Confidence Building in Cyberspace: A Comparison of Territorial and Weapons-Based Regimes

View the Executive SummaryAn analysis of weapons-based confidence-building measures shows how academics can work together to self-police their research for national security implications, socialize new members of the academic community into the importance of considering security issues, and develop and disseminate norms regarding what is and is not a moral and ethical use of these technologies. It may be possible for academics and policymakers to come together to work for a ban or build-down on cyber weapons patterned on international efforts to ban chemical and biological weapons and implement export regimes to control the export of code which may form the components of cyber weapons. If we conceptualize cyberspace as territory, we can also learn from the example of territorially-based confidence-building measures such as those implemented along the Indo-Pakistan border. This approach stresses the importance of developing notification procedures to prevent misperceptions and the escalation spiral, as well as communicating regularly to establish trust between all parties. The case studies presented here illustrate the promises and pitfalls of each approach and offer valuable warnings to policymakers seeking to implement such measures in cyberspace. They show what happens when not everyone in a regime is equally committed to a specific outcome by illustrating the difficulties of monitoring compliance in confidence-building regimes, and show the ways in which doctrines and confidence-building measures may not be perfectly aligned.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1455/thumbnail.jp

Do Fewer Resources Mean Less Influence? A Comparative Historical Case Study of Military Influence in a Time of Austerity

View the Executive SummaryAs military conflicts come to an end, it is not uncommon for societies to expect a “peace dividend” and to engage in elite and popular conversations about how much defense spending is still needed. The issues are similar across countries and time periods: How can defense planners preserve capabilities, avoid the reversibility problem, and plan for the long term? How can they guide the development of technologies and doctrines in a climate of austerity? This manuscript draws lessons from previous historic situations and applies them to today.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1471/thumbnail.jp

Violent Governance, Identity and the Production of Legitimacy: Autodefensas in Latin America

This article examines the intersections of violence, governance, identity and legitimacy in relation to autodefensas (self-defence groups) in Latin America, focusing on Mexico and Colombia. By shifting focus from the question of where legitimacy lies to how it is produced and contested by a range of groups, we challenge the often presumed link between the state and legitimacy. We develop the idea of a field of negotiation and contestation, firstly, to discuss and critique the concept of state failure as not merely a Western hegemonic claim but also a strategic means of producing legitimacy by autodefensas. Secondly, we employ and enrich the notion of violent pluralism to discuss the pervasiveness of violence and the role of neoliberalism, and to address the question of non-violent practices of governance. We argue that the idea of a field of contestation and negotiation helps to understand the complexity of relationships that encompass the production of legitimacy and identity through (non)violent governance, whereby lines between (non)state, (non)violence, and (il)legitimacy blur and transform. Yet, we do not simply dismiss (binary) distinctions as these continue to be employed by groups in their efforts to produce, justify, challenge, contest and negotiate their own and others’ legitimacy and identity

Deterring Cybertrespass and Securing Cyberspace: Lessons from United States Border Control Strategies

Perhaps the best starting point for those looking to “borrow” a deterrent strategy for cyberspace from other fields is not the example of nuclear deterrence but instead the example of United States-Mexican border security. The nuclear deterrent analogy is not the best fit for understanding cyber-deterrence—due to the ways in which rewards and payoffs for would-be attackers in cyberspace are different from those in the nuclear analogy—among other factors. The emphasis here is not on deterrent effects provided by specific weapons but rather on the ways in which human actors understand deterrence and risk in making an attempt to violate a border, and the ways in which security architects can manipulate how would-be aggressors think about these border incursions. This Letort Paper thus borrows from the criminology literature rather than the military-security literature in laying out how individuals may be deterred from committing crimes in real space and in cyberspace through manipulating rewards and punishments. Lessons from attempts at deterring illegal immigration along America’s borders are then presented, with lessons derived from those situations, which are helpful in understanding how to deter incursions in cyberspace.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1296/thumbnail.jp

A Typology of Arguments about Drone Ethics

Many different actors oppose the use of unmanned autonomous weapons (UAV’s) from adversary states, to international governmental organizations to policymakers and academics. However, the basis for their opposition varies, as do the assumptions behind their arguments. This Letort Paper lays out distinctions between arguments about technology, arguments about policy, and arguments about strategy.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1287/thumbnail.jp

Power, autonomy, and adaptation: The reorganization of Russia's ministries, 1985-1995.

This dissertation considers the reorganization which has occurred in Russia's ministries since 1985 and argues that Russia's ministries are in some instances significant actors in Russian politics today. However, there is no single pattern for describing Russian ministerial behavior in the post-Soviet period. Rather, Russia's ministries differ greatly in terms of the amount of power and autonomy which they enjoy. In the first section, I develop a number of indicators for measuring autonomy and present a typology. This typology organizes the ministries according to the differing amounts of autonomy which they presently enjoy vis-a-vis the legislature, the presidency, and the other organs of the executive branch. The rest of the dissertation seeks to explain the puzzle presented in section one, by asking, What resources or strategies have allowed some ministries to gain so much more autonomy than others in the new Russia? Using organization theory, I argue that just as successful corporations have been those which have 're-engineered' themselves to cope with a changing environment where old strategies are no longer effective, the most successful Russian ministries have been those which re-engineered themselves. Using case-study methodology, interviews with ministerial personnel, and newspaper articles, I show that re-engineering involves changing an organization's defined mission, its standard operating procedures, its organizational culture, and sometimes its leadership. In the conclusion to this dissertation, I comment on the relevance of these findings for understanding bureaucratic reorganization in comparative politics in general and in newly democratizing nations in particular.Ph.D.Political scienceSocial SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/130531/2/9732132.pd