NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-RECOVERY FROM OWNER UNDER STATUTE WHEN NO RECOVERY MAY BE HAD AGAINST NEGLIGENT DRIVER

Plaintiff, 12 years old, was injured as a result of his father\u27s negligent operation of an automobile owned by defendant and operated with defendant\u27s consent. In his complaint, plaintiff joined his father and the owner as defendants. There was no allegation that the father was acting as an agent of the owner nor that the owner himself was negligent A demurrer interposed on behalf of both defendants was sustained by the trial court On appeal, held, affirmed. Plaintiff may not maintain an action against the defendant-owner because the owner could recover over against plaintiff\u27s father, the net effect of which would be to allow indirectly a recovery which could not be had directly because of a parent\u27s immunity from such a suit. Ownby v. Kleyhammer, (Tenn. 1952) 250 S.W. (2d) 37

TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX-WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCIDENT OR HEALTH INSURANCE UNDER SECTION 22(b)(5)-

Plaintiff brought this action to recover federal income tax paid by him for the year 1945 on a sum of $1800 which plaintiff received from his employer pursuant to a free sickness benefits plan which plaintiff\u27s employer had in effect, claiming that this amount was excludable from gross income under section 22(b)(5) as amounts received through accident or health insurance. Plaintiff\u27s employer was an insurance company with authority to write health and accident insurance, and free protection was given to all full-time salaried home and branch office employees who could pass a satisfactory medical examination. Many ordinary features of a typical health insurance policy were present except that no premium was paid by the employee. The district court held that the employer was under no contractual liability to pay these benefits because of the lack of consideration for the employer\u27s promise, and that therefore there was no insurance. On appeal, held, reversed, there is adequate consideration present in the agreement of employment, creating a valid and enforceable insurance contract and making the payments to the plaintiff pursuant thereto excludable from gross income under section 22(b)(5). Epmeier v. United States, (7th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 508

Economics of Profitable Southern Pea Production.

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Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - State Statute Requiring Interstate Motor Carrier to Secure a Permit

Petitioner brought an action in an Arkansas state court to enjoin enforcement of a state statute which required all contract carriers using the highways of the state to secure a permit from the state Public Service Commission. The Arkansas Supreme Court found that five driver-owners who had been arrested while transporting petitioner\u27s product in interstate commerce without such a permit were contract carriers within the meaning of the statute. Neither petitioner nor any of the drivers had applied for a state permit. Under the terms of the statute, granting of the permit was contingent on certain factors, such as the financial reliability of the applicant, applicant\u27s sense of responsibility to the public, and the existing and proposed transportation service. Held, four justices dissenting, the requirement of such a permit imposes no undue burden on interstate commence because there was no showing that the state will ever attempt to impose any of the apprehended burdensome conditions as prerequisite to the granting of the permit. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 73 S.Ct. 204 (1952)

Constitutional Law - Due Process - Coerced Confessions and the Stein Case

Stein v. People of State of New York, a coerced confession case decided by the Supreme Court last June, at first suggests some rather startling propositions about the effect of a denial of procedural due process. Since Brown v. Mississippi in 1936 it has been well settled that the admission of a coerced confession into evidence in a state criminal proceeding contravenes the due process guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the confession cases subsequently considered by the Supreme Court it has been consistently held that the admission of an extorted confession vitiates the entire proceeding and renders the conviction void. Moreover, the cases have indicated that where a coerced confession has been used in evidence the conviction must fall even though there is evidence apart from the confession sufficient to sustain the jury\u27s verdict. Indeed, this is in accord with the general constitutional doctrine that a denial of procedural due process is jurisdictional in nature, resulting in a nugatory proceeding irrespective of the weight of evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused. However, the majority of the Court in the Stein case held that even though a coerced confession may have been admitted into evidence, the conviction would be sustained because there was other evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty by the jury. The purpose of this comment is to examine the implications of this decision and to attempt to determine to what extent it overrules well-settled constitutional principles

Torts - Child\u27s Right to Recover for Alienation of Parent\u27s Affection

Plaintiff\u27s parents were divorced in 1934 when plaintiff was five years old. Custody of plaintiff was awarded to her mother, but plaintiff alleged that she received usual paternal love, affection, maintenance, and support from her father until 1941, when plaintiff\u27s father took defendant as his mistress, keeping her until his death in 1952. Plaintiff brought this action for damages on the theory that defendant alienated the affections of her father, thereby depriving plaintiff of fatherly affection, guidance and support. Defendant\u27s demurrer was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, held, reversed. In the absence of a statute, a child has no cause of action against a third party for the alienation of the affections of its parent. Scholberg v. Itnyre, (Wis. 1953) 58 N.W. (2d) 698

The relevance of positivity in spin physics

Positivity reduces substantially the allowed domain for spin observables. We briefly recall some methods used to determine these domains and give some typical examples for exclusive and inclusive spin-dependent reactions.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures, Talk presented at CIPANP 2009, San Diego California, USA, May 26-31, 2009 To be published in AIP Conference Proceeding

GENETIC CONTROL OF THE ANTIBODY RESPONSE IN INBRED MICE : TRANSFER OF RESPONSE BY SPLEEN CELLS AND LINKAGE TO THE MAJOR HISTOCOMPATIBILITY (H-2) LOCUS

The transfer of spleen cells from (C3H x C57Bl/6) F1 mice, capable of responding to (T,G)-A--L, into irradiated C3H parental recipients, normally incapable of responding to (T,G)-A--L, transfers the ability to make either a primary or secondary immune response to this synthetic polypeptide antigen. This localizes the genetic control of the ability to respond to the spleen cell population and indicates that the genetic control is exerted upon a process directly related to antibody formation. Studies with congenic strains of mice and linkage studies in segregating backcross populations show that the ability to respond to (T,G)-A--L and (H,G)-A--L is linked to the H-2 locus and can thus be localized to the IXth mouse linkage group. Note Added in Proof: Of the three possible recombinant animals noted in Tables IV and V, two were infertile. The third animal was not a recombinant, since progeny testing and reimmunization showed that this animal was an H-22/H-2k heterozygote capable of responding well to (T,G)-A--L