Cooperazione e competizione nello sfruttamento di una risorsa rinnovabile

In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. Agents aren't assumed to be divided into the two groups from the beginning; by solving the static game we obtained the best response function of i-th player without making other agents positions. Then, the Nash equilibria we calculated point out how different strategies - all the players cooperate, all the players compete or players can be divided into cooperators and defectors - can coexist.Resource Exploitation, Game theory

Determinazione di strategie nello sfruttamento di una risorsa rinnovabile

In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. The model provide for one utility function which can be used for every kind of player. Agents aren't assumed to be divided into the two groups from the beginning; by solving the static game we obtained the best response function of i-th player without making other agents positions. Then, the Nash equilibria we calculated point out how different strategies - all the players cooperate, all the players compete or players can be divided into cooperators and defectors - can coexist. In any case we have analyzed, it's possible to observe how the total harvest depend on renewable resource stock, and how it influences agents' positions. Keywords Resource Exploitation, Game Theory

Fondamenti di Matematica

Il capitolo propone un'ampia rivisitazione dei diversi argomenti di analisi matematica ed elementi di costruzione di algoritmi e calcolo computazionale necessari nella formazione di colui che si occupa di big data

Competition and Cooperation in a dynamical model of natural resources.

In this paper, we propose a model describing the commercial exploitation of a common renewable resource by a population of strategically interacting agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the payoff of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. The partition of the players into two groups, defectors and cooperators, results from the players’ choices, so it is not predetermined. This partition is decided as a Nash equilibrium of a static game. It is shown that different types of players can exist in an equilibrium; more precisely, depending on the parameter values such as resource stock, cost, and so on, there might be equilibria only with defectors, cooperators, or with a combination of cooperators and defectors. In any case the total harvest depends on the renewable resource stock, so it influences agents’ positions. It is assumed that at each time period the agents harvest according to Nash equilibrium, which can be combined with a dynamic model describing the evolution of fish population. A complete analysis of the equilibria is presented and their stability is analysed. The effect of the different Nash equilibria on the stability of the fish stock, showing that full cooperation is the most stable case, is examined. Key Words: Nash equilibria, resource exploitation, population dynamics

Sharing R&D Investments in International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

This paper studies the coalition formation and the stability of the International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in a pollution abatement dynamic model. We point out two meaningful aspects of this topic. Firstly, we consider asymmetry among countries, dividing them into two types: developed countries with a considerable environmental awareness and developing ones that pay less attention to environmental preservation. In addition, the former have a high-technology industry that allows for a unit abatement cost lower than the latter, and that are characterized by a labour-intensive industrial structure. Secondly, we introduce a positive externality in the cooperation by considering the R&D investment as two costs, namely the research investment and the developing cost. We assume that countries can coordinate their R&D activities by sharing their fixed research investments in order to avoid duplication of green activities. Moreover, by collaborating developing efforts, cooperators benefit from a reduction of a unit abatement cost higher than defectors. On the other hand, although non-cooperators completely support R&D investments for clean technologies, they realize lower abatements and benefits of a spillover effect due to development investments realized by cooperators. These two aspects could encourage the formation of stable coalitions

Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach

Groundwater is a common resource that has been wasted for years. Today, we pay the consequences of such inappropriate exploitation and we are aware that it is necessary to realize policies in order to guarantee the use of this resource for future generations. In fact, the irrational exploitation of water by agents, nevertheless it is a renewable resource, may cause its exhaustion. In our paper, we develop a differential game to determine the efficient extraction of groundwater resource among overlapping generations. We consider intragenerational as well as intergenerational competition between extractors that exploit the resource in different time intervals, and so the horizons of the players in the game are asynchronous. Feedback equilibria have been computed in order to determine the optimal extraction rate of “young” and “old” agents that coexist in the economy. The effects of the withdrawal by several generations are numerically and graphically analyzed in order to obtain results on the efficiency of the groundwater resource