Essays on banking in Italy

Il lavoro ‘Essays on Banking in Italy’ si compone di tre ricerche realizzate nel periodo 2005-2008. Nel primo studio (The Monitoring and certification roles of bankers on industrial boards), i dati sulla composizione degli organi societari delle imprese censite dalla Camera di Commercio sono stati incrociati, per la prima volta a conoscenza di chi scrive, con altre tre fonti di informazioni tra cui la Centrale dei rischi. Tale incrocio ha permesso di identificare la presenza degli amministratori di banca negli organi societari delle imprese e studiarne gli effetti sul costo del credito. E’ stato possibile discriminare tra un’ipotesi favorevole (information view) e una sfavorevole (conflitto di interessi). Noi troviamo che le banche rappresentate nel board di un impresa applicano tassi di interesse simili a quelli applicati da banche assenti dal board. Pertanto non abbiamo evidenza di conflitto di interessi. Il secondo lavoro (What’s risk got to do with it ? An analysis of interest rates in the Italian consumer credit market) analizza le determinanti dei tassi di interesse sul credito al consumo delle famiglie. Il risultati dello studio suggeriscono che il potere di mercato delle banche ha un effetto significativo sui tassi di interesse che queste applicano alle famiglie. L’analisi mostra invece un ruolo limitato del rischio: il rapporto sofferenze su prestiti risulta generalmente non significativo e una misura alternativa risulta solo parzialmente migliore. Un approfondimento, basato su regressioni quantili, suggerisce, infine, che una relazione positiva standard tra rischio e tasso sussista solo per la parte inferiore della distribuzione dei tassi e venga meno per la parte sopra la mediana. Nel terzo lavoro (Why is the volume of bank loans low in some countries and high in others? The role of government debt) sono analizzate le determinanti della dimensione dei mercati bancari nei paesi sviluppati. Il contributo principale del lavoro è quello di mostrare il legame inverso tra l’emissione di titoli del debito pubblico e l’offerta di prestiti bancari al settore privato dell’economia. In base all’interpretazione fornita, lo spiazzamento osservato è un effetto della repressione finanziaria attuata dai governi di alcuni paesi per preservare la stabilità finanziaria. Con riferimento all’Italia, le restrizioni attuate attraverso massimali all’offerta di credito delle banche e vincoli all’apertura di sportelli possono aver contenuto l’offerta di finanziamenti al settore privato, da un lato, e incrementato la domanda di titoli domestici come quelli rappresentativi del debito pubblico, dall’altro.The work ‘Essays on Banking in Italy’ consists of three studies conducted in the period 2005-2008. The first and the second study investigate pricing behaviour of banks on loans granted to private sector, i.e. to firms (The Monitoring and certification effects of bankers on industrial boards) and to households (What’s risk got to do with it ? An analysis of interest rates in the Italian consumer credit market) while the third study (Why is the volume of bank loans low in some countries and high in others? The role of government debt) deals with the determinants of the size of business activity in developed countries. In the first research, a database collecting information on board’s composition of a very large number of firms (those registered at the Chamber of Commerce) was matched with other three sources of data, including the Central Credit Register, for the first time to the best of my knowledge. Such a matching allowed us to identify and study effects of bank representation on corporate board, and to discriminate between a beneficial monitoring activity as well as, alternatively, a costly conflict of interest. Our analysis shows that interest rates loans from the bank with a director who is also a director of the borrowing firm are not significantly lower than those charged by other banks. Therefore, we do not find evidence of a conflict of interest effect. In the second research we investigate the determinants of the price of consumer lending in Italy. The results suggest that concentration level exerted a significant influence on pricing conditions while the evidence on the role of risk is less clear. According to results from a quintile regression approach, we may track down a standard relationship between risk and prices only as for the lowest quintiles of the interest rate distribution. As far as interest rates applied by banks above the median prices are concerned, cost of lending seems to be less sensitive to risk. In the third paper we look at the determinants of the size of banking markets in developed countries. The novelty of the paper is to shed a light on the negative linkages between government securities issuance and the amount of credit granted by banks to private sector. We find a crowding–out effect that we interpret as an outcome of financial repression. As well as Italy is concerned, restrictions to financial activity operated through credit ceilings and branch restrictions may have shrunk bank supply of financing to private sector, on the one hand, and artificially channelled bank resources to domestic assets such as the public debt, on the other hand

What determines the size of bank loans in industrialized countries? The role of government debt

Given the importance of banking intermediation, we investigate the determinants of the size of bank loans in 18 OECD countries in the period 1981-1997. The aim of the paper is to show that the ratio of government debt to GDP has a negative effect on the level of bank credit. Second, countries with a German legal origin have higher ratios of loans to GDP than common law countries. Our results are robust to including such variables in the regressions as per capita GDP, stock market capitalization, the banking reserve requirement, the level of inflation and its volatility, openness to trade and the use of different econometric methods.bank loans, government debt, financial repression, legal origin of finance

The Italian banking system: Facts and interpretations

The paper compares the essential features of the Italian banking system with those of the other large euro-area countries. The analysis focuses on banks’ size, ownership and competitiveness, their role in financing firms, the composition of their balance sheets and their degree of internationalization, profitability and terms for customers. Within this overall framework the paper examines the banking system’s response to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and subsequent developments. The progress made in decades past is recalled and further necessary steps set out.Autore: Pozzolo, Alberto Franco; email: [email protected]

