Building a Tower of Babel? Integrating Core Motivations and Features of Social Structure into the Political Psychology of Political Action

The political psychology of political action provides the potential for building bridges between scholars from different fields. The main aim of this article is to set some baby steps toward building two conceptual bridges by bringing together a core motivation approach to political action with core features of the social structure that embeds those core motivations. The first conceptual bridge relies on considering a broader motivational model than provided by rational actor or social identity approaches, whereas the second bridge relies on considering core features of the social structure as potentiating these core motivations for political action. More specifically, I first discuss definitions of political action. Second, I identify four converging themes across different literatures on collective action, social movement participation, and voting turnout, resulting in a taxonomy of core motivations for political action (i.e., personal or group-based identity, efficacy, emotion, and moral motivations). Third, in a more explorative fashion I identify four core features of the social structure (ingroup, outgroup, interpersonal network, and institutional features), which I tentatively connect with the taxonomy of core motivations. Finally, I discuss the theoretical, empirical, and practical implications of this generalist, generative, and integrative perspective on political action.</p

Toward an Integrative Perspective on Distinct Positive Emotions for Political Action:Analyzing, Comparing, Evaluating, and Synthesizing Three Theoretical Perspectives

Which emotions explain why people engage in political action (e.g., voting, protesting)? To answer this question, theory and research in psychology and political science predominantly focused on distinct negative emotions such as anger. The current article conceptually explores the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions by developing an integrative perspective that specifies which positive emotions can be differentiated (i.e., their form), which function these emotions have, and which implications these have for explaining political action. To this end, I analyze, compare, evaluate, and synthesize three approaches to positive emotions (affective intelligence theory, appraisal theories of emotion, and broaden-and-build theory). This perspective generates new hypotheses for the field to test, including the role played by distinct positive emotions such as joy, inspiration, interest, hope, and pride in motivating political action. I discuss how this perspective may help restore a balance in research on emotions and political action by focusing on the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions

Toward a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in collective action:A quantitative research synthesis of four motivations and structural constraints

Sociopsychological theorizing and research on collective action (e.g., social protests) has mushroomed over the last decade, studying a wide variety of groups, contexts, and cultures. Through a quantitative research synthesis of four motivations for collective action (1,235 effects from 403 samples; total N = 123,707), we summarize and synthesize this body of research into the dual chamber model, a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of collective action. We aim to replicate previous meta-analytic conclusions (about identity, injustice, and efficacy) and break new theoretical ground by (a) integrating a fourth motivation (morality) into the very heart of the psychology of collective action, (b) extending these four motivations to advantaged group members acting in solidarity with the disadvantaged, and (c) integrating theoretically relevant structural (i.e., cultural and other contextual) constraints. Results substantiated the dual chamber model as all four motivations yielded unique, positive, medium-sized effects and interrelationships were positive (particularly among morality and identity, conceptualized as the dual chambers of the protester’s beating heart). Meta-analytic structural equation modeling supported the added value of including morality. Moreover, findings confirmed that the strongest specific motivations were emotional injustice and politicized identification, while newly adding moral conviction to that list. Finally, the four motivations extended to advantaged group members acting in solidarity with the disadvantaged, while only the identity motivation was constrained by theoretically relevant cultural dimensions and values (e.g., collectivism and hierarchy). We discuss the implications and limitations of the dual chamber model for integrative theorizing, innovative research, and the practice of collective action

Protesting to protect "us" and/or "them"? Explaining why members of third groups are willing to engage in collective action

In three studies we test whether three key predictors of collective action (i.e., group identification, anger, and efficacy) also predict whether and how members of third groups are willing to undertake collective action. Little is known about this, particularly about whether and how third-group members may engage in collective action to protect their own group and/or to protect an outgroup in need. In three studies that employed different three-group contexts, we found that the three predictors contributed to third-group members' collective action intentions aimed at protecting the ingroup as well as those aimed at protecting the outgroup. Study 1 found this among Latvians (N = 89) in response to the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory; Study 2 found this among residents of a Dutch village (N = 98) located nearby a gas-extraction-related earthquake region, in response to authorities' inadequate protection of the residents of that region; and Study 3 found this among Latino Americans (N = 278) in response to police brutality against Black Americans. Moving beyond replication and application of previous work, our set of studies show first evidence for ingroup and outgroup protection as motives of third-group members' collective action. We discuss the implications of our findings for the broader social psychology of collective action literature

The Polish Round Table as a blueprint for “successful” social change?

