Volunteering and the State

This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individual’s decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individual’s engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals’ willingness to volunteer.Volunteering, voluntary labor supply, private provision of public goods, public social expenditure, political consensus, democratization

Coasian payments for agricultural external benefits - an empirical cross-section analysis

This paper deals with a cross section analysis of local compensation payments to farmers for their provision of landscape amenities in alpine tourist communities. These payments can be interpreted as the outcomes of Coasian negotiations. Based on Austrian data we empirically identify the underlying determinants of the negotiating process. The probability for a positive negotiation outcome depends on politico-economic factors such as municipal revenues per resident and the share of votes for distinct parties in parliamentary elections. Whereas benefits associated with landscape amenities also play an important role transaction costs of bargaining are of minor relevance. If the variety of the countryside seems to be endangered tourist communities start compensating their farmers for landscape-enhancing activities. Local subsidy schemes supplement European Union and national policies in support of rural areas as they internalize positive agricultural externalities.Coase Theorem; Coasian payments; external benefits of agriculture; landscape-enhancing agricultural services

Volunteering and the State

This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individual's decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individual's engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals’ willingness to volunteer.volunteering, voluntary labor supply, private provision of public goods, public social expenditure, political consensus, democratization

Full- & Reduced-Order State-Space Modeling of Wind Turbine Systems with Permanent-Magnet Synchronous Generator

Wind energy is an integral part of nowadays energy supply and one of the fastest growing sources of electricity in the world today. Accurate models for wind energy conversion systems (WECSs) are of key interest for the analysis and control design of present and future energy systems. Existing control-oriented WECSs models are subject to unstructured simplifications, which have not been discussed in literature so far. Thus, this technical note presents are thorough derivation of a physical state-space model for permanent magnet synchronous generator WECSs. The physical model considers all dynamic effects that significantly influence the system's power output, including the switching of the power electronics. Alternatively, the model is formulated in the $(a,b,c)$- and $(d,q)$-reference frame. Secondly, a complete control and operation management system for the wind regimes II and III and the transition between the regimes is presented. The control takes practical effects such as input saturation and integral windup into account. Thirdly, by a structured model reduction procedure, two state-space models of WECS with reduced complexity are derived: a non-switching model and a non-switching reduced-order model. The validity of the models is illustrated and compared through a numerical simulation study.Comment: 23 pages, 11 figure

The fallacy of the Good Samaritan: Volunteering as a weird way of making money

This paper explores individual motives for volunteering: The analysis is based on the interpretation of volunteering as a consumption good (consumption model) or as a mean to increase individual’s own human capital (investment model). We present an econometric framework taking into account self selection into volunteering and simultaneity between the volunteering decision and the determination of income in order to test these two models and to identify the underlying motives. We find strong statistical evidence for the investment model with a highly robust and significant impact of volunteering on the wage rate. On average the wage premium as the difference in the wage rate between one person volunteering and not volunteering amounts up to 15.7 percent. Within the framework of the investment model it turns out that the number of volunteering hours plays a major role in explaining this wage premium. This supports the idea of volunteering as a mean to accumulate human capital and signalling willingness to perform. As far as the consumption model is concerned we find no convincing statistical evidence for its validity. The strong evidence for the investment model requires the consideration of voluntary activities in the estimation of wage equations. Moreover, we conclude that the existence of the wage premium is a decisive factor for people to volunteer or not and therefore reflects an important argument in the recruitment process of volunteers for several organisations.volunteering; voluntary labour supply; human capital accumulation; wage premium; altruism.

Volunteering and the State

This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individuals decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individuals engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals willingness to volunteer

The Effectiveness of Health Screening

Using a matched insurant-general practitioner panel data set, we estimated the effect of a general health-screening program on individuals’ health status and health care cost. To account for selection into treatment, we used regional variations in the intensity of exposure to supply-determined screening recommendations as an instrumental variable. We found that screening participation substantially increased inpatient and outpatient health care costs for up to two years after treatment. In the medium term, we found cost savings in the outpatient sector, whereas in the long run, no statistically significant effects of screening on either health care cost component could be discerned. In summary, screening participation increases health care costs. Since we did not find any statistically significant effect of screening participation on insurants’ health status at any point in time, we do not recommend a general health-screening program. However, given that we found some evidence for cost-saving potentials for the sub-sample of younger insurants, we suggest more targeted screening programs.Health screening, health care costs, sick leave, mortality

The Effectiveness of Health Screening

Using a matched insurant-general practitioner panel data set, we estimated the effect of a general health-screening program on individuals’ health status and health care cost. To account for selection into treatment, we used regional variations in the intensity of exposure to supply-determined screening recommendations as an instrumental variable. We found that screening participation substantially increased inpatient and outpatient health care costs for up to two years after treatment. In the medium term, we found cost savings in the outpatient sector, whereas in the long run, no statistically significant effects of screening on either health care cost component could be discerned. In summary, screening participation increases health care costs. Since we did not find any statistically significant effect of screening participation on insurants’ health status at any point in time, we do not recommend a general health-screening program. However, given that we found some evidence for cost-saving potentials for the sub-sample of younger insurants, we suggest more targeted screening programs.Health screening, health care costs, sick leave, mortality

The effectiveness of health screening

Using a matched insurant-general practitioner panel data set, we estimated the effect of a general health-screening program on individuals' health status and health care cost. To account for selection into treatment, we used regional variations in the intensity of exposure to supply-determined screening recommendations as an instrumental variable. We found that screening participation substantially increased inpatient and outpatient health care costs for up to two years after treatment. In the medium term, we found cost savings in the outpatient sector, whereas in the long run, no statistically significant effects of screening on either health care cost component could be discerned. In summary, screening participation increases health care costs. Since we did not find any statistically significant effect of screening participation on insurants' health status at any point in time, we do not recommend a general health-screening program. However, given that we found some evidence for cost-saving potentials for the sub-sample of younger insurants, we suggest more targeted screening programs