cyanobenzothiazol‑6‑yl‑L‑asparagine (CBT-asparagine). This ncAA has the chemical ability of perform a highly specific covalent binding reaction, which we wanted to incorporate into our target protein. Therefore, we created a library of aaRS with random mutagenized amino acid binding sites and a selection system to select for the aaRS that specifically incorporates the ncAA. In parallel to the libary and selection based approach, we modeled the aaRS which could incorporate our new amino acid CBT-asparagine. We demonstrated that both ways are suitable for the evolution of aaRS. Although incorporation of ncAAs through the amber codon works, there are challenges associated with this approach. The repurposing of codons leads to the decrease of the growth rate of E. coli and it is only feasible to incorporate up to two different ncAAs. Therefore, we took a new way to incorporate ncAAs. The incorporation of an unnatural base pair into the DNA generates 64 new codons. Our first challenge was the uptake of the unnatural base from the media, because E.coli has no nucleoside triphosphate transporter and is not able to synthetize the bases itself. We cloned a nucleoside triphosphate transporter that enables the uptake of both bases from the media. Furthermore, we analyzed the transcriptome of the plant Croton tiglium, which produces the unnatural base isoG. The transcriptome revealed an enzyme for the biosynthesis, which was cloned and characterized for the biosynthesis of isoG in E. coli. To detect the unnatural base we developed two orthogonal systems. A restriction experiment based on the software tool M.A.X. and an adaption of the Oxford Nanopore sequencing, which were combined into one software suite. To demonstrate the possibilities offered by the incorporation of ncAAs, we developed a toolbox containing five different tools. We chose seven different ncAAs for these five tools and demonstrated interesting applications for them. These ncAAs can be used for various approaches in basic research, medicine and manufacturing. Furthermore, with our submitted parts, every iGEM team can incorporate these ncAAs into their target proteins. Regarding our project, two of the ncAAs that are part of our toolbox perform an autocatalytic reaction upon irradiation with ultraviolet light. Therefore, we decided to build our own LED panel that allows us to perform experiments with these non‑canonical amino acids under reproducible irradiation conditions

Auxotrophy to Xeno-DNA: an exploration of combinatorial mechanisms for a high-fidelity biosafety system for synthetic biology applications

Abstract Background Biosafety is a key aspect in the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition, which offers student teams an amazing opportunity to pursue their own research projects in the field of Synthetic Biology. iGEM projects often involve the creation of genetically engineered bacterial strains. To minimize the risks associated with bacterial release, a variety of biosafety systems were constructed, either to prevent survival of bacteria outside the lab or to hinder horizontal or vertical gene transfer. Main body Physical containment methods such as bioreactors or microencapsulation are considered the first safety level. Additionally, various systems involving auxotrophies for both natural and synthetic compounds have been utilized by iGEM teams in recent years. Combinatorial systems comprising multiple auxotrophies have been shown to reduced escape frequencies below the detection limit. Furthermore, a number of natural toxin-antitoxin systems can be deployed to kill cells under certain conditions. Additionally, parts of naturally occurring toxin-antitoxin systems can be used for the construction of ‘kill switches’ controlled by synthetic regulatory modules, allowing control of cell survival. Kill switches prevent cell survival but do not completely degrade nucleic acids. To avoid horizontal gene transfer, multiple mechanisms to cleave nucleic acids can be employed, resulting in ‘self-destruction’ of cells. Changes in light or temperature conditions are powerful regulators of gene expression and could serve as triggers for kill switches or self-destruction systems. Xenobiology-based containment uses applications of Xeno-DNA, recoded codons and non-canonical amino acids to nullify the genetic information of constructed cells for wild type organisms. A ‘minimal genome’ approach brings the opportunity to reduce the genome of a cell to only genes necessary for survival under lab conditions. Such cells are unlikely to survive in the natural environment and are thus considered safe hosts. If suitable for the desired application, a shift to cell-free systems based on Xeno-DNA may represent the ultimate biosafety system. Conclusion Here we describe different containment approaches in synthetic biology, ranging from auxotrophies to minimal genomes, which can be combined to significantly improve reliability. Since the iGEM competition greatly increases the number of people involved in synthetic biology, we will focus especially on biosafety systems developed and applied in the context of the iGEM competition