The Polish Round Table offers a rare historical example where negotiations between representatives of opposing political sides achieved major political transformation in a peaceful way. Such an outcome should undoubtedly be labeled a success. However, in our commentary, taking the example of the Polish Round Table, we take a critical look at the interpretation of success of social movements by social scientists. In line with the ethos of social sciences, social scientists value (harmoniously achieved) progressive types of change, such as the change that followed the negotiations of the Polish Round Table. Indeed, when it comes to the Round Table, our definition of success may be blurred by the political evaluation of the changes of 1989 from a liberal perspective. The target articles point out the importance of specific structural conditions (both internal and international) and psychological processes (perceptions of power, efficacy and moral commitment) that led to the successful outcome. We therefore argue that it is pivotal to delineate the conditions of success, if we want to apply them to other contexts without bias. Neither hindsight, nor liberal bias are problematic per se, but they can evoke a form of wishful thinking that, as scientists, we may want to treat with some skepticism

Intergroup contact and collective action:A match made in hell, or in heaven?

ince Wright and Lubensky (2009) suggested that intergroup contact and collective action seem strategically incompatible when it comes to social change, social psychologists have been inclined to see their potential match as one made in hell, rather than in heaven. Against this backdrop, I review and discuss the contributions to this special issue, most of which seem to suggest that intergroup contact and collective action are a match made in heaven, not hell. To account for these seemingly divergent perspectives, I suggest that both intergroup contact and collective action be conceptualized as relational, interaction‐based phenomena within which the forces of harmony and conflict—intergroup contact and collective action, respectively—reflect two sides of the same coin, namely individuals’ need to regulate their relationships within their social network. As such, it is individuals’ embeddedness in (networks of) social relationships that determines whether intergroup contact and collective action work together, or against each other, toward social change. I discuss the need for a broader and integrative theoretical perspective that does justice to the underlying psychology of these phenomena in terms of relationship regulation

Attitude Moralization Within Polarized Contexts:An Emotional Value-Protective Response to Dyadic Harm Cues

Polarization about societal issues involves attitudinal conflict, but we know little about how such conflict transforms into moral conflict. Integrating insights on polarization and psychological value protection, we propose a model that predicts when and how attitude moralization (i.e., when attitudes become grounded in core values) may be triggered and develops within polarized contexts. We tested this model in three experiments (total N = 823) in the context of the polarized Zwarte Piet (blackface) debate in the Netherlands. Specifically, we tested the hypotheses that (a) situational cues to dyadic harm in this context (i.e., an outgroup that is perceived as intentionally inflicting harm onto innocent victims) trigger individuals to moralize their relevant attitude, because of (b) emotional value-protective responses. Findings supported both hypotheses across different regional contexts, suggesting that attitude moralization can emerge within polarized contexts when people are exposed to actions by attitudinal opponents perceived as causing dyadic harm

On conviction's collective consequences:Integrating moral conviction with the social identity model of collective action

This article examines whether and how moral convictions predict collective action to achieve social change. Because moral convictions defined as strong and absolute stances on moral issues tolerate no exceptions, any violation motivates individuals to actively change that situation. We propose that moral convictions have a special relationship with politicized identities and collective action because of the potentially strong normative fit between moral convictions and the action-oriented content of politicized identities. This effectively integrates moral conviction with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), which predicts that, on the basis of a relevant social identity, group-based anger and efficacy predict collective action. Results from two studies indeed showed that moral convictions predicted collective action intentions (Study 12) and collective action (Study 2) through politicized identification, group-based anger, and group efficacy. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our integrative model

The return of moral motivation in predicting collective action against collective disadvantage

The social psychology of collective action against collective disadvantage has hitherto underspecified, not to say neglected, the profound power of moral motivations. This is particularly important because moral motivations can unite disadvantaged and advantaged group members to fight for a joint cause (e. g., civil rights). After a brief review of the literature on collective action and moral motivation, we propose that moral convictions, defined as strong and absolute stances on moralised issues, represent an essential part of moral motivation. Hence, any violation of a moral conviction motivates individuals to change the situation. Because this motivation leads to identification with the relevant group, it effectively integrates moral conviction with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). This model suggests that a relevant social identity is the psychological basis for undertaking collective action motivated by group identification, group-based anger, and group efficacy. Our approach thus explains how seemingly individualistic moral convictions can have collective consequences