Bank Capital, Liquidity and Systemic Risk

We analyze the impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank insolvency and aggregate investment. We develop a model of the banking system that is characterized by the interaction of many heterogeneous banks with the real sector, interbank credit relations as a consequence of bank liquidity management and an insolvency mechanism. This allows us to study the impact of capital adequacy regulation on systemic risk. In particular we can analyze the impact of regulation on contagious defaults arising from mutual credit relations. We show that the impact of capital adequacy on systemic stability is ambiguous and that systemic risk might actually increase as a consequence of imposing capital constraints on banks. Furthermore we analyze the indirect consequences of capital adequacy regulation that are transmitted to the real economy by their impact on equilibrium interbank rates and thus the opportunity costs of liquidity within the banking system.

Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment

We propose a new method for the analysis of systemic stability of a banking system relying mostly on market data. We model both asset correlations and interlinkages from interbank borrowing so that our analysis gauges two major sources of systemic risk: correlated exposures and mutual credit relations that may cause domino effects of insolvencies. We apply our method to a data set of the ten major UK banks and analyze insolvency risk over a one-year horizon. We also suggest a stress-testing procedure by analyzing the conditional asset return distribution that results from the hypothetical failure of individual institutions in this system. Rather than looking at individual bank defaults ceteris paribus, we take the change in the asset return distribution and the resulting change in the risk of all other banks into account. This takes previous stress tests of interlinkages a substantial step further.Systemic Risk; Financial Stability; Stress Testing; Interbank Market

The Financial System in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland after a Decade of Transition

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (CEEC-3) have undertaken substantial efforts to build a new financial system under the constraints of their legacies from central planning. In this study, first we look at the banking sector. Then we give a description of bond and stock markets. These topics are complemented by an analysis of the structure of funding for the private and public sector, of the financial sector's vulnerability and of the legal conditions for external finance as well as for banking supervision. We find that the financial sector and financial intermediation are internationally integrated already to a large extent. This implies, inter alia, a non-negligible exposure of the corporate sector to exchange rate risk. While funding via equity markets remained modest, local currencydenominated debt issues are important for public financing. Our analysis shows that the legal, supervisory and regulatory infrastructure of the financial system is formally well developed, but suffers from enforcement problems. -- Polen, die Tschechische Republik und Ungarn unternahmen, ausgehend vom Erbe der zentralen Planwirtschaft, substanzielle Anstrengungen zur Errichtung neuer Finanzsysteme. Aufbauend auf einer Untersuchung des Bankensektors sowie der Kapitalmärkte erfolgt eine Analyse der Finanzierungsstruktur des privaten und des öffentlichen Sektors, der Krisenanfälligkeit des Finanzsektors sowie der rechtlichen Regelungen für externe Unternehmensfinanzierung und Bankenaufsicht. Finanzsektoren und -intermediation sind bereits in hohem Maße international integriert. Dies impliziert u.a., dass der Unternehmenssektor einem beachtlichen Wechselkursrisiko ausgesetzt ist. Während die Finanzierung über den Aktienmarkt gering ist, sind in nationaler Währung denominierte Schuldtitel für die Finanzierung des öffentlichen Sektors wichtig. Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass der rechtliche und aufsichtsrechtliche Rahmen der Finanzsysteme formal gut entwickelt ist. Es gibt jedoch Mängel bei der praktischen Umsetzung dieser Standards.Financial System in Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland,Financial Sector Transition,Transition Economics

Bank capital, liquidity and systemic risk

We analyze the impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank insolvency and aggregate investment. We develop a model of the banking system that is characterized by the interaction of many heterogeneous banks with the real sector, interbank credit relations as a consequence of bank liquidity management and an insolvency mechanism. This allows us to study the impact of capital adequacy regulation on systemic risk. In particular we can analyze the impact of regulation on contagious defaults arising from mutual credit relations. We show that the impact of capital adequacy on systemic stability is ambiguous and that systemic risk might actually increase as a consequence of imposing capital constraints on banks. Furthermore we analyze the indirect consequences of capital adequacy regulation that are transmitted to the real economy by their impact on equilibrium interbank rates and thus the opportunity costs of liquidity within the banking system

Financial System Transition in Central Europe: The First Decade

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (CEEC-3) have undertaken substantial efforts to build a new financial system under the constraints of their legacies from central planning. In this study, first we look at the banking sector. Then we give a description of bond and stock markets. These topics are complemented by an analysis of the structure of funding for the private and public sector, of the financial sector’s vulnerability and of the legal conditions for external finance as well as for banking supervision. We find that the financial sector and financial intermediation are internationally integrated already to a large extent. This implies, inter alia, a non-negligible exposure of the corporate sector to exchange rate risk. While funding via equity markets remained modest, local currency-denominated debt issues are important for public financing. Our analysis shows that the legal, supervisory and regulatory infrastructure of the financial system is formally well developed, but suffers from enforcement problems.

Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment

We propose a new method for the analysis of systemic stability of a banking system relying mostly on market data. We model both asset correlations and interlinkages from interbank borrowing so that our analysis gauges two major sources of systemic risk: correlated exposures and mutual credit relations that may cause domino effects of insolvencies. We apply our method to a data set of the ten major UK banks and analyze insolvency risk over a one-year horizon. We also suggest a stress-testing procedure by analyzing the conditional asset return distribution that results from the hypothetical failure of individual institutions in this system. Rather than looking at individual bank defaults ceteris paribus, we take the change in the asset return distribution and the resulting change in the risk of all other banks into account. This takes previous stress tests of interlinkages a substantial step further

Initial test results from the RedFlow 5 kW, 10 kWh zinc-bromide module, phase 1.

In this paper the performance results of the RedFlow zinc-bromide module (ZBM) Gen 2.0 are reported for Phase 1 of testing, which includes initial characterization of the module. This included physical measurement, efficiency as a function of charge and discharge rates, efficiency as a function of maximum charge capacity, duration of maximum power supplied, and limited cycling with skipped strip cycles. The goal of this first phase of testing was to verify manufacturer specifications of the zinc-bromide flow battery. Initial characterization tests have shown that the ZBM meets the manufacturer's specifications. Further testing, including testing as a function of temperature and life cycle testing, will be carried out during Phase 2 of the testing, and these results will be issued in the final report, after Phase 2 testing has concluded