Essays on banking in Italy

Il lavoro ‘Essays on Banking in Italy’ si compone di tre ricerche realizzate nel periodo 2005-2008. Nel primo studio (The Monitoring and certification roles of bankers on industrial boards), i dati sulla composizione degli organi societari delle imprese censite dalla Camera di Commercio sono stati incrociati, per la prima volta a conoscenza di chi scrive, con altre tre fonti di informazioni tra cui la Centrale dei rischi. Tale incrocio ha permesso di identificare la presenza degli amministratori di banca negli organi societari delle imprese e studiarne gli effetti sul costo del credito. E’ stato possibile discriminare tra un’ipotesi favorevole (information view) e una sfavorevole (conflitto di interessi). Noi troviamo che le banche rappresentate nel board di un impresa applicano tassi di interesse simili a quelli applicati da banche assenti dal board. Pertanto non abbiamo evidenza di conflitto di interessi. Il secondo lavoro (What’s risk got to do with it ? An analysis of interest rates in the Italian consumer credit market) analizza le determinanti dei tassi di interesse sul credito al consumo delle famiglie. Il risultati dello studio suggeriscono che il potere di mercato delle banche ha un effetto significativo sui tassi di interesse che queste applicano alle famiglie. L’analisi mostra invece un ruolo limitato del rischio: il rapporto sofferenze su prestiti risulta generalmente non significativo e una misura alternativa risulta solo parzialmente migliore. Un approfondimento, basato su regressioni quantili, suggerisce, infine, che una relazione positiva standard tra rischio e tasso sussista solo per la parte inferiore della distribuzione dei tassi e venga meno per la parte sopra la mediana. Nel terzo lavoro (Why is the volume of bank loans low in some countries and high in others? The role of government debt) sono analizzate le determinanti della dimensione dei mercati bancari nei paesi sviluppati. Il contributo principale del lavoro è quello di mostrare il legame inverso tra l’emissione di titoli del debito pubblico e l’offerta di prestiti bancari al settore privato dell’economia. In base all’interpretazione fornita, lo spiazzamento osservato è un effetto della repressione finanziaria attuata dai governi di alcuni paesi per preservare la stabilità finanziaria. Con riferimento all’Italia, le restrizioni attuate attraverso massimali all’offerta di credito delle banche e vincoli all’apertura di sportelli possono aver contenuto l’offerta di finanziamenti al settore privato, da un lato, e incrementato la domanda di titoli domestici come quelli rappresentativi del debito pubblico, dall’altro.The work ‘Essays on Banking in Italy’ consists of three studies conducted in the period 2005-2008. The first and the second study investigate pricing behaviour of banks on loans granted to private sector, i.e. to firms (The Monitoring and certification effects of bankers on industrial boards) and to households (What’s risk got to do with it ? An analysis of interest rates in the Italian consumer credit market) while the third study (Why is the volume of bank loans low in some countries and high in others? The role of government debt) deals with the determinants of the size of business activity in developed countries. In the first research, a database collecting information on board’s composition of a very large number of firms (those registered at the Chamber of Commerce) was matched with other three sources of data, including the Central Credit Register, for the first time to the best of my knowledge. Such a matching allowed us to identify and study effects of bank representation on corporate board, and to discriminate between a beneficial monitoring activity as well as, alternatively, a costly conflict of interest. Our analysis shows that interest rates loans from the bank with a director who is also a director of the borrowing firm are not significantly lower than those charged by other banks. Therefore, we do not find evidence of a conflict of interest effect. In the second research we investigate the determinants of the price of consumer lending in Italy. The results suggest that concentration level exerted a significant influence on pricing conditions while the evidence on the role of risk is less clear. According to results from a quintile regression approach, we may track down a standard relationship between risk and prices only as for the lowest quintiles of the interest rate distribution. As far as interest rates applied by banks above the median prices are concerned, cost of lending seems to be less sensitive to risk. In the third paper we look at the determinants of the size of banking markets in developed countries. The novelty of the paper is to shed a light on the negative linkages between government securities issuance and the amount of credit granted by banks to private sector. We find a crowding–out effect that we interpret as an outcome of financial repression. As well as Italy is concerned, restrictions to financial activity operated through credit ceilings and branch restrictions may have shrunk bank supply of financing to private sector, on the one hand, and artificially channelled bank resources to domestic assets such as the public debt, on the other hand

The certification role of bank directors on;corporate boards

There is a large literature on the effects of the presence of bankers on firms'boards as these bankers may reduce monitoring costs by facilitating information flows between the lender and the borrower, may credibly certify the financial soundness of the firm to other creditors who are not represented in the board and may act as financial experts for the management. At the same time, lending bankers on boards may have a conflict of interests. In this paper, we study the impact of the presence of bankers on firms' boards on interest rates charged to firms. We have two results.;First, as interest rates on loans from the board director's bank and from other banks are very similar we do not find evidence of a conflict of interests effect. Second, we have strong evidence of certification effects played by bank directors as rates charged by all banks on loans to firms with bankers on boards are lower than those charged by all banks to firms without bankers. The certification effect is even stronger if the banker on board has itself loaned to the firm.

What Determines the Size of Bank Loans in Industrialized Countries? The Role of Government Debt

Given the importance of banking intermediation, we investigate the determinants of the size of bank loans in 18 OECD countries in the period 1981-1997. The aim of the paper is to show that the ratio of government debt to GDP has a negative effect on the level of bank credit. Second, countries with a German legal origin have higher ratios of loans to GDP than common law countries. Our results are robust to including such variables in the regressions as per capita GDP, stock market capitalization, the banking reserve requirement, the level of inflation and its volatility, openness to trade and the use of different econometric methods.bank loans, financial repression, government debt, legal origin of finance