Group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm performance: Some evidence based on archival data

The objectives of this paper are (i) to provide evidence on the association between the choice of group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm characteristics, and (ii) to provide evidence on the economic consequences of adopting a particular compensation scheme. Our key findings based on 2517 firm years for the period of 2001-2010 show that on average, the choice between group or individual compensation schemes for senior executive compensation schemes are consistent with a firm's economic characteristics and on average, the choice of compensation schemes does not affect subsequent firm performance. However, we find some evidence that firms that adopt compensation schemes inconsistent with their economic characteristics have lower subsequent performance. Our findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd

Is continuous disclosure associated with board independence?

This study provides evidence on the association between board composition and different types of continuous disclosure. Our sample is based on a sample of 450 firms for the period 2006-2007. Our experimental design uses both ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions and two-stage least-squares regressions (2SLS), although the Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 test indicates that the OLS results alone would be appropriate. We include the 2SLS results in order to be able to compare the results against previous findings. Our key findings are that there is no association between board composition and different types of continuous disclosure. Our results are robust with respect to alternative variable definitions. © The Author(s) 2012

The Impact of Quasi-Regulatory Reforms on Boards and Their Committees During the Period 2001-2007

This study investigates the cumulative impact of quasi-regulatory and regulatory reforms, and political pressure on board composition and sub-committees of boards over the period 2001 to 2007. Based on a sample of 450 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, we find that most firms complied with the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice by 2007. In particular, 85% of firms had an independent board and there was a significant increase in majority independent committees (audit, remuneration and nomination). While there was an increase in majority board independence, the increase in the mean level of board independence to 71% was modest. The level of compliance was highest for large firms, but the impact was largest on small firms, which changed their board composition the most. The relation between firm characteristics and board composition declined between 2001 and 2007, and changes in board composition were not able to be explained by changes in firm characteristics. If it is assumed that firms on average select their board to reflect their economic needs, this suggests that the changes in board composition may have been costly for firms. © 2011 CPA Australia

The cost of implementing new accounting standards: The case of IFRS adoption in Australia

© 2016, © The Author(s) 2016. This article examines the implementation errors that are made when accounting standards are implemented for the first time. Focusing on the transition to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), we provide evidence on the causes of these errors as well as the economic consequences of disclosing these errors. We find that the quality of both the chief financial officers (CFOs) and the auditors are associated with less implementation errors. We also find that there is a learning process as later adopters of IFRS report less errors compared to early adopters in the financial reporting cycle. In terms of the consequences of disclosing these errors, we find that firms reporting more implementation errors experience an increase in information asymmetry when these errors become known to market participants. Furthermore, we find a positive association between implementation errors and increases in audit fees when the implementation errors are disclosed. Our results are robust with respect to a number of sensitivity tests

Do better-governed Australian firms make more informative disclosures?

We investigate whether and if so, how, corporate governance "quality" is related to the information flows from a company and how the stock market and its agents respond. Specifically, we study links between the "quality" of a firm’s corporate governance (CGQ) and the informativeness of its disclosures. We employ a novel, intra-year "timeliness" metric, in the spirit of Ball and Brown (1968) and Brown et al. (1999), to capture the average speed of price discovery throughout the year. Our results suggest that the answer to our question is "Yes": better-governed firms do make more informative disclosures