Biomass flow transfers between a prey and a predator.

<p>Black arrows represent energy transfers or losses. The prey has a trophic level τ and the predator has a trophic level (τ+1). Fishing mortality F and natural mortality M0 represent non-predation mortalities. Excretion U and respiration R are the predator metabolic losses. The partial transfer efficiency (P_τ+1/Q_τ+1) and total transfer efficiency (P_τ+1/P_τ) are indicated (derived from Gascuel et al.,[<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0182826#pone.0182826.ref039" target="_blank">39</a>]).</p

TCI and ECI trends on an a priori selection of LMEs.

<p>(a) Time indicator nominal values trends (b) Efficiency indicator nominal values trends–‘Group 1’ gathers the 10 most strongly exploited ecosystems (according to their SSPs); ‘Group 2’ gathers the 10 ecosystems with the strongest increase in SST since 1990; ‘All LMEs’ gathers the 56 LMEs. Colored sectors refer to bootstrap confidence intervals of the mean, at 95%.</p

Clustering based on trends in the Time Cumulated Indicator (TCI_R) and the Efficiency Cumulated Indicator (ECI_R): Selection of results regarding clusters description by supplementary qualitative variables.

<p>Clustering based on trends in the Time Cumulated Indicator (TCI_R) and the Efficiency Cumulated Indicator (ECI_R): Selection of results regarding clusters description by supplementary qualitative variables.</p

Worldwide values and trends of transfer efficiency, residence time, fishing and climate indicators.

<p>(a) Mean 1950–2010 values of the Time Cumulated Indicator TCI per type of ecosystem (in years); (b) Mean 1950–2010 values of the Efficiency Cumulated Indicator ECI per type of ecosystem; (c) Worldwide trend in TCI; (d) Worldwide trend in ECI; (e) Worldwide SST anomaly relative to the mean of the time-series (orange, in °C, left axis) and O₂ anomaly trends (yellow, in mol O₂ m^-3, right axis) (f) Worldwide trends in the fishing pressures indices: SSP (red, in % on the left axis) and L_index (orange, right axis); (g) Shannon index (h) Percent of fish species. Colored sectors refer to bootstrap confidence intervals of the mean of LMEs, at 95%.</p

Results from the Principle Component Analysis and clustering on the Time Cumulated Indicator TCI_R.

<p>(a) Worldwide map of the clusters; Mean trend per cluster from 1950 to 2010 in: (b) Relative to 1950 TCI_R (colored sectors refer to bootstrap 95% confidence intervals); (c) Nominal values of TCI; (d) Number of overexploited and collapsed stocks in SSPs (%); (e) FiB index; (f) the Mean Trophic Level; (g) the Shannon biodiversity index.</p

Results from the Principal Component Analysis and clustering on the ECI_R.

<p>(a) Worldwide map of the clusters; Mean trend per cluster from 1950 to 2010 in: (b) Relative to 1950 ECI_R (colored sectors refer to bootstrap 95% confidence intervals); (c) ECI nominal values; (d) L_index of fishing pressure; (e) Difference SST_(y)−SST₍₁₉₅₀₎; (f) the Shannon biodiversity index (g) Fraction of finfish species (%).</p

Table_1_Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss.DOCX

One of the greatest threats to the conservation of transboundary stocks is the failure of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to equitably allocate future fishing opportunities. Across RFMOs, catch history remains the principal criterion for catch allocations, despite being recognized as a critical barrier to governance stability. This paper examines if and how subsidies have driven catch histories, thereby perpetuating the legacy of unfair resource competition between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal States, and how this affects ongoing allocation negotiations in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Using limited publicly available data on subsidies to Indian Ocean tuna fleets, we show that subsidies have inflated catch histories of many DWFN's. As long as historical catch remains the key allocation criterion, future fishing opportunities will continue to be skewed in favor of DWFNs, in turn marginalizing half of the IOTC member States, which collectively account for a paltry 4% of the current catch. Without better transparency in past subsidies data, accounting for this distortion will be difficult. We provide alternative allocation options for consideration, with our analysis showing that re-attributing DWFN catch to the coastal State in whose waters it was caught may begin to alleviate this historical injustice.